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COMES NOW Plaintiffs, George Martin and Martin Custom Homes, LLC, by
George Martin, through counsel, and file this Memorandum in Response to Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment, and in support thereof states as follows:
PRELIMINARY MATTERS
1.

The District Court for the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for

Camas County, in Case No. CV-07-24, has made findings of fact, conclusions of law and
orders regarding the litigation between the parties hereto, which are all attached hereto
and made a part hereof, and which have binding and controlling precedent on issues
pending before this Court. Plaintiffs hereby request this Court to take judicial notice of
same, and offer each said order, marked as Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 into evidence. These
rulings by the State Court have a binding and preclusive affect on the determinations
before this Court as "law of the case". Defendants are collaterally estopped from relitigating the facts and issues determined therein. Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of
Agriculture, 478 F.3d 985,1007 (9th Cir. 2007)
INTRODUCTION
2.

Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. I.R.c.P. 56(c).
The district court, and this Court on appeal, must liberally construe the facts in the
existing record in favor of the party opposing the motion, who is also to be given the
benetIt of all reasonable inferences drawn from those facts Student Loan Fund of Idaho,
Inc. v. Pavette County, 125 Idaho 824, 827-28 (Ct. App. 1994) citing, Doe v. Durtschi.
110 Idaho 466, 469, 716 P.2d 1238, 1241 (1986); Smith v. Idaho State Univ. Fed Credit
Union, 103 Idaho 245, 646 P.2d 10 16 (Ct.App.1982).
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RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY
3.

The matter pending before this Court has a convoluted procedural history, both

administrative and judicial. (Procedural history provided by Exhibits 1-3, prior Court
Orders.) The Camas County Board of Commissioners, (hereinafter referred to as the
"Board") in late 2005 instructed the Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission
(hereinafter referred to as the "P&Z" or "Commission") to amend the zoning ordinance
and rezone certain areas of Camas County.
4.

The P&Z held meetings and hearings and eventually submitted an Amended

Comprehensive Plan with amended Land Use Map and an Amended Zoning Ordinance
and amended Zoning Map to the Board.

Notably P&Z did not submit any written

findings.
5.

Thereafter the Board adopted, on May 25, 2006, as Resolution 96, an amended

Comprehensive Plan, (amended again on March 29, 2007); on March 29, 2007, as
Ordinance #150, an amended Zoning Designation Map; and on April 18, 2007, as
Ordinance #153, an amended Zoning Ordinance.
6.

On or about May 4,2007 Plaintiffs filed in this Court, under Case No. CV-07-24,

their Petition seeking a declaration that the Camas County Comprehensive Plan adopted
as Resolution 96, and the Camas County Zoning Ordinance and Zoning Map adopted as
Ordinance numbers 150 and 153 were all and each of them invalid, null and void as
violative of the substantive and procedural requirements of Idaho's Local Land Use
Planning Act.
7.

The basis of challenge against the 2006-2007 Comprehensive Plan, Land Use Map,

Zoning Ordinance and Zoning Designation Map included vruious procedural and
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substantive failures to comply with LLUPA and due process of law, including, but not
limited to; failure to maintain a reviewable record; inadequate legal notice of Public Hearing
violations; conflicts of interest, and failure to comply with the substantive dictates of
LLUPA.
8.

The Court agreed with Plaintiffs and issued Preliminary Injunctions against

Defendants on December 28, 2007 and then again on April 2, 2008, finding that an
inadequate record had been maintained, and that the chair of the Planning and Zoning
Commission, Ed Smith, and the chair of the Board of County Commissioners, Ken
Backstrom, had proceeded despite unlawful conflicts of interest. (Decisions attached
hereto and made a part hereof)
9.

In reaction to the above referenced Court Orders, Defendant, Camas County on or

about May 12, 2008, by Resolutions 114 and 115, illegally adopted a new Amended
Comprehensive Plan and Land Use Map. On that same date, by Ordinance Nos. 157 and
159 the Camas County Board of Commissioners, adopted a new amended Zoning
Ordinance and Zoning Designation Map. (See attached Exhibits for 2008 zomng
amendment re-enactments)
10.

Plaintiffs in tum sought leave of Court to amend its Petition to include a request for

Declaratory Judgment relating to these "2008 Amendments" which Motion languished
while the parties attempted settlement negotiations, final evidentiary hearing of August 20,
2008 and thereafter awaiting the Court's ruling, during the several month period when the
declaratory judgment matter, and motion for leave were under advisement.
11.

Plaintiffs, in addition to the above referenced Motion to File Amended Petition, on

May 20,2008, during an evidentiary hearing submitted in open court Plaintiffs Application
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for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary InjlU1ction and Declaratory Relief, all
addressed to seeking immediate judicial review of the 2008 amendments. (See Exhibit 25)
12.

While the declaratory judgment action was under advisement, on or about

October 8, 2008, the Court issued its order on Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File
Amended Petition by Adding Two Additional Causes of Action, namely actions for
damages lU1der Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, which motion had been filed prior
to the conclusion oftrial.
13.

On October 15, 2008, within one week of the Court's ruling refusing to allow

amendment of the Petition in the original action to allow litigation regarding validity of
the 2008 amendments, Plaintiffs filed the instant action by Complaint for Declaratory
Judgment.
14.

On or about November 5, 2008 Defendant Camas County, and the individual

defendant's Backstrom, Davis, and Chapman filed Notice of Removal to Idaho Federal
District Court.
15.

On December 3, 2008 this Fifth Judicial District Court for the State of Idaho,

County of Camas, issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Following
Trial granting all relief requested by Plaintiffs, adjudging" (1) The amendments to the
Comp Plan adopted May 25, 2006 and March 29 2007, as Resolution 96 are null and
void. (2) The amendments to the Camas County Zoning Ordinance, adopted April 18,
2007, as Ordinance #153, and the Zoning Designation Map adopted March 29,2007 as
Ordinance # 150 are all, and each of them, null and void."
16.

On or about February 11, 2009 Defendants filed the Motion for Summary

Judgment now before the Court.
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17.

The Federal District Court, on March 17, 2009, issued its Order granting

Plaintiffs Motion to Remand. (Order of the United States District Court for The District
of Idaho attached hereto.)
IDENTIFICATION OF ISSUES
18.

This Honorable Court, in its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Application

for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction found Plaintiff was not
likely to succeed on the merits of his cause of action. The Court concluded that the
Defendants' conduct in adopting the 2008 amendments was legislative, rather the quasijudicial. Therefore, this Court concluded that "plaintiff would have to prove that the
Board either (l) failed to comply with the notice and hearing requirements on

I.e.

sections 67-6509 & 67-6511 or (2) that the County acted arbitrarily or capriciously in its
repeal of the prior plan and ordinance and its adoption of the 2008 plan and ordinance."
Furthermore, this Court concluded that Plaintiff had yet to establish standing, by proof of
a "distinct palpable injury .... fairly traceable causal connection bctween the claimed
injury and the challenged conduct."
Not surprisingly Counsel for Defendants in his Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment tracks these conclusions with his arguments, that Plaintiffs lack
standing; that the Board's 2008 amendments were legislative and not quasi-judicial, and
therefore subject to constitutional attack only for an arbitrary abuse of authority, which
they argue is not the case here. It is understandable how an initial cursory review of the
case law could easily lead to these conclusions.
However, a complete understanding of the facts of this case and the entire
development of the law makes clear that Mr. Martin has suffered particularized harm,
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fairly traceable to the Boards actions; that the Board's 2008 amendments are quasljudicial, not legislative, in character giving rise to heightened due process; and the
Board's actions in adopting the 2008 amendments violate both procedural and
substantive requirements of the Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA) and
constitutional guarantees.

Alternatively, even if this Court cannot find the Board's

actions in adopting an amended zoning ordinance, thereby rezoning Plaintiffs'
neighboring properties, thereby reducing the economic value of plaintiffs' property, are
entitled to quasi-judicial due process scrutiny, then the Board's actions were arbitrary and
capricious and in violation of the notice and hearing provisions of I.C. sections 67-6509
& 67-6511.

The legal issues, and sub-issues, before this court, in order of analysis are as follows;
(a) Whether Plaintiffs have standing to challenge Defendants' actions in adoption
of the 2008 amendments?
a. Whether one's own property must be the subject of one's O\vn
application for rezone to obtain standing?
(b) Whether Defendants' actions in adoption of the 2008 amendments were quasijudicial or legislative or stated alternatively, what level of due process scrutiny
is due Plaintiff under the facts presented?
a. Whether a rezone application must be that of a non-government
employee property owner to confer quasi-judicial status?
b. Whether a rezone application must be for a single parcel to confer
quasi judicial status?
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c. Whether a rezone application generated by members of the Board
directed at many parcels of property, including parcels owned by
members of Board and Commission require heightened due process?
(c) Whether genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether LLUPA
procedural and substantive requirements have been met by Defendants?
CONTESTED FACTS
19.

In its statement of material facts, and by affidavits of Dwight Butlin and Ken

Backstrom, in a general way, Defendants assert that the procedural and substantive
requirements of LLUPA have been met.

However the allegations made by verified

Petition, restated herein, and reiterated in the attached affidavits and supported by the
attached documentary evidence have not been directly challenged. It must also again be
noted the above referenced Comprehensive Plan, Land Use Map, Zoning Ordinance and
Zoning Designation Map were adopted by Defendant, Camas County, in an abbreviated
process whereby the entire "deliberative process" by the Planning and Zoning
Commission and Board of Commissioners occurred in mere minutes without any actual
analysis of the substantive dictates of LLUPA, nor was the taint of conflict of interest in
anyway removed.
(a) This Court has previously issued no less than four (4) orders concluding that
Plaintiffs' have standing to challenge Defendants' rezoning of property he
owns, has a contractual interest in, and neighboring properties.
(b) George Martin is a real estate professional who acquired interest in Camas
County real property with the specific intention of development, based upon
the land use designation and zoning then present on the property in which he
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acquired an interest AND the land use designation and zoning then present on
neighboring properties and throughout the County.
(c) Defendants' actions in adopting the 2008 amendments were amendments of a
pre-existing zoning schematic in Camas County.
(d) Discrete and individual parcels of real property, each holding property rights
in said zoning, were either altered or affected by alteration of neighboring
property by virtue of the rezone.
(e) The permitted zoned use of Plaintiffs' property and that of surrounding
properties were changed as a result of the 2008 amendments.
(f) Plaintiffs challenge the validity of the 2008 amendments because they were

illegally adopted. (See McCuskey v. Canyon County, 123 Idaho 657 851 P.2d
953) The basis of Plaintiffs' claim is not that Defendants made the wrong
zoning decision, but that the enactment of the 2008 amendments did not
comply with LLUPA.
(g) Defendants failed to comply with notice and hearing requirements of I.C. 676509 and 67-6511 in the following respects;
I.

No summary of the proposed amendments was published. (See
legal notice of public hearing attached hereto - citation Jerome
County v. Halloway, 118 Idaho 681)

n. Notice of public hearing was not provided to all political
subdivisions

providing

services

within

the

planning

jurisdiction, specifically the City of Fairfield and West Magic
Fire District
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Deficiencies under I.C. Section 67-6511 and Camas County No.
142 in providing additional or alternative notice in the case of
zoning district boundary change in that notice was not posted as
required at the Camas County Courthouse or Fairfield City Hall

iv. Deficiencies in the recommendations made by the Planning and
Zoning Commission to the Board of County Commissioner
regarding the new amended Comprehensive Plan, Zoning
Ordinance and related Land Use Map and Zoning Designation
Map in violation ofLC. Sections 67-6507,67-6509 (a) & (b), 676511 (b), and in the findings issued by the Board of
Commissioners, after public hearings concluded and containing
matters never deliberated upon.

(h)

Defendants failed to publish the entire text, including legal description of the
rezoned land, of the ordinances amending the comprehensive plan and
rezoning individual property within the County, or alternatively a summary
that actually describes the amendments made as required by I.C. Section 31715.

(i)

Members of the Planning and Zoning Commission and Board of County
Commissioners had an economic interest in the outcome of this process
under Idaho Code Section 67-6506 and despite recusing themselves,
because the outcome was predetermined and the substance of the
Comprehensive Plan, Zoning Ordinance and related maps were
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substantially the same as those previously enjoined, are illegal as the
result of a process tainted by fatal conflict of interest.

G)

The draft date of the new amended Camas County Comprehensive Plan and
Zoning Ordinance is March 10, 2008 before any meeting had been held,
indicating unnoticed and illegal meetings of the Board of Commissioners.

(k)

The draft date of the new amended Camas County Comprehensive Plan and
Zoning Ordinance Land Use Map and Zoning Map is March 142008 before
any meeting had been held, indicating unnoticed and illegal meetings of the
Board of Commissioners.

(l)

In addition to the above statutory procedural errors the Defendants do not
factually answer or point to documents and records indicating even an effort
to comply with the substantive requirements of LLUP A found in Idaho
Code 67-6502.

(m)

Similarly, I.C. Section 67-6528 states in relevant part, " ... In adoption and
implementation of the plan and ordinances, the governing board or
commission shall take into account the plans and needs of the state of
Idaho and all agencies, boards, departments, institutions, and local special
purpose districts ... " No such accounting of said plans or needs was had
in this case or appears in the record of same, and Defendants have pointed
to nothing in its Motion for Summary Judgment to cure this absence in the
record.

(n)

Likewise,

I.e.

Section 67-6511 (a) provides in relevant part, " ... Requests

for an amendment to the zoning ordinance shall be submitted to the
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zoning or planning and zonmg commISSIOn which shall evaluate the
request to determine the extent and nature of the amendment requested.
Particular consideration shall be given to the effects of any proposed zone
change upon the delivery of services by any political subdivision
providing public services, including school districts, within the planning
jurisdiction ... "

No such evaluation of the extent and nature of the

amendment has here occurred, or appears in the record of same.
(0)

Similarly,

I.e.

Section 67-6511 (b) allows a Planning and Zoning

commission to make a recommendation to amend a Zoning Ordinance
only "After considering the comprehensive plan and other evidence
gathered through the public hearing process ... " No such consideration
was made or appears anywhere in the record of this new process, and
Defendants have pointed to nothing in its Motion for Summary Judgment
to cure this absence in the record.
(p)

Idaho Code Section 67-6537 (4), states "When considering amending,
repealing or adopting a comprehensive plan, the local governing board
shall consider the effect the proposed amendment, repeal or adoption of
the comprehensive plan would have on the source, quantity and quality of
ground water in the area." Nothing in the record hereof indicates that any
such consideration of ground water issues was had by the Camas County
Board of Commissioners, and Defendants have pointed to nothing in its
Motion for Summary Judgment to cure this absence in the record.
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Finally, the legislature, to be certain the purposes of LLUPA were
adhered to, adopted 67-6535, requiring approvals of land use ordinances
affecting a change in zoning district boundary, like that which has
occurred here, to base the decision upon standards in writing. None of
this occurred in the initial or new amendment process, and Defendants
have pointed to nothing in its Motion for Summary Judgment to cure this
absence in the record.

None of the above facts are challenged and remain outstanding and ripe for trial.
STANDING

20.

Plaintiff has standing. In Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 778 P.2d 757

(1989), the Court stated three basic propositions concerning standing that guide our
decision here:

]. The doctrine of standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the
issues the party wishes to have adjudicated.
2. To satisfy the case or controversy requirement of standing, litigants generally
must allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the
judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury.
3. A citizen and taxpayer may not challenge a governmental enactment where the
injury is one suffered alike by all citizens and taxpayers of the jurisdiction.
Miles at 641, 778 P.2d at 763. Standing may be predicated upon a threatened harm as
well as a past injury. Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 133 P.3d 1232. (2006)
In order to have standing a plaintiff must show that it has a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy. "This requirement of personal stake has come to be
understood to require not only a distinct palpable injury but also a fairly traceable causal
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connection between the claimed injury and challenged conduct."

Rural Kootenai

Organization Inc. v. Board of Commissioners, 133 Idaho 833, 993 P.2d 596 (1999),
quoting Butters v Hauser, 131 Idaho 498, quoting Miles v. Idaho Power Co, 116 Idaho

635. "To satisfy the case or controversy requirement of standing, litigants generally must
allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief
requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury." Miles. Miles, a mere ratepayer, was
found to have standing to seek declaratory judgment. The Court emphasized, "This is
more than a generalized grievance. It is a specialized and peculiar injury, although it
may affect a large class of individuals. Miles at 642. (emphasis added)

Rural Kootenai is clearly distinguishable from the facts of the instant matter. In
Rural Kootenai the Plaintiff was an organization that challenged a subdivision
preliminary plat approval for alleged violation of its due process rights as a result of not
receiving proper notice. The organization claimed the harm or peril it was protecting
against was water pollution.

The Supreme Court held plaintiff lacked standing to

challenge notice, but curiously addressed the merits of the organization's claims and
remanded the matter due to violation of the local ordinance. Rural Kootenai at 841. The
Court cited Student Loan Fund of Idaho. Inc. v. PaYette County, 125 Idaho 824, 827-28
(Ct. App. 1994) for the proposition that" ... situs of owned property in relation to an area
touched by the ordinance is relevant to a standing inquiry only insofar as the property's
location exposes the owner to peculiarized harm."
In Student Loan Fund of Idaho. Inc. v. Payette County, 125 Idaho 824, a
corporation that owned land in Payette County that was designated as within a newly
declared area of city impact by an Area of City Impact Agreement, pursuant to LLUPA,
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I.e.

§ 67-6526, brought declaratory judgment action challenging validity of agreement.

Neither the agreement, nor the implementing ordinances, actually rezoned the property,
but did call for future rezoning ordinances. Student Loan Fund, at 825. The Court
pointed out that Plaintiff did not allege the governments' actions will increase the Fund's
taxes, decrease services available to the Fund, decrease the value of the Fund's property,
prevent the Fund from developing its property, or interfere with the Fund's use and
enjoyment of its property. The Court found no evidence that the zoning called for by the
agreement would alter in any way the permitted uses of or restrictions upon the Fund's
property or adjoining land, or that it has or will impair the land's marketability or value
and therefore it lacked standing. Id at 826-27.
Unlike in Rural Kootenai and Student Loan Fund here plaintiff is an individual,
not an organization, who, as the basis for standing, complains of financial damage, not an
environmental harm to be suffered by all citizens, or mere proximity. Mr. Martin does
not complain that he is harmed solely because of the location of his land in a new
comprehensive land use designation he may suffer some future harm, but that he has
suffered an immediate negative fiscal impact because of tbe actual rezoning of his
property and adjacent lands. More specifically, Mr. Martin does allege that the value

of the property in which he has an interest is reduced in value by the 2008 amendments;
will suffer decrease in available services; and increase in taxes and prevent him from
developing the land as he would have been able under the pre-existing zoning schematic.
This Court cited Ameritel Inns. Inc. v. Greater Boise Auditorium District, 141
Idaho 849 (2005) for the proposition that Plaintiffs have, thus far, not sho'vVTI a distinct
and palpable injury to himself with a fairly traceable causal connection between the
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claimed injury and challenged conduct. In fact the Idaho Supreme Court found that
Ameritel did have standing. Ameritel was a taxpayer within the Auditorium District that
offered convention and meeting services who challenged a bond election seeking to raise
funds for a convention center expansion. In finding Ameritel had standing the Court
highlighted Plaintiff's claim that "substantial expansion of meeting facilities proposed in
the Capital Station project . . . will increase the District meeting space that is in
competition with meeting space of Ameritel." The Court found this to be an allegation of
a particularized injury that is not one suffered alike by all citizens within the boundaries
of the Auditorium District. Ameritel at 852-53. Like in the Ameritel case, Plaintiffs here
complains that the government's illegal action will increase competition and therefore
hurt him financially.
In the LLUP A realm only an isolated few cases can be found where standing is
discussed and not found. An overwhelming majority of the cases do not address the issue
and simply move on with an analysis of the appropriate criteria to be applied. In the
recent case, Cowan v. Board of Com'rs of Fremont County 148 P.3d 1247 (2006) the
Court found plaintiff had standing to challenge approval of a subdivision on neighboring
land. Cowan alleged that a new development, if built, would adversely impact his
property rights and diminish his property value. The Cowan Court cited with approval
Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71 (2003) stating "In Evans this Court determined that
in land use decisions, a party's standing depends on whether his or her property will be
adversely affected by the land use decision. See Evans, 139 Idaho at 75, 73 P.3d at 88.
This Court held "[t]he existence of real or potential harm is sufficient to challenge a
land use decision." Id. at 76, 73 P.3d at 89. (emphasis added) Mr. Martin, like the
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plaintiffs in Cowan and Evans, is or will be adversely impacted, in a financial way, by
development on neighboring properties.
Without a specific discussion of standing, the Court proceeded to the merits of
alleged LLUP A violations in Sprenger, Grubb & Associates, Inc. v. City of Hailey, 133
Idaho 320, 986 P.2d 343, when the City had rezoned property owned by plaintiff. The
Court found the city's rezoning process invalid because the comprehensive plan upon
which the rezone relied was not in compliance with LLUP A. The Sprenger Grubb case
demonstrates that standing does not depend upon who brings a rezone application, a land
owner or the government. Jerome County v. Holloway, 118 Idaho 681, 799 P .2d 969
(1990)

QUASI-JUDICIAL VERSUS LEGISLATIVE STANDARD OF REVIEW
DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS
21.

The Idaho Supreme Court in Cooper v. Board of County Commissioner of Ada

County, 101 Idaho 407, 614 P.2d 947 (1980), fundamentally altered judicial review
criteria in examining the validity of local land use decisions by local governing boards.
Gay v. County Commissioners of Bonneville County, 103 Idaho 626, 628; 651 P.2d 560
(1982). For the first time a distinction was drawn between adoption of comprehensive
plans or the enactment of general zoning ordinances in contrast to decisions about
whether to rezone particular parcels of property. Adoption of general zoning policies was
deemed legislative, while rezoning of property was deemed quasi-judicial. Legislative
conduct, the court held, could be attacked only on constitutional grounds for an arbitrary
abuse of authority, whereas quasi-judicial actions afford the adversely affected citizen or
aggrieved party full due process of law. Cooper at 411.
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In discussing its rationale the Cooper Court stated, "The shield from meaningful
judicial review which the legislative label provides is inappropriate in these highly
particularized land use decisions." Id at 410.

The Court favorably quoted Professor

Arthur Smith, from Judicial Review of Rezoning Discretion:

Some Suggestions for

Idaho, 14 Idaho L.Rev. 591-99, " ... When such a process determines what a particular
owner mayor may not do, whether an adjoining owner's expectation will be
compromised, whether a community will accommodate housing needs, we may question
its essential fairness."
In the case before the Court the permit or application in question is that referenced
specifically in I.C. Section 67-65 I 1(b), an amendment of a previously established zoning
ordinance. Like in Cooper, the ultimate outcome of the process determined what Mr.
Martin could or could not do with his property, and altered his expectations, as a
neighbor, of what could be done with surrounding properties, thus damaging him
financially.

The Court in Cowan, Evans and Price v. PaYette County Board of

Commissioners, 131 Idaho 426 (1998) all have made clear that the particularized damage
to a plaintiff need not necessarily stem from the adverse impacts, past or future, of a
rezone on his property, but adverse impacts resulting from a rezoning his neighbors
property.
Likewise the Court in Gay, 103 Idaho 626 held that owners of property adjoining
a parcel for which the governing board approved a change of use, previously not
permitted, were entitled to procedural due process. The ovvners of neighboring property
brought an action to vacate the board's permitting process citing numerous procedural
errors and insufficient findings and record. Id at 627. Like in the present case, the
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question before the Court in Gay was "whether procedural due process was afforded in
proceedings before zoning authorities, on a request to change the authorized use of a
particular parcel of land." As should the Court here, the Court in Gay answered in the
affirmative.
The Court reiterated that "the right to procedural due process is secured by
Article 1 Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. The Court went on to determine what process is due 'affected
persons' under I.C. Section 67-6521, and held that " ... notice, opportunity to be present
and rebut evidence, preparation of specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, and
the keeping of a transcribable record comprise a common core of procedural due process
requirements, constitutionally mandated in all cases where zoning authorities are
requested to change the land use authorized for a particular parcel of property." Id at 629.
In McCusky v. Canvon County, 123 Idaho 657; 851 P.2d 953 (1993) a landowner
who's property had been down-zoned from "heavy industrial" to "rural residential" filed
a declaratory judgment action challenging the validity of the zoning amendment two
years earlier. Plaintiff argued that the procedure by which the zoning amendment was
adopted violated his due process rights because he was not personaI1y notified of any
hearings to consider a zoning change to his property. The Court agreed. The first issue
was whether the rezone could be challenged by action for Declaratory Judgment, to
which the Court answered in the affirmative.
The McCusky Court reasoned that the challenge was as to the validity of the
enactment of a comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance, not that the authorities made
the 'wrong zoning decision. ld at 660. The Court quoted the opinion in Jerome Countv v.
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Holloway, 118 Idaho 681, 799 P .2d 969 (1990), " ... the district court has jurisdiction to
issue its declaratory judgment regarding the validity of the 1985 amendment to the
zoning ordinance. In Jerome County v. Holloway, the Court emphatically stated, "When
the statute requires notice and hearing as to the possible effects of a zoning law upon
property rights the action of the legislative body becomes quasi-judicial in character, and
the statutory notice and hearing then become necessary in order to satisfy the
requirements of due process of law, and may not be dispensed with .. .It is a well settled
principle that notice and hearing requirements in zoning enabling acts are conditions
precedent to the proper exercise of the zoning authority" id at 684.
In Scott v. Gooding, 137 Idaho 206 46 P.3d 33 (2002), the Court found an
Ordinance requiring one thousand feet of separation between a CAFO and a residence to
be legislative.

The Court, citing Cooper, detennined that a legislative action, while

recognizing the right to proceed by claim for declaratory relief, cannot be attacked by
petition for judicial review. The Court reasoned that nothing in the record indicated that
plaintiff's intended their petition to include a claim for Declaratory Relief. The lesson
from Halloway, McCusky and Scott, is that even if an action can be deemed legislative,
when notice and hearing are required, the matter will be evaluated lmder a quasi-judicial
standard. It must be noted that in the case before the Court was filed, and is, an action for
declaratory relief. Under these standards Plaintiff is entitled to full due process of law.
In 2008 the Idaho Supreme Court decided three cases that Defendant urges this
Court to accept as controlling. The cases, Giltner v. Jerome COlmty, 145 Idaho 630,
Highlands Development v. City of Boise, 145 Idaho 958, and Euclid Avenue Trust v.
City of Boise, 193 P.3d 853, are all easily distinguishable from the case at bar. In Giltner
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a Dairy challenged a comprehensive plan amendment applicable to neighboring property
that received an upgraded land use designation. No rezoning or other application as
contemplated by LLUPA was at issue. Euclid stands only for the limited proposition that
civil actions cannot be joined with a petition for judicial review. In Highlands, the Court
held that LLUPA does not provide for a challenge by petition for judicial review to initial
zoning of annexed property, and referred to LLUPA for the types of actions the provide a

remedy, such as rezones. The Martin case, unlike the Giltner case involves a rezone, of
his and adjoining properties and not merely a comprehensive plan land use designation
change on his neighbors' property. Martin has not joined civil actions to a Petition for
Judicial Review, as prohibited by Euclid, but pursued his right to proceed by independent
action attacking the validity of the zoning ordinance. Finally, Highlands addressed the
right to challenge by judicial review an initial zoning of annexed property, not an
amendment to established zoning districts under I.C. Section 67-6511 (b), such as is the
facts in this case.
The only distinction that can fairly and reasonably be drawn between Cooper and
its progeny is the number of particular parcels of property rezoned. As a matter of public
policy the safeguards necessary and scrutiny to be given when many discrete parcels are
rezoned must be more, not less. Because the Board of Commissioners directed the P&Z
to rezone large areas and many parcels of real property, including property that they
themselves owned, (unbekno\\-l1st to other members of the Commission or Board) does
not provide a public policy rationale to offer them a shield from meaningful judicial
review. The fact that many parcels were rezoned at one time does remove the need for a
more controlling standard. The scale issue was addressed by the Court in Miles, and
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found not to defeat a challenge to government action on procedural grounds. "To allow
the discretion of local zoning bodies to remain virtually unlimited in the determination of
individual rights is to condone government of men rather than government by law."
Cooper at 411.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray this Court enter its Order denying Defendants
Motion for Summary Judgment.

CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS
ATTORN
OR PLAINTIFF

Christopher P. Simms

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 1st day of April, 2009, a copy of
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT was served upon counsel via facsimile and addressed to Paul
Fitzer, Attorney for Camas County Defendants 950 W. Bannock St., Ste 520, Boise,
Idaho 83702, facsimile number 208331 1202.

Christopher P. Simms
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY
GEORGE MARTIN and MARTIN CUSTOM) Case No.: CV-07-24
HOMES, L.L.c. ,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
) DECISION ON REQUIREMENTS OF A
) "TRANSCRlBABLE VERBATIM RECORD"
ED SMITH and CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO,) AND OTHER RECORDS FOR PURPOSES
by and through the duly elected Board of
) OF A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Commissioners in their official capacity, KEN)
BACKSTROM , BILL DA VIS , and RON
)
CHAPMAN,
)
)
Defendant
)
)
)
)
)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Thi s matter cam e on for hearin g at th e Camas County Courthouse on the 25th of
September, 200 7. C hri stopher Simms, Ketchum , Idaho , appearing for and on behalf of
pl ainti ff, and Carl Wit hroc, Boi se, Idaho appearin g for and on behalf of Camas County.
The onl y issues for hearin g on this date, based on prior agreements between counse l and
w ith the COUI1. were wheth er Cam as County had maintained an adequate reviewabl e
record of admini strative hearin gs as required by law. If not, the Court is to consider
whether an order sho uld iss ue restraining or preliminaril y enj oining defend ant Cam as
County from acting upon or processing land-use applications and/or rezoning property,
and/or approvin g subdivisi ons.

The plaintiff, at the Court ' s direction, has reserved till later whether other
challenges and issues raised by pl aintiff to the functioning and/or authority of the Camas
County Planning and Zoning Commission (e.g.-other LLUPA violations, conflicts of
interest, adequacy of notice, etc.) are valid. Evidence was submitted, and at the
conclusion of hearing, add itional briefing was called for, to be completed by October 16,
2007. The briefs have been timely received by the Court, and the matter \vas taken under
advisement by the Court on October 16,2007 .
The Court reiterates statements in its decision of August 2007 that factual
determinations made in this decision and order are for purposes of a preliminary
injunction on ly. Pursuant to Rule 65(a) IRCP, evidence rece ived upon this application for
a preliminary injuncti on becomes part of the record on the tri al and need not be repeated
upon the trial. However, there may still be evidence the defendants seek to introduce
which alters or amend s current findings or conclusions. Thus, no findings or conclusions
made in this order are !inaL and they may be modified, altered , or even reversed as the
case progresses and further evi dence develops.

ISSUES PRESENTED
(1) Does the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act apply to Camas County

planning and zoning activity?
(2) Even if the APA applies, do the action s of Camas County in
implementing a new Comprehensive Plan amI a new zoning ordinance constitute
"legislative activity" which is not subject to judicial review?
(3) If the APA applies, and /or Camas County's activities are subject to
judicial review, has Camas County complied with legal requirements by

.=------------..

~---.,...,

maintaining a "transcribable verbatim record" (and other required records) during
the course of proceedings?

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

Preliminarily, the Court must rule on the defendant's Motion to Strike the
Affidavit of George Mm1in filed after hearing. There is no provision for the filing of this
atTidavit. The Court did not grant leave to submit additional evidence. Mr. Martin's
assertions in the affidavit "vere not and are not subject to cross-examination. The Motion
to Strike will be granted. The profened evidence may certainly be the subject of later
hearings, but it comes too late to consider it as a part of this hearing.

Does the Idaho Administrative rroccdure Act (APA) apply to the Camas
County proceedings?
The APA, found at Title 67, Chapter 52 of the Idaho Code, has its own set of
notice, hearing, and record-keeping requirements, over and above those required by the
Local Land Use Planning Act, (I.e. 67-6501 et seq.) Camas County cites Gibson v. Ada

Coumy Sheriff's Dep'/ 139 Idaho 5, 7, 72

pJrd

845 (2003) for the proposition that local

governing boards are not --agencies" under the APA ,and hencc thc APi\ cloes not apply
to them, unless a statute expressly makes provisions of the i\Pi\ applicable to them.
Plaintiff Martin points to Urrutia v. Blaine County 134 Idaho 353, 2 P.3 rd 738 (2000).

Un'ilia is an appellate review of a zoning decision, and states flatly that the Idaho
Administrative Procedures Act (lDAPA) governs review of local administrative
decisions, and the Board (Blaine County's Board of Commissioners) is treated as an
administrative agency for purposes of judicial review. Urrutia cites Comer v. City of

Twin Falls, 130 Idaho 433, 942 P.2 od 557 (1967) for authority, although there is a long

line ofIdaho cases since then that support this position. See, e.g. Price v. Payette County

Board o.fCommissioners 131 Idaho 426,958 P.2

nd

583, (1998), Evans v. Teton County

139 Idaho 71, 73 P.3rd 84 (2003), Payette River Property Owners Ass'n v. Board of

Commissioners of Valley County 132 Idaho 55 1,976 P.2 nd 477 (1999), and Cowan v.
Board o{Commissioners oj Fremont County 143 Idaho 501, 143 P.3 rd 1247 (2006).
Moreover, a statute does exist, in the LLUP A which expressly makes provisions of the
APA applicable to LL UP A. See Idaho Code 67-6521 (1)( d). In fact, the proposition that
the APA applies to county zoning decisions has been so well established it is difficult to
believe Camas County located the Gibson v. Ada County case without running across the
numerous other decisions in the land use area which support it. Counsel are reminded of
their ethical obligation to disclose controlling authority to the Court. In short, the Court
rejects the suggestion that the provisions ofIDAPA do not apply to Camas County's Jand
use decisions.
Do the actions of Camas County, in amending their Comprehensive Plan and
adopting a new zoning ordinance, constitute "legislative activity" which is not
subject to judicial review'?
Camas County contends that they met the LLUPA requirements for record
keeping. that LLUP A does not require local governing boards to maintain the sort of
record plaintiffs claim should be kept under IDAPA, and that, in any event, "legislative
activity" (as opposed to quasi-judicial activity) is immune from judicial review, citing

Burt v. City of Idaho Falls ] 05 Idaho 65, 665 P.2 nd 1075 (1983). They argue further that
the challenged activity of Camas County is not subject to the requirements of 67-6536
(maintain a transcribable verbatim record) because "no appeal is provided for". As noted
above, 67-6521 (1 )(d) provides for an appeal pursuant to the provisions of the APA
allowing judicial review. Thus, Camas County must provide a transcribable verbatim

record as mandated by 67-6536 if the challenged actions of the County are "quasijudicial" as opposed to "legislative" in nature. Camas County correctly points to Cooper

v. Board of County Com'rs of Ada County 101 Idaho 407, 614 P.2nd 947 (1980) as the
most definitive case on this point. Camas claims their activity (in amending the
Comprehensive Plan and adopting a new zoning ordinance) is legislative, because the
actions of Camas County, (even though Camas County may have changed the zoning in
large areas of Camas County through this activity), were no! undertaken at the instance

or request of any specific lando·wner. This particular distinction sought by Camas County
does not appear to be supported by case authority. The origin of the zoning application
does not appear to be legally significant. This is as it should be. It matters not to one
whose property has been rezoned to their detriment whether the request came from a
particular landowner or the governing body. The distinguishing characteristics, rather,
between legislative and quasi-j udicial activity are whether the action "produces a general
rule or policy which is applicable to an open class of individuals, interest, or situations, or
whether it entails the application of a general rule or policy to specific individuals,
interests. or situations. If the former determination is satisfied, there is legislative action;
if the latter determination is satisfied, the action is judicial.·' Cooper v. Board o.[Corn 'rs

o/Ada County 101 Idaho 407.614 P

947 (1980), quoting from Fasano v. Board of

County Com 'rs, 264 Or. 574. 504 P.2d 23, 26 (1973)
"Ordinances laying down general policies without regard to a specific piece of
property are usually an exercise of legislative authority .. On the other hand, a

determination whether the permissible use afa specific piece 0.[property should be
changed is usually an exercise o/judicial authority ... " Jd (emphasis added).
"Generally, when a municipal legislative body enacts a comprehensive plan and
zoning code it acts in a policy making capacity. But in amending a zoning code, or

reclassifying land thereunder, the same body, in effect, makes an adjudication
between the rights sought by the proponents and those claimed by the opponents of
the zoning change. The parties whose interests are affected are readily identifiable."

Cooper, supra, quoting Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327,331
(1972) .
This Court concludes that the actions of Camas County in effecting a rezone of
large portions of the County by the adoption of a new zoning ordinance is quasi-judicial,
rather than legislative activity, and thus is not immune from judicial review. This
conclusion mandates a second conclusion: because the action of the county is "quasijudicial, and thus reviewable, "an appeal is provided for" under I.e. 67-6536, and thus a
'·transcribable verbatim record" of certain proceedings is required by

I.e. 67-6536.

Accordingly, the third issue referenced above (whether Camas County maintained such a
record) presents itself for determination.

Did Camas County maintain a transcribabJe verbatim record (or other
required records) during the course of proceedings?
There are several sub-issues that have been raised indirectly in the context of
exploring whether Camas County maintained a transcribable verbatim record, most of
them dealing with '.,vhat records have, or have noL been mainta1l1ed, and whether they
meet the legal requirements of the APA or LLUP A. These sub-issues, which have not
necessarily been put directly in issue by the procedural process that has been employed,
include whether the Camas Planning and Zoning Commission kept records of their
meetings, whether they made a recommendation to the Camas County Board of
Commissioners, whether they held public hearings before they did so, and whether the
Board of Commissioners issued findings of fact or conclusions oflaw after they amended

6258

the Comprehensive Plan, or the zoning ordinance under attack. In the context of some of
these sub-issues, it is entirely possible Camas County has maintained legally acceptable
records, or held appropriate public hearings, or issued findings and conclusions, and they
just have not been produced yet or are not before the Court. In this regard, the Court is
sensitive to Defendant's stated position that they have not known exactly what records
Plaintiff claims have not been maintained. As this is an application for a preliminary
injunction, and has been proceeding as Plaintiff raises issues in successive hearings, it is
entirely possible some of these records do exist in proper fonn, and will be produced in
due course. The COUl1 does not intend to dwell extensively on these sub-issues, except to
the extent to note what is required, what will eventually have to be produced, and to what
extent these sub-issues impact the present issue (which has been squarely raised) as to
vvhether a transcribable verbatim record was kept at the necessary times.
First. it should be noted that whether activity of the Camas P&Z, or the Board of
Commissioners, for that matter, is legislative or quasi-judicial does not exempt them
from statutory requirements imposed by LLUPA. For example, prior to recommending a
Comprehensive Plan, or (111 amendment or repeal o/a Comp Plan, (which all might be
purely legislative activity) the P&Z Commission must conduct at least one publie hearing
in which interested people shall have an opportunity to be heard. I.C 67-6509. Notice of
that meeting must be published along with "a summary of the plan to be discussed".
Notice of intent to repeal or amend the plan must be sent to "all political subdivisions
providing services" at least 15 days prior to the public hearing. 67-6509. If the governing
board (Bd. Of Commissioners) will be conducting a subsequent public hearing, notice of

the planning and zoning commission recomrnendation shall be included in the notice of
hearing provided

the governing board. Ie 67-6509(0). It provides further: "A

record of the hearings, findings made, and actions taken by the commission shall be

maintained by the city or county." These statutory mandates/or recordkeeping at the

P&Z level may not be dispensed with. If challenged, the County has to have an adequate
record that at leasl details when and where and how each of these things occurred.
Moreover, the Court presumes, without deciding, that pursuant to the provisions of the
Administrative Procedures Act, section 67-5249, actions at the P&Z level might
constitute virtually the entire record subject to appeal. This could occur, for example,
even if the actions of the P&Z are deemed entirely "legislative" proceedings in
considering a Comp Plan amendment, (e.g.-if challenged in a declaratory judgment), for
it is possible no further "agency" action under the APA occurs at the Board of
Commissioner level; that is, tbe Board might not conduct further hearings under 676509(a), and simply adopt the P&Z recommendations, and thus virtually the entire
"agency record" required by 67-5249 might consist of what occurred at the P&Z level.
In other cases, where the Board of Commissioners hears evidence or testimony or
makes a final decision that is subject to appeal (e.g.-approval or denial of a subdivision) it
might not be necessary for the P&Z to maintain certain records or make cel1ain findings.
See Cowan v. Ed olCom 'rs olFremonr County I

Idaho 501,148 P 3

fd

1247 (2006)

(I.e. 67-6535(b) does not apply to decisions of the P&Z because P&Z lacks the authority
to fInally approve or deny an application under

-(504). The long and short of it is that

the P&Z runs the risk projects may be challenged successfully if adequate records are not
kept and the determination that records are inadequate might not come until much later.
Applying these factors to the case at bar suggests that, as it appears the Comp
Plan was amended, and the Camas P&Z Commission undertook and commenced work in
this area at the instigation of the Board of Commissioners, there should exist, at a
minimum, records of at least one public hearing held at the P&Z level, the findings
made by the P&Z, the actions taken by the P&Z, and the recommendation rnade to the

Board oj Commissioners should be included in the notice 0.(public hearing sent oul by
the Board ojCommissioners. Finally, once the Board acted upon the Comp Plan and
amended the zoning ordinance, written findings of fact and conclusions of law are
required. "I.e. 67-6535 governs the issuance of findings of fact or conclusions of law
relevant to a local land use agency's approval or denial of a land use application.
Approval or denial of a land use application must be in writing explaining the relevant
criteria and standards, the relevant contested facts, and the rationale for the decision
based on the applicable provisions of the comprehensive plan and relevant ordinances."
Evans v. Telon County 1339 Idaho 7 I, 73 PJd 84 (2003). The record in this case. thus
far, would not appear to contain all these items.
Those are the sub-issues. Of more immedi3te significance, however, are dual
requirements under 67-6509(b) and 67-6536. Pursuant to the former section, the
"governing board shall not hold a public hearing, give notice ora proposed hearing, nor
[({ke action upon the plan, amendments, or repeal until recommendations have been
receivedjl-om the commission" Pursuant to 67-6536. a transcribable verbatim record
must be kept of all public hearings "during which the commission or governing board
delibe,-ates toward a decision after compilation of the record." In the present case,

{here is no record of any kind identifying IIhe/1
Comp Plan

vl'clS

P&:t. recommendation

(0

amend the

sent to or received by {he Board o(Commissio17ers, or who! if contained

Thus it becomes impossiblc to tell whether the g(Hcrning board took action bef9re the
recommendations were received from the P&Z commission, or whether the Board
deliberated toward a decision "after compilation of the record". As the evidence bears
out, it appears they did one or the other, without a "transcribable verbatim record"; there
are many meetings of the Board that simply were not recorded. If they had been, at least
the pm1ies (and the Court) could tell whether discussions took place that violated one
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statute or the other. Without any record that is verbatim, and can be transcribed, no one,
least of all the Court, can be assured of what conversations took place. The absence of a
transcribable verbatim record of zoning or land use proceedings may result in a violation
of a party's right to procedural due process. Rural Kootenai Organization v. Board of

Commissioners 133 Idaho 833, 993 P. 2

nd

596, (1999). Furthermore, it is not possible at

this point for persons present to present, by affidavit or testimony, their recollections of
what was. or was not discussed, for the purpose of attempting to have the Court conclude
no statutes were violated. To allow such testimony to stand in place of a verbatim record
vvould nullify the very reason a verbatim record is required. Finally, in this case, even
\vithout such an offer of proof, the evidence presented thus far leads the Court to the
conclusion that deliberations took place between the Commissioners, 'whether the

recomrnendalions had heen received or not, which violated the statutory provisions. That
is. i r the recommendation had been received from P&Z, the evidence from the available
minute entries suggests the Board was deliberating after compilation of the record,
violating 65-6536. If the recommendations hod not been received, the Board appears to
have taken "action upon the plan" before it was received;

Of,

at the very least (because

no tapes were made). it is not possible to tell the Board did not take action These
observations are directed at some of the oroceedings before the Board that arouablv
b
,.;
~

L..

imohed the Comp Plan. but it is impossible to telL without a verbatim record, whether
the Board was considering matters in the record already compiled, that related to
amendment of the zoning ordinance as well. A review of the evidence supports findings
tbat these things occurred.
The Court finds from the evidence thus far that members of the P&Z undertook.
after request from the Board of Commissioners, to amend the Comp Plan. It is not clear
from the testimony that the P&Z did contact other agencies as required by I.C. 67-6509,

1°2Lo2

or even that P&Z held the public hearing required. Perhaps they did. There is no record

thus for of any written recammendationfrom the P&Z to amend the Camp Plan, nor is
there any record oj/indil1gs made by the P&Z Commission.

I.e.

67-6509(0).

Exhibit 9 from the hearing is the minutes of the Board of Commissioners meeting
of November 14,2005. This meeting was not recorded, or no verbatim record exists. It is
clear from the minutes the Board heard a request of George Barber to rezone 198 acres
in Camas County. This process violates the requirement of a verbatim transcribable
record, as the Board is hearing from an applicant regarding a pending application. While
this action has not been attacked, it demonstrates clearly the Board is operating without a
verbatim record on a matter where one is required, in violation of1.C 67-6536.
On February

J 3,2006,

(Exhibit 10), the Board was addressed by Earl Wilson

regarding P&Z matters. "He also shmved the Board the latest version of P&Z new
proposed zoning map." There is no tape of this meeting. Has the Board received a written
recommendation from P&Z at this point regarding amending the Comp Plan? No one
knows. Thus, in conversations with Earl Wilson, is the Board '·taking action on a plan"
before it is received. or is it "deliberating alter compilation of the record"? No one knows
or can say. No verbatim record was kept.
The same problem is evident on Exhibit 11. No record \vas made of the March 13,

2006 meeting, or at least no tapes exist Two people appeared at a "public hearing"
before the Board to request a rezone. "The Board \vorked on Planning and Zoning
matters. "
By April 13, 2006, it appears the Board has received a proposal to amend the
Zoning Ordinance. See Exhibit) 2 page 2. Thus proceedings after this date appear fo be
"deliberations after compilations of the record" which would require a transcribable
verbatim record. There are no tapes of this meeting. Exhibit 15, page 2, contain the

minutes of the June 26, 2006 meeting of the Board of Commissioners. There is no tape of
this meeting. The minutes recite: "Earl Wilson met with the Board and discussed

possible changes to the Zoning Ordinance regarding CUP's and Variances. " The only
conclusion the Court can draw from this evidence is that the Board has the proposed
ordinance before it and is discussing proposed changes to it. These would appear to be
"deliberations after compilation of the record"; a transcribable record was required and
there is none.
On July lO, 2006, (Ex 16, pg. 2) the Board discussed possiblc amendments to
Ordinance # II and voted to send it to the P&Z for a public hearing. The same problems
exist, but there is no tape of the meeting . At the meeting on Aug 14, 2006, (Ex 17. pg.
2). it appears from the minutes the Board deliberated changes to the Comp Plan, and
determined to pass those along to the P&Z Commission. Without a record, one cannot tell
what type of deliberations these are, or what evidence, if any has been considered.
Pursuant to 67 -5249(2)(f)and (g)of the APA, the agency record should consist of "staff
memoranda or data submitted" and any "preliminary order". The only record the Court
has is 3 lines from the minutes.
No tape exists of the Sept 26.
that meeting. Apparently the Board

meding At least 2 matters are of concern at
a final approval of a subdivision. and clearly

"deliberated" in doing so (see page 2 of Exhibit 18) A commiSSIoner recused himself
from this proceeding, as it was apparently it was his cluster subdivision under review.
Again, although this pal1icular activity (passing upon this particular subdivision) is not
being challenged on the merits, it did require a verbatim record. Conflicts of interest will
be explored in further proceedings. Of further concern is the mention in the minutes that
Suzi Bingham "met with the Board regarding Planning and Zoning matters." Regarding
what? The minutes continue that "the Board needed to decide what the definition of an
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existing parcel meant." Why? Is this in regard to a pa11icular pending application?
Amending the Zoning Ordinance under attack, or some other? Review of a P&Z
recommendation? Amendment to the Comp Plan? Maybe this required a verbatim
record, maybe it did not, but without one to review, and in view of other meetings,
including this one, where a record clearly should have been kept and \vas not, the County
cel1ainly is not entitled to the benefit of any doubt that might exist.
Exhibit 20, page 2 are the minutes of the Board's meeting on November 28, 2006.
They reflect "The Board continued discussing the proposed new Zoning Ordinance."
There is no tape of this meeting. This would appear to be after recommendation or
referral of this ordinance from P&Z: otherwise, there is no explanation as to how or why
the Board has this before them for any type of consideration at all. The Court cannot
escape the conclusion that this is "deliberating toward a decision after compilation of the
record". without a verbatim record, in violation ofI.C. 67-6536. Even if the decision
made at a meeting is only to determine to go forward to public hearing, or to make
changes in proposed language, or on a zoning map, that would likely constitute
"deliberating (Q\,vard a decision". (see 67-2341(2) for a definition of "deliberation" as
Llsed in the open meetings law). From the record before the Court, no one can tell \vhat
\vas discussed, what evidence, if any was received from staff or others, whether the
Board considered proposed zoning maps, whether amendments to zoning particular
parcels or areas was discussed, or whether proposed amendments to the Comp Plan found
their way into these discussions.
The same defects are present from the meeting held December 11, 2006. Once
again, there is no tape. The Board "reviewed the Subdivision Ordinance and proposed
changes". The Board "Discussed the Camas County Zoning Ordinance." "The Board
discussed the City Area of Impact." They also decided, apparently, to have Ken "meet

with the attorney to make the recommended revisions and forward on to the Planning and
Zoning Commission." What are these recommended revisions? Are they amendments to
the actual zoning? Are they amendments to definitions? Do they favor particular
individuals? One cannot tell.
Although there is a tape of the December 26, 2007 meeting, it is clear by then the
Board has received "the P&Z map". Was that map discussed at prior meetings? When
was it received by the Board? The record yields no answer.
On Jan 8. 2007, and again on Jan 16,2007, the Board again "reviewed the
proposed Zoning and Land Use Map." and on Jan 16 they also discussed the proposed
Zoning Ordinance and Subdivision Ordinance. There is no tape of either meeting. See Ex
24,25, and 29. On Jan

,2007. the Board met with Dwight Butlin, the Planning and

Zoning Commissioner from Camas County. There is no tape of this meeting. The Board
reviewed the Subdivision Ordinance ... and apparently discussed with Butlin changes
made to the ordinance and wording from a "Technical Review Committee". What was
that? Were there recommendations or proposals that came from them? If so, there is no
record of what was reviewed. According to the APA. staff data or memoranda should
be maintained and preserved. The: met agall1 on February 20, 2007 and reviewed the
proposed Zoning Ordinance. SubclIvision Ordinance, Comp Plan Map and Zoning Map
that "will be used at the Public Hearing on March 14,2007." (sec Ex 27, pg. 2)
The last meetings directed toward this issue were held on March 26, 27, and 29.
Tapes do exist of these meetings. They were not admitted into evidence, however, and
what they contain is unknown to the Court. They do, presumably constitute a record as
required by

I.e. 67-6536.

Apparently, the Zoning Ordinance was passed at this time, and

the Zoning Map was approved, along with amendments to the Comp Plan. Although
invited by the Court to submit whatever evidence they felt might be relevant on these
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points, Camas County has not submitted any. To the Court's knowledge, there are no
written findings of fact, conclusions of law, or record setting forth the relevant criteria
and standards, what evidence the Board relied on, and their rationale, if any, for decisions
reached. To an outsider, all of this looks as if the Board of Commissioners has gathered
the data, deliberated along the way, consulted with their P&Z Commissioner, and made
changes and revisions to the proposed Comp Plan, Zoning Ordinance, and Zoning Map,
all without a record. Then, once everything had been decided, they held a public hearing,
on the record. After that, they passed amendments to the Comp Plan and the Zoning
Ordinance. It is not these March 26, 27, and 29 hearings that concern the Court; it is the
failure to record and preserve what appear to be deliberations "after compilation of the
record" or "taking action upon the plan" prior to receipt ofa recommendation from P&Z,
that occurred at other times and meetings before the Board took final action in the March
hearings.
It is clear the Board considered the Comp Plan and the proposed amendment to
the zoning ordinance together. These procedures can be done in tandem. See Price v.

Payelle County Ed Of County

COI11

·rs. 131 Idaho 426. 958 P.2d 583, (1998). However,

it is 110t clear that the Board entered written findings and conclusions as required by

I.e.

35; perhaps they did and they are not yet in evidence. If they did not, a t~ltal flaw
likely exists which will require the Court. e\cntually, to vacate the actions of the Board
and remand for further proceedings. See Price v. Poyeul:! County, supra.

CONCLUSIONS
For the foregoing reasons, this Court concludes Camas County has not met the
requirements of Idaho Code 67-6536 by keeping a transcribable verbatim record in
matters during which the governing board was deliberating toward a decision after

IS
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compilation of the record, and for which an appeal is provided-amendment of the zoning

urdinance. This has been the primary thrust of the hearing conducted thus far on this
issue. This conclusion is not likely to change upon trial or further hearing, as this
particular challenge (absence of a verbatim record) has been raised directly, and the
evidence has come from the testimony and records of the county employees charged with
maintaining these records. Proceedings thus far have been consolidated vvith the trial of
the action on the merits pursuant to Rule 65(a)(2).
There are other challenges (called "sub-issues" above) which, as noted, have been
raised indirectly, but are before the Court; evidence must be produced directly upon these
points at some stage of the proceedings. These sub-issues deal pnmarily with the
existence of records aside from a transcribable verbatim record. As further noteel, these
records might exist, but have Just not yet been produced. The Court is not determining
which party has the burden of proving the existence or non-existence of these records:
hc)\vever, their absence. or lack of production will undoubtedly work against Camas
County. as the Court is attempting to delineate at least some of the records that must exist
to survive Plaintiff s challenges. As noted. these include a record that P&Z conducted a
duly noticed publIc hearing prior to recommending an amendment of the Comp Plan per
67-6509. a record that a proper notice was given and published, along with a summary of
the plan to be discussed per 67-6509, and a record that political subdivisions were duly
notlced. As the governing board did apparently hold the subsequent public hearing, rather
than the P&Z, the written recommendation from the Camas P&Z to amend the Comp
Plan had to be included in the notice of hearing provided by the governing board under

I.C 67-6509(a). /\ record of the hearings, findings made, and actions taken by the
commission should also exist. These are records that should exist {ojusli/J; lhe COUl1ly'S
amendmenl to the Comp Plan The Court has already concluded that these proceedings
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to amend the Comp Plan are likely legislative, and, not being subject to direct appeal, do
not carry with them the requirements that each proceeding have a transcribable verbatim
record as otherwise required by 67-6536.
When the Board acted upon the Comp Plan (which apparently occurred on March
26,27, and 29), a verbatim record was apparently made. It remains to be seen whether this
record is adequate or what it contains. The COUJ1 cannot find at this point whether the
amendments to the Comp Plan were done properly or not. The record of these hearings
on March 26,27, and 29 must eventually show, however, that the Board considered the
Comp Plan and the amendment to the zoning ordinance in the proper sequence. See Price
v Payelle COllnry Board ojCollnfy Com 'rs 131 Idaho 426 at 430.
Finally_ there is no record demonstrating when, or if, the P&Z recommendations
regarding the Comp Plan changes, or any amendments to the zoning ordinance, actually
came into the bands of the Board. More importantly, there is no record thus far of any
findings offact. or conclusions of law lI1dicating what action the Board took, or why,
after the tvlarch 2007 hearings.
Absence of any or all of the records referred to above could be fatal to the Comp
Plan or the Zoning Ordinance or the Zoning Map amended during or after the March
2007 hearings. The CouJ1 is not

any determinations yet in that regard. The Court

is able at this time to conclude that. as regards the zoning ordinance amendment the
~

~

~

failure to have and maintain a transcribable verbatim record is a violation of Idaho Code
67-6536. Thus, pursuant to the provisions ofIdaho Code 67-5279, the agency action
adopting and amending af leas! the Zoning Ordinance (and, if a result of the zoning
ordinance amendments, the Zoning Map as well) has been made upon unlawful
procedure and/or in violation of statutory provisions. The Court further concludes that on
the basis of the record thus j~1L substantial rights of the Plaintiff have been prejudiced.

Camas County argues strenuously that Plaintiff has not suffered irreparable hann,
and thus should not be entitled to an injunction. If the evidence was closed, Plaintiff
would be entitled to an order vacating the zoning ordinance amendment, and likely the
zoning map as wel1, and remanding proceedings back to the Board of Commissioners of
Camas County. See Price v. Payette County Board o/County Com 'rs 131 Idaho at 430.
As noted above, the evidence as to what "verbatim" records exist has come from Camas
County's own employees, and is not likely to change.
Previously, the Court declined to enter either a temporary restraining order or a
preliminary injunction. (See Decision on Status of Camas County Planning and Zoning
Commission For Purposes of a Preliminary Injunction, dated Aug 9, 2007). At least part
the reason was that the reliefPJaintilTwL\s requesting at that point was an injunction
stopping Camas County from processing appl ications under the new zoning ordinance
# 147, although Plaintiff had no objection to the County processing applications under an
older existing ordinance. The Court could not conclude that irreparable harm existed in
one case but not the other, as Plaintiffs prImary complaint was a generalized assertion he
would suffer from increased competition. A review of that decision indicates another
other important observation: the Court':; notation that ifit could conclude Camas County
\vas not operating in a legal fashion in any respect in making land use decisions, the
Court might well issue a preliminary in)

not necessarily because there was

particular harm being caused to Plainti tl. but because there would be great and
irreparable injury being caused to all the citizens of Camas County.
Since this last decision, the Court has also determined what the appropriate
remedy is if particular actions of the County are legally defective. It is not appropriate for
the Court to determine, even in the long run, and particularly for purposes of a
preliminary injunction, that Camas County may not process applications under one

ordinance, but may under another, or that an agency may not proceed to review
applications or grant permits if their process has been defective. Rather, if there have
been defects in the proceedings, the only appropriate remedy under the Price case is to
vacate the specific activity in question and remand proceedings to the appropriate agency.
Thus, in determining whether injunctive relief should issue, the major question becomes
whether the Court will ultimatelv arrive there. The Court is keenly aware of the standards
"'

-

involved. While legislative actions by counties are subject to collateral actions such as
declaratory judgments, they cannot be attacked by a petition for judicial review. Cowan v.

BoardofCom'rs o/Fremont County 143 Idaho 501,148 P.3d 1247 (2006) A
preliminary mandatory injunction is granted only in extreme cases where the right is very
clear and it appears that irreparable injury will flow from its refusal. Emns v. District
C'our! of/he Fifth Judicial District 47 Idaho 267, 270, 275 P. 99, 100 (1929). The

substantial I ikelihood of success necessary to demonstrate that a party is entitled to
mjunctive relief cannot exist where complex issues of law or fact exist 'vvhich are not free
from doubt. Harris v. Cassia County 106 Idaho 513, 518, 68} P.2d 988. 994 (1984).
The Court has now conducted a lengthy examination of the record keeping
leading to the enactment of the Zoning Ordinance, which is subject to judicial review. It
remains an open question whether a party is entitled to injunctive relief under a
judgment action. The Court is further satisfied that Plalllti 1'1' bas nov\
demonstrated its entitlement to a preliminary injunction with regards, at least to the
loning Ordinance, (and presumably the Zoning Map) amended on or after the March
hearings. The Court further finds, at this point the right is clear, and that once
Camas County proceeds under the Zoning Ordinance the harm will be ilTeparable. and
cannot be undone.
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NOW, THEREFORE, THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS, AND THIS
DOES ORDER, Camas County is hereby enjoined, restrained, and prohibited, tmtil
fllrther order of the COUll, from proceeding under the zoning ordinance amended in
March of2007 and the related zoning map if the zoning map purportedly effected any
sort of change in existing zoning.
Pursuant to the provisions ofRu1e 65(c), no bond shall be required. This order is
not a final order pursuant to Rule 54 (b) and is subject to modification or revision at any

time.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this

~

day of December, 2007.

Robert 1. Elgee, District Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
.
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY
I

.

I·

GEORGE MARTIN and MARTJ, CUSTOM)
HOMES, L.L.C. ,
)

)

I

Plaintifl:

Case No.: CV-2007-24

)

)
)
)

vs.

ED SMITH and CAMAS COlJN'FY, IDAHO, ) DECISION ON CONFLICT OF INTERESTS
. by and through the duly elected Bbard of
) ISSUE FOR PURPOSES OF A
Commissioners in their official ca~J<'lCity, KEN PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
BACKSTROM, BILL DAVIS, anti RON

I

CHAPMAN .'

I
1

Defendant

I

PROCEDURAL I-lISTOJ y AND REVmW OF PRIOR ORDERS AND

II PROCEEDINGS
,

On December 28, 2007) this Court entered a "Decision on Requirements of a

'Transcribable Verbatim Record'

td

Other Records for Purposes of a Preliminary

Injunction." That Decision enjOinr d Camas COm1ty from proceeding u.nder the March

2007 amendments to the Camas

crunty zoning ordinance until further order of the Court.

That injunction has been further amended by a subsequel1t order entered approximately

I

March 1O~ 2008, following a crimihal contempt hearing: which also prohibits the County
I

fi'om proceeding under the pre-exitting zoning ordinance as well (Ordinance 12, enacted

I

DECISION ON CONFLICT OF INTERESTS ISSUE FOR PURPOSES OF A PRELIMlNARY
I
INJUNCTION

I
I
i

in 1976), pending further order of the Court. Trial has been scheduled in Camas County
to commence May 20, 2008, at which time, or shortly after, all pending matters should
become the subject of a fmal order.

Camas County has also sought leave from both tms Court and the Idaho Supreme
Court to appeal the granting of the preliminary injunction. TItis Court denied that
request, and a decision from the Idaho Supreme Court has not yet been received as to
whether they will al?cept review of the interlocutory order granting an injunction. This
Court has reviewed Camas Countis Memorandum in Support of Motion for Acceptance
of Appeal by Permission. As the naMe of the preliminary injunction order and the
decision supporting it is interlocutory, and subject to revision until such time as it
becomes final, there are some points raised by Camas County's appeal brief that should
be acknowledged by this Court, and perhaps some points in the Court's Decision that
should be solidified.
Several arguments are raised by the C01.miy in their brief before the Supreme
Court. One of the hinge points of the County's argument throughout all of the
proceedings thus far. is that the actions taken by the Camas County Board of
Commissioners in considering large scale zonjng changes throughout the County were
done in a legislative, not quasi-judicial capacity. Their argument seems to be that if the
County undertakes to rezone portions of the County on a large enough scale, the County
can dispense with the procedural formalities required of quasi-judicial matters. Indeed,
the County makes the same argument in current briefing: that Camas County
Commissioners or P& Z Commissioners can enga.ge in contlicts of interest in public
matters and public proceedings and public decisions affecting their ovm property so long
as these "proceedings" are legislative. This Court takes a different view.

DECISION ON CONFLICT OF ThI'TERES'rS ISSUE FOR PIJRPOSES OF A PRELIMINARY
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In support of their position, Camas County cites Burt v. City of Idaho Falls, 105
Idaho 65~ 665 P.2d 1075. The Court does not read Burt as Camas County does. Even

Burt says: "The ~exation ordinance was silent as to the zoning of the annexed land;
therefore if came into the city as unzoned land. ., (Emphasis added) Burt, supra at 67.
The Idaho Supreme Court in Burt went on to cite Cooper v. Board o/County

Commissioners ofAda County. 101 Idaho 407, 614 P.2d 947 (1980) stating that" ... the
action aftIte Bo~dof Comntissioners in acting lipan a rezoning request was quasijudicial in nature." (Emphasis added). This Court has focused on the fact the property
was rezoned, which appears to be the focus of the Burt court. Camas County has focLtsed
on the word "request," in arguing that there is no particular applicant here making a
request; that this action in rezoning huge portions of Camas County was done at the
instigation and request of the Board of Commissioners or P&Z. However, none ofthe
decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court seem to rest on the distinction as to who requested

the rezone; in this Court's view, the distinction rests on the/act that the propeny is
rezoned

Assuming for the moment that Camas County might be correct in its argument
that the overall proceedings in March of2007 were "legislative" does not, however, get
them "out of the woods." At least part of the thmst of this Court's December 28, 2007

decision is that the proceedings effecting the rezone in March 0[2007 were subject to
appeal, pursuant to Idaho Code 67-652 1(l)(d), and thUB proceedings leading up to the
March hearing were subject to the requirements that Camas COlmty mrul1tain a

"transcribable verbatim record" pursuant to Idaho Code 67-6536. But whether the
proceedings before the Board of Commissioners are in fact appealable does not appear at
all to be the ultimate factor in detemlining whether a transcribabie verbatim record must
be kept. Rather, with or without an appeal, Idaho Code 67-6536 provides that: "The
DECISION ON CONFLICT OF INTERESTS ISSUE FOR PURPOSES OF A PRELIMTNARY
INJUNCTION
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proceedings envisioned by this statute for which a transcribable verbatim record must be
kept shall include all public hearings at which evidence or testimony is received .. or
I

during which the commissum or governing board deliberates toward a decision after
compilation oj the record." It was this Court's finding from the evidence that th.e Board
had deliberated toward a decision, at public hearings, apparently after the P&Z

recommendation had been received, with no record of those deliberations or discllssions.
1\

i

•

These findings further served as the basis for the Court's conclusion that a required
record had not been maintained. Moreover, if an appeal is a required element of 676S21(1)(d), Idaho Code 31-1506 seems to make any order or proceeding of the Board

sUbject to judicial review.

Camas County also contends (both before thiSCOUlt and before the Idaho
Supreme Court on their appeal motion) that because their overall activity was legislative,
and thus not subject to judicial review, 110 transcribable record need have beel1

maintained under § 67-6536. This does not necessarily answer the question as to whether
any particular proceeding was quasi-judicial. If this particular proceeding in March of
2007 (when the County amended the comp plan and rezoned large pOltiol1s of the county)

was quasi-judicial, then it could not be "legislative" for purposes of keeping lit record, nor
can the proceedings leading up 10 it be exempt as legislative activity. In shOtt, the
County cannot go through a proceeding that is unquestionably "quasi-judicial" in

character, for which all parties agree a verbatim record is required, but meet and discuss

the pending matters prior to [he hearing and call that activity "legislative." Idaho Code §
67-6536 is clearly intended to apply to meetings thaI might take pla.ce before or after the
scheduled and noticed public hearing.
In reviewing this issue) it appears the March 2007 hearings during which the

County actually passed the amended comp plan and rezoned large portions of the County
DECISION ON CONFLICT OF INTERESTS ISSUE FOR PURPOSES OF A PRELIMINARY
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were ul1questionably qua.si-judicial. In addition to the Burt decision, the County has also
cited Jerome County v. HDlloway 118 Idaho 681> 799 P.2d 969 (1990) for the proposition
that the County ~ acted in a legislative capacity) and states in their brief that "no

discussion of the te~ 'quasi-judicial' ... was had" in that case. Au contraire. 111ere is a
passage in that case that bears directly on this issue. In discussing the notice and hearing
req'llirements of Idaho Code § 67-6509 (the same notice and hearing requirements of
LLUPA applicable to the March 2007 hearings) the Idaho Supreme Court stated: "This
Court confronted this issue in the case of Citizens for a Better Government v. County of

Valley, 95 Idaho 320, 508 P.2d 550 (1973) and quoted with approval the Supreme Court

of the State of California as follows: "When the statute requires notice and hearing as to
the possible effect of a zoning law upon property rights the action of the legislative
body becomes quasi-judicial in character, ... " citing Hurst v. City ofBurlingame, 207

Cal. 134,277 P. 308 (1929) (Emphasis added in both parts.)
Granted, although this discussion is centered on the requirements of notice and
hearing, the case makes clear that the County carmot exempt themselves from the
requirements of a transcribable record by calling all activity of the County "legislative"
in nature. As the Jerome County case would seem to make abundantly clear, even if a
particular decision of the County might be construed overall by a Court as legislative
activity, and thus not reViewable, particular hearings are ul1questionably "quasi-judicial"
because they require notice and hearing. As such, there is no way the County can deem

themselves engaged in "legislative activity" in conducting these hearings such that they
are immune from the requirements of keeping a record, both during these hearings and
leading up to them. In sum, whether a matter is ultimately reviewable by a Court, and
whether it is "quasi-judicial" are different questions, The matters under review were
unquestionably quasi-judicial insofar as the record keeping requirements are concerned.
DECIsrON ON CONFUCT OF l!'JTERESTS ISSUE FOR PURPOSES OF A PRELIMINARY
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ISSUES l)RESENTED
In addressing the current conflict of interest issue it is important to note that the
facts are not in dispu~e, at least through the headngs held so far. Camas County never
attempts to dispute the fact that both Smith and Backstrom own property that was directly
affected by the zoning changes that took place. Further, Camas County has not disputed
the fact that neither Smith as chair of the planning and zoning commission, or Bac](strom
as head of the Board'of Commissioners ever disclosed their property holdings.

1

Additionally, Camas County never argues or disputes the fact that neither Smith nor
Backstrom ever recused themselves from participating in the proceedings at issue. There
is no suggestion in the evidence that Smith or Backstrom did not participate in every
hearing at issue. Instead, Camas County has raised 3 arguments in its defense:
1.) Whether Idaho Code § 67-6506 applies to Camas County when it adopted

amendments to its Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Ordinance? Camas County
takes the position that proceedings at issue were "legislative" as opposed to
"quasi-judicial" and therefore Smith and Backstrom are exempt from conflicts of
interest.

2.) Whether Martin must prove the level of economic interest that is present on the

part of any planning and zoning commission member or county commissioner
with an alleged conflict of interest, and whether Martin must prove that any

1 At hearing, Backstrom admitted that he never disclosed any ofllis property holdings, he never recused
himself from any of the proceedings, and he never sought advice of counsel as to whether or not he should
have done either. Smith testified that the only disclosure he mane as to any of his land holdings. was to
simply point to the general areas where he owned land on a map during a wol'l< session held by the
Planning and Zoning commission. Further, Smith testified that this was the only disclosure he made, at any
level of proceedings. Additionally, Smith testified that he solicited a legal opinion from rhe County's legal
counsel as to whether there was a conflict of interest which was not shared with the public and which he
relied upon in deciding to continue participating in the deliberations.
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chaD.ges in zoning designations were motivated by, or actually affected, a
conflicted. member's economic interest.

3.) If a violation ofIdaho Code § 67-6506 occurs, is the appropriate remedy to

simply disregard the conflicted members vote?
ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS
Initially,

it is important to note that the activities challenged by Martin encompass

more than one hearing or proceeding.

From the Comt's reading, Camas Cotl1lty argues

that all of its actions are in essence "legislative" and thus the alleged violations of the

LLUPA do not aJ?ply. As noted elsewhere in this and earlier decisions, while the Court
agrees that the creation of a Comprehensive Platl is probably a "legislative" activity, the

Court disagrees with the assertion that the passing of a zonini ordinance, simply because
it is deemed to cover the whole c01.mty or is done in cOl1junction with the Comprehensive
Plan is in any way "legislative."
1.) Does Idaho Code § 67-6506 al2plv in the instant ca:;e?

Camas County contends that Idaho Code § 67-6506 (which prohibits conflicts of
interest) does not apply to the proceedings which are the subject oftrus instant lawsuit.
Specifically, Camas County relies wholly on the contention that the County, in adopting
its Land Use Map, Zoning Ordinance, and Zoning Map, exercised its legislative power
and that § 67-6506 only applies to quasH1.ldicial proceedings,
Idaho Code § 67-6506 states the following:
A governing board creating a planning, zoning, or planning and zoning
conmlission, or joint commission shaH provide that the area and interests
within its jurisdiction are broadly represented on the commission. A
member or employee of a governing board, commission, or joint
commission shall not participate in any proceeding or action when the
member or employee or his employer, business partner, business
associate, or any person related to him by affinity or consangui,."1ity within
the second degree has an economic interest in the procedure or action.
Any actual or potential interest in any pI'oceeding shall be disclosed at
DECISION ON CONFLICT OF INTERESTS ISSUE FOR PURPOSES OF A PRELlMlNARY
INJUNCTION
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or before any meeting at which the action is being heard or
considered. For purposes of this section the tel'm "participation" means·
engaging in activities which constitute deliberations pnrsnant to the
open meeting act. No member of 1\ governing board or a planning and
zoning commission with a conflict ot'interest shall participate in any
aspect of the decision-maldng process concerning a matter involving
the conflict of interest. A knowing violation ofthls section shall be a
misdemeanor. (Emphasis added)

See IDAHO CODE ANN § 67-6506. In applying Idaho Code § 67-6506, the Idaho
Supreme Court has stated that the legislature intended to prohibit economic
conflicts ofinterest and that in adopting Idaho Code § 67-6506 the legislature
acted "to assure that, consistent with Ollr democratic principles, only impartial and
objective persons make decisions affecting other person's liberty and property."

Manookian v. Blaine County. 112 Idaho 697, 701 (Idaho 1987).
As noted in the Court's discussion regarding the current posture of the
case and previous rulings and detenninations by this Court, though Camas County
may have engaged in some activities which could be "legislative," they
undeniably engaged in activities which are "quasi judicial" in natrU"e and are
therefore subject to the conflict of interest provisions of Idaho Code § 67-6506.

Thus even if Camas County is light in its assertion that Idaho Code § 67-6506
does not apply to "legislative" activities, it is clear to this Court that some of the
proceedings, (particularly those which were the s4bjects of prior notice and which
constituted "public hearings"), which Smith and Backstrom participated in. are
properly characterized as "quasi-judicial" and thel'efore their participation was in
violation of the conflict of interest provisions ofIdaho Code § 67~6506.
Camas County also contends that Idaho Code § 67-6506 does not apply
(apparently to any proceedings involving rezoning or the Comp Plan) because
DECISION ON CONFLICT OF INTER£STS rssUE FOR PURPOSES OF A PREUMJNARY
rnrrmCTION
g

r.

Uij

INC

~UUNII

JUUl~lnL

r Ht\

l~U.

requiring the zonipg process to occur piecemeal would violate the requirements of
Idaho Code § 67-6511 and § 67-6508. Camas COl.U11y posits that those code
sections require that comprehensive planning take into account the whole of the

jurisdiction. The Court rejects this argument. First; Camas County attempts to
group all of the challenged activities into one group, "legislative activity," when
in reality, as set forth above, at least some of the challenged activities are "quasi-

judicial." (Le .... rezoning portions of the county). Second, while "planning"
might have to take into account "the whole of the juri sdiction" as Camas County
suggests, there is no requirement in either of the statutes reforred to that mandate
the County do zoning "all in one piece)) or "all at one time."
Beyond a mere assertion that doing zoning in piecemeal violates Idaho
Code § 67-6511, Camas County gives no other support for their contention. In no
way does the application of § 67-6506 prevent zoning from being done in
accordance Vlith the comprehensive plan. 2 Further, zoning is commonly done on
a piecemeal basis, and as long as it is in accordance Vlith the comprehensive plan.

it does not violate § 67-6511. The application of ~ 67-6506 in this case would not
and does not change this. The Court is in no way declaring or even implying that
zoning should not be done in accordance with the comprehensive plan. Applying
the conflict of interest requirements of § 67-6506 supports, rather than prohibits,
the concept that zoning should occur for various parcels at various times. I.e. §

l In £:'lct, had the zoning in this case been done in a piecemeal fashion so that conflicted members could
have recused themselves during proceedings which involves land in which they have an economic Interest,
while still participated in proceedings which involves land in which they did not have an economic interest,
there would be no issue for this Court to decide.

DECISION ON CONFLJCT OF INTERESTS ISSUE FOR PURPOSES OF A PRELIMINARY
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67-6506 only prevents parties with an economic interest from participating in the
zoning affecting their particular property.
2.) Economic Int~rest and its affect on the proceedings at issue
Camas Cq~ty next 31'gues that Martin has failed to meet his burden of
proof by pointing to the fact that "no evidence exists suggesting that either
gentleman lobbied Or advocated for particular zones, Or that either discussed his
ownership of properties with other members of the Planning and Zoning
Commission or the Board of Commissioners.',3 Camas County contends that it is

incumbent on Martin to prove that any change in zoning designations were
motivated by an economic interest, which resulted in a direct pecuniary benefit,
and which adversely affected him.
It is undisputed that both. Smith's and Backstrom's property were directly

affected by the zoQing changes and that they were both in a position to possibly

influence or perhaps direct changes to zoning: at a minimum both participated in
the decision to malce such changes.

The language ofIdaho Code § 67-6506 is clear and unambiguous; it
certainly contains no requirement that a party who has an economic interest must
reap a direct pecuniary benefit or that there must be some direct adverse harm
directly to the plaintiff The statl.lte states that any "actual or potential interest'
in any proceeding must be disclosed. See IDAHO CODE A. . .'N § 67-6506 (emphasis

:' Through their assertion, Defendants have squarely identified the major complaint dlat has led to the
current lawsuit: the fact that there is little in [he way of any record to figure out what was discussed,
considered, disclosed, and/or voted on. In order for this COLHi or any interested citizen to review in order ~o
make an informed decision about disputes or to detel111ine if conflicts were ever disclosed, it record is

mandatory.
DECISION ON CONFLICT OF INT~STS ISSUE FOR PURPOSES OF A PRELIMINARY
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added). Moreover, it prohibits "participating in any aspect ofthe decision making

process. .,
The Court needs look no further than Manookian v. Blaine County to
analyze this issue. InManookian v. Blaine County, the Chair of the Planning and
Zoning Commission, and a member of the Board of County Commissioners
owned land on whlch one of several proposed alternative routes for a power line
might cross. 112 Idaho 697, 703 (1987). After the P & Z recommended, and the
Board approved an alternate route which did not cross the property of either of the
members, the affected property owners challenged the actions alleging a conflict
of interest under § 67-6506. Jd. Though the conflicted members did not even vote
in the ultimate decision~ their participation alone was sufficient to taint the

proceedings and thereby invalidate them. ld (Emphasis added). The Court did
not require a showing on the part of plaintiffs that either conflicted member
lobbied or received any direct pecuniary benefit from the proceedings.
Following A1anookian and the clear language of Idaho Code § 67-6506,
this Court does not believe that the Martin need make a showing any greater than
what was required of the plaintiffs in Manookian. That lS, Martin need not show

that the cont1icted members reaped any sort of pecuniary benefit or show that
Martin was in any way adversely affected. Martin need only show that the
conflicted members had an economic interest in the proceedings in which they
participated. Jd
Camas County goes to some length to point out that land holdings of
Smith and Backstrom which were rezoned were not the only areas that were
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rezoned, and that any changes in zoning were consistent with the comprehensive
plan and were not singled out for favorable or unfavorable treatment. In essence,
the argument is made that if enough other property is rezoned at the same time)

actualconflic!s of interest can be ignored. There is no support in the Jaw for this
proposition. TIus same argument was made in Manookian, where the appellants
argued that the construction of high voltage lines across a person's property does
not have the type of "economic effect" contemplated by § 67·6506. See 112
Idaho at 701. Further, the dissent in that case even noted that the parties who
were fOtUld to have "conflicts of interest" denied that their property either

increased or decreased in value:1 112 Idaho at 703. In Manookian, plaintiffs
were not required to prove the amount of economic interest that was present on
the part of the conflicted members, nor were they required to prove an increase or
decrease in the value of the conflicted members property or of their own propertyj
they were simply required to prove that an economic interest existed, and despite
arguments to the COl1iTary, the majority in that case noted that transmission lines
impact the land they occupy, and that depending on the present and future use of
the property, there are multiple ways the property could be economically
impacted.ld. at 701 (emphasis added).
Analogous to the economic impact fOfmd to exist in Manookian so as to
malce I.e. § 67-6506 applicable, Martin, in this case, need not prove the amount
of economic interest present on the part of Smith and Backstrom, but instead need

4

Similar assertions were made during the court hearing, where Defendant Ed Smith was questioned as to

his lack of intent to develop. sell, or build on any of the land that he owned which was up-zoned during the

process in question.
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only prove that one existed and that the conflicted parties stilJ participated.
Distinguishable and even more egregious than the parties in Manookian, the
parties here not only participated in the proceedings, but took part in voting as
well. Whether up-zoned or dOWTl~zoned, the ability to subdivide the land into
,

I

smaller parcels or

put it to a use that it would not have otherwise had absent the

zoning changes, impacts the land in an economic way which can be measured and
q·uantified. See Id. at 701.
The Court rejects Camas County's arglunents that, first, these proceedings,

even if they were legislative~ would necessarily be eXel1ipt from a conflict of
interest analysis. Second. the Court rejects the suggestion these proceedings were
legislative; only some might have been. Smith and Backstrom participated in
proceedings that required notice and hearing and were unquestionably "quasijudicial". Third, Martin need not show that a public official actually benefitted

from the conflict of interest. Fourth, whether Smith or Backstrom actually voted
is of 110 legal significance; participation in a quasi-judicial proceeding is enough.

Fifth, the magnitude or contemplated size of the rezone is no shield against the
requirements ofLe. 67-6506.

3.) Appropriate Remedy.

Camas County has argued that even if the Court finds there to be a
violation of I.e. § 67-6506 either becallse the participatio11 of Smith, (who o"WIled
property whlch was positively affected by zoning recommendations which he

participated in making to the Board of Commissioners), or because of the
participation of Backstrom, (who also owned property which was favorably
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affected by actions which were taken and approved with his participation on the
Board of Commissioners), the proper remedy is to simply disregard the conflicted
member's vote. Camas County urges such an outcome because this was a county~
wide process, and there has been no showing of undue influence by Smith or
Backstrom. However, the Court is .tm-persuaded, and finds that simply
disregarding a conflicted member's vote is not sufficient to purge the taint that a
conflict of interest may have had on the proceedings leading up to the vote.

First, Camas County cites to no Idaho authority to support the proposition
that the appropriate remedy, where a conflict of interest exists, is to simply
disregard the conflicted members vote. The Court finds the language of Idaho
Code § 67-6506 to be clear and unambiguous. Manooki(.ln v. Blaine Counly. 112
Idaho 697, 701 (Idaho 1987). "Where a conflict of interest exists a commission
member 'shall not participate in any proceeding or action ... ,., See Id; see also
lDAIjO CODE ANN

§ 67-6506. Further, such a member is prohibited from

participating even ifhe or she will not vote. s Sprenger, Grubb & Associates, Inc"
v, City oj Hailey, 127 Idaho 576,584 (Idaho 1995).

In Manookian v, Blaine County, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the District Court which concluded that the participation oft\vo

planning and zoning members who had an econon:lic interest in the matters
presented to them for decision, and who participated in the hearings before the
Planning and Zoning commission consti1uted a violation ofI.C. § 67-6506. The

See 2006 Idaho Session Laws, H.B. No. 724, ell. 2 [3 which amended Idaho Code 67·6506 to furthel'
prohibit conflicted members from even testifYing at, or presenting evidence to, a public hearing Or simi1l1r
public process.

5
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effect of such participation rendered the decisions of the county planning and
7..oning commission and the Board of County Commissioners illegal and without

force and effici. Id The Idaho Supreme Court fiuther noted that even though the
coirllicted members disqualified themselves before the voting took place) the
language ofl.C. § 67·6506 bars them from participating in the proceedings at all.
Under the Court's reading of Manookian, disregarding the vote of a
conflicted member is not appropriate.

ORDER
The Court concludes,fiw purposes of a preliminary injunction only, that conflicts

of interest existed at both the planning and zoning and county commissioner level which
will likely, upon trial, render Camas County's passage of the March 2007 zoning

amendments illegal and without further force and effect. If the Court were entering final
judgment today, this would be the result mandated by law without regard to whether

Martin himselfhas suffered or is suffering il1'eparable harm, or any harm whatsoever. As
it is, it would appear to be irreparable harm to all the citizens of Camas County if the

Court were to allow Camas County to proceed with zoning changes based on a void or

illegal ordinance. As with the prior order granting a preliminary injunction, the evidence
supporting it comes from the County's 0\\11 agents or employees, and is unlikely to
change at trial.
The Court finds, again, relying on the cases cited in its earlier decision, that the
right here is very clear. Accordingly, the injunction previously entered is hereby
continued in full force and effect. TI1is order constitutes a wholly independent and
separate order, and a separate basis for an injunction; dissolving one or the other of these
injunctions would not affect the other.
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A Court Trial is scheduled in Camas County for Tuesday, May 20,2008. It will

not be continued under any circumstances, as these matters need to be finalized and
have tbe utmost priority.
No bond is required of plaintiff pursuant to Rule 65(c). TI1is order is not a final
order pursuant to Rule 54(b) and is subject to modification or revision at any time.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated thisd.tJ day of April, 2008

District Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY
GEORGE MARTIN,
Plaintiff,
and
MARTIN CUSTOM HOMES, LLC,

)
)
) Case No.: CV-2007-24
)
)
) FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
) LAW, and ORDER FOLLOWING TRIAL
)
)
)
)
)

vs .
ED SMITH,
Defendant

)

and
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO,
By and through the duly elected
Board of Commissioners in
the ir official capacities,

KEN BACKSTROM ,

BILL DA VIS, and
RON CHAPMAN

)
)

)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)

)
Defend ants.

)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 4,2007, the plaintiff filed a petition alleging Breach of Contract, a claim
for Tortious Interference with Contract, and, in Count III , a Petiti on for Declaratory
Judgment or in the Alternative Petition for Judicial Review. This last claim has proceeded
primarily as a petition for declaratory judgment rather than as a claim for judicial review.
An amended petition was filed on or about December 13,2007.
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Plaintiff George Martin applied for and was denied a temporary restraining order
and later a preliminary injunction on the issue of whether Camas County had a duly
constituted planning and zoning commission. The decision denying that relief was filed
on or about August 9, 2007.
Thereafter, Martin applied for and was granted a preliminary injunction on the
issue of whether Camas County was required to or did maintain a "transcribable verbatim
record" of certain proceedings as required by Idaho Code § 67-6536. That decision was
entered and filed on December 28, 2007.
Martin again applied for a preliminary injunction on the issue of whether certain
Camas County Commissioners, or others, had prohibited conflicts of interest. This court
entered a written decision on that issue along with a second injunction on April 2, 2008.
In that decision, the court also re-examined the question of whether at least some of the
proceedings before the Camas Board of Commissioners were quasi-judicial in nature, and
thus required that a verbatim record be maintained.
Pursuant to IRCP Rule 65(a)(2), and by virtue of stipulations between the parties,
the court ordered the hearings on the applications for preliminary injunctions
consolidated with the trial. The evidence from them has become part of the trial record
and thus did not need to be repeated at trial.
Trial was held before the court sitting in Camas County without a jury on August
20,2008. The plaintiff has been represented throughout by Christopher Simms, Ketchum,
Idaho. Camas County has been represented throughout by the firm of Moore, Smith,
Buxton, & Turcke, Chartered, of Boise, Idaho. Phillip Collaer, of Anderson, Julian, &
Hull, of Boise, was excused from attending the trial. Following trial, the parties submitted
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briefs, the last coming on September 26, 2008. At that time, the court took this matter
under advisement.

INTERIM DECISIONS FROM THE IDAHO APPELLATE COURTS
While this case has been pending, the Idaho Supreme Court has entered a few
decisions in the area of land use planning; their affect on this case is unclear. Among
them are GiltnerDairy, LLCv. Jerome County, 145 Idaho 630,181 P.3d 1238 (2008);

Highlands Developmenl Corporation v. City of Boise, 145 Idaho 958, 188 PJd 900
(2008); and Euclid Avenue Trust v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 306, 193 P.3d 853 (2008).
The Giltner Dairy and Highlands Development cases raise issues such as whether judicial
review of certain zoning decisions is available to aggrieved parties, while Euclid Avenue
clarifies that a petition for judicial review, being an appellate proceeding, may not be
combined with other claims for relief.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Overview

I.) The court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. Venue is
proper.
2.) This court reiterates and re-adopts its decision filed December 28,2007
regarding Camas County's failure to keep and maintain an adequate transcribable
verbatim record, and its decision filed April 2, 2008 on the issue of whether certain
conflicts of interest existed.
3.) This court will be the first to recognize that, while the distinction between
"legislative" and "quasi-judicial" activity has not always been clear, some of the Idaho
Supreme Court's recent decisions-notably Highlands Development Corporation v. City
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of Boise-cast doubt on whether and under what conditions a court

may review quasi-

judicial zoning decisions under the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act ("IDAPA"). See

Highlands Development Corporation v. City of Boise, 145 Idaho 958, 962-70, 188 P.3d
900, 904-12 (2008) (Jones, 1. dissenting). This court also recognizes the distinction the
Idaho Supreme Court clearly made in Euclid AvenueTrust that judicial review of
administrative activity should proceed as an appeal while, as different procedural rules
apply, the appellate and civil processes should not be allowed to proceed together. This
case was well underway before Euclid Avenue Trust was decided.
Although the court has paid significant attention to the issue of whether Camas
County's process of holding public hearings and maintaining a proper record was
legislative activity as opposed to quasi-judicial, most of that examination has focused on
determining what record the county was required to maintain, and not in determining
whether this case involves an appeal of arguably legislative activity. Admittedly, in its
decision on the "transcribable verbatim record" issue, the court paid a good deal of
attention to whether there could be an appeal from those administrative decisions. In its
next opinion, which concerned the conflicts of interest issue, this court clarified its earlier
decision by pointing out that at some time during the 2007 rezoning process, Camas
County clearly engaged in "quasi-judicial" activity when it held noticed public hearings
for the purpose of passing amendments to its Comprehensive Plan, and also when it
rezoned large portions of the county, if not all of it, during the March 2007 meetings.
The court's determination that a transcribable verbatim record was required turns
on its findings that the County engaged in deliberations leading up to the quasijudicial

public hearings at which the Comprehensive Plan and new zoning were adopted, and that

Findings of FacL Conclusions of Law, and Order Following Trial -- 4

2Cf3

the County did so without making any record of those deliberations. J Moreover, at the
time the court was reviewing the verbatim record issue, all of the evidence had not yet
been presented, and there were at least two open questions. One question involved
determining when the Board of Commissioners actually received a written
recommendation from the Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission ("P&Z"), so

that deliberations by the Board of Commissioners might have thereafter ensued in
violation of§ 67-6536. The second question concerned what the written recommendation
from P&Z might have contained.
The answer to those questions is that no one from Camas County can provide that
information. In other words, no one knows exactly what the Board of Commissioners
received from the P&Z, and no one can tell when it was received. Thus, no one can tell
precisely when the Board commenced "deliberating toward a decision after compilation
of the record." It is evident from the court's prior findings that the Board of
Commissioners was certainly having discussions "off the record" after it received P&Z's
recommendations, but before the public hearings commenced.
In this regard, the court wishes to clarify its view that Idaho Code § 67-6536
mandates a record of any deliberations once P&Z's recommendations have been
received, and that such deliberations are not confined or limited to discussions among the
Board of Commissioners once they have heard all the public testimony. Otherwise, the
Board gets to deliberate all they want after P&Z's recommendations have arrived, but
prior to the public hearings, and with no record maintained as to what was discussed.
The Board then gets to come to whatever conclusions they desire. If that happens, the
I "When a statute requires notice and hearing as to the possible effect of a zoning law upon property rights
the action of the legislative body becomes quasi-judicial in character." Jerome County v. Holloway, 118
Idaho 681, 799 P.2d 969 (1990).
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public hearings become a sham. Without a record, the public has no assurance this is not
exactly what has happened. The "record" here-P&Z's recommendations-was
obviously received and discussed by the Board in some fashion for quite some time
before any public hearings commenced.
The court also views Idaho Code § 67-6356 as requiring a verbatim record if a
board engages in a quasi-judicial proceeding, and deliberates with an objective of
reaching a decision, regardless of whether an appeal is ullimately available to some

party.
4.) Camas County has argued long and hard in this case that its actions were
legislative, not quasi-judicial, and thus are exempt from judicial review. While counties'
legislative actions are subject to collateral actions such as declaratory judgments, they
cannot be attacked by judicial review. Burt v. City ofIdaho Falls 105 Idaho 65, 665 P.2d
1075 (1983): Cooper v. Ada County Commissioners, 10] Idaho 407,614 P.2d 947 (1980).
A trial and several evidentiary hearings were held on three preliminary injunction issues.
Here, the plaintiff clearly indicated at the commencement of trial he was proceeding on
the declaratory judgment aspects of this case, and did so by going forward with trial and
by presenting evidence and testimony. For these reasons, and for the reasons set forth
above, the court will review the facts and law and enter a decision as a declaratory
judgment, and not as a judicial review proceeding. Thus, while the court agrees that large
portions of the County's challenged activities may be legislative, certainly not all of the
County's activities are. More importantly, however, is that simply because the County's
actions may have been legislative in nature, and thus perhaps exempt from ajudiciaJ
review proceeding, this fact does not mean those actions are exempt from law.
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In order to accept Camas County's position, one must accept the proposition that
if a county acts on a broad enough scale and rezones enough property, it acts in a purely
legislative capacity. Thus, if it acts in a legislative capacity, it is essentially immune from
the legaJ requirements of LLUP A or any number of other statutory requirements, and
need not keep verbatim records of meetings or avoid conflicts of interest. Additionally,
under the county's position, its actions are not reviewable.
Camas County also suggests in its briefing that, in view of the recent decisions of
the Idaho Supreme Court, comprehensive plans, land use maps, zoning ordinances and
zoning maps rezoning property are no longer subject to the statutory review procedures
of LLUPA. Time will tell.

B. New Findings and conclusions.
5.) The plaintiff still has civil causes of action pending against Camas County
based on whether the County acted appropriately in effecting the questioned rezones. The
issues in this case are not moot, and the plaintiff may or may not be entitled to attorney's
fees. Actions are not mooted by an amendment or replacement if the controversy is not
removed or the amendment or replacement does not otherwise resolve the parties' claims.

Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v Idaho State Board of Education ]28
Idaho 276,912 P.2d 644 (1995).
Two related principles bear on the mootness issue. The first is the public interest
doctrine. Even if a case is determined to be moot, if the issue presented is one of
substantial public interest, the issue may need to be addressed for future direction and
guidance. Johnson v. Bonner County School Dis/riel No. 82, 126 Idaho 490, 492,887
P.2d 35,37 (1994); Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v. Idaho State
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Board of Education 128 Idaho 276, 912 P.2d 644 (1995). The second principle is that,
even if a case could technically be deemed moot, it can fall within the exception of
"capable of repetition yet evading review." As the Court noted in Idaho Schools for

Equal Educational Opportunity, the county could pass new ordinances every year,
making any prior determinations arguably moot. 128 Idaho 26, 912 P.2d 644. As the
Court there stated, "Then, as in this case, each time a declaratory judgment action is filed
claiming the method of school funding is not 'thorough' under that year's standards, the
district court could dismiss the case as moot claiming those standards had been
sunsetted." ld. at 284, 912 P.2d at 651. Thus, "a situation arises wherein the case is
repetitive or continuing, but is incapable of being resolved." Id
The court notes that this situation has already presented itself here. On the heels
of this presently pending case, the plaintiff has already sought and been denied leave to
file an amended complaint alleging that the new ordinance passed in 2008-the one
Camas County claims renders this case moot-suffers from the same defects as the ones
being presently ruled upon. (See Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend Petition by

Adding Two Additional Causes of Action, filed on or after August 7, 2008 herein, and
Plaintiff's Applicationfor Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary injunction, and
Declaratory Relieffiled herein on or after August 7, 2008.). In these new pleadings that
the plaintiff sought to be made a continuing part of this case, the plainti ff has attacked the
very 2008 ordinances that the defendant claims have mooted the present case, and for
many of the very same reasons. The plaintiff should be entitled to a detel111ination of the
issues in this first case, as they directly impact the allegations in the second.
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6.) Camas County claims that the plaintifflacks standing. It is undisputed that the
plaintiff holds record interest in several parcels of real estate situated throughout various
portions of Camas County. (See attached Stipulation.). Pursuant to that stipulation, at
least some of the plaintiff s property was rezoned, apparently down zoned from AT to
AS. (See Paragraph 15 of Stipulation.). In addition, the plaintiff may be affected ifhis
neighbors are allowed to develop adjoining property in a rural area. See Evans v Teton

County, 139 Idaho 71, 73 PJd 84 (2003); Cowan v. Fremont County, 143 Idaho 50 1, 148
PJd 1247 (2006). The plaintiff has also claimed that the county will allow development
on several parcels near his, and that by allowing nearby properties to be upzoned
(including parcels belonging to commissioners that have been upzoned in violation of
conflicts of interest statutes), the county has acted with an evil motive and in a manner
that deprives the plaintiff of both of due process and equal protection. Those civil
damages claims, though filed in this action, have yet to be resolved. For the above
reasons, the court concludes that the plaintiff has standing.
7.) In making amendments to the Comprehensive Plan in March, 2007, Camas
County used very little new information. The general consensus of the Board of
Commissioners was that old information was still valid. The Board felt the zoning
ordinances needed to be amended because of gro\Nth in Camas County. At least one
Board member admits that the Board permitted new density in new areas of the county
without knowing the impact of new zoning and without obtaining any new studies. In the
same breath, that same board member also admits that the Board did not anaJyze how
new development would affect roads or transportation.
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8.) A large-scale rezone of the county was effected in March, 2007. The county
claims that the original recommendation from the P&Z Board was for a large rezone and
that the County Board then gave public notice and re-zoned the entire county on or after
March 14, 2007. This has not been the subject of testimony or argument, though it may
be ascertainable by lengthy and protracted review of the evidence. However, the court is
not resolving this issue. The March 2007 rezone involved a contemporaneous amendment
to the Comprehensive Plan and did effect a rezone, at least by estimates, of 10,000 to
20,000 acres, ifnot the whole county.
9.) There is an area of Camas County known as the "recharge" area, which is the
area within the southern half-mile or so of the base of the Smoky Dome peaks. Prior to
the March 2007 rezone this was zoned "Agricultural"; after the rezone it has some
residential zoning. In some of this area, the county had a land use map that designated
this area as "Agricultural TransitionaL" or "Ag Tran." The parties seem to agree that
obtaining an actual rezone to Ag Tran required an application to P&Z, and approval by
the Board. The Board, however, felt that because of the map, they had no way to deny
any applications for a rezone from "Ag" to Ag Tran. The Board apparently rezoned this
area in March, 2007 without any recommendation from P&Z. Large portions of the
recharge area have also been rezoned from Ag to "Residential," and to zoning allowing
one house per five acres. No studies were apparently done to detennine the effects of the
rezone on water in the recharge area.
10.) In approximately 2006, the Board of Commissioners, or some of its
members, approached the Camas P&Z Commission and asked them to come up with a
new zoning map for Camas County. This may have been the Board's response to its own
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opinion that they could not prohibit rezone applications from Ag to Ag Tran in those
areas of the county designated Ag Tran by the existing map. The inference the court
draws is that this request by the Board or some of its members was oral and is not in the
record. If it is, the court has not been directed to it.
11.) There is no written record of any recommendations in this regard that

the Camas P&Z Commission ever completed and sent to the Board. That is, there is
no record that P&Z ever prepared and sent to the Camas County Board of Commissioners
any written recommendation for a rezone or an amendment to the Comprehensive Plan
that the Board could either accept or reject.
12.) At least initially, P&Z was not attempting to rewrite the Comprehensive Plan,
but only attempting to comply with the Board's request for a zoning map. Partway
through the process, P&Z determined it had to change the Comprehensive Plan and map
in order to get to the zoning map. P&Z chose not to gather new data because its members
felt not much had changed. P&Z did not consider the whole of the county in making
whatever recommendations it did make, and in fact, did not make any recommendations
as to changes in the Comprehensive Plan. According to the testimony, this failure to
consider the whole of the county was "rectified in 2007," apparently by the Board. The
court has not been directed to the record to confirm that any of that action was attributed
to the P&Z Commission.
13.) According to the testimony from P&Z members there is no written
recommendation from the P&Z to the Board, as noted above. What was sent to the Board
was a compromise consisting of a single big "proposed land use map," together with
additional maps submitted by each P&Z commissioner that contained what each would
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like to see. What is important is that whatever map(s) was sent to the Board, if such
a map by ilselfcould constitute a written recommendation pursuant to Idaho Code § 676509, is not now before the court. Trial Exhibit 0 is not it. There is not, therefore, any

record maintained by Camas County as required by Idaho Code § 67-6509(a) of the
"hearings, findings made, and actions taken by the commission." These maps went
to the Board sometime in 2006, although it is impossible to say when. At least one P&Z
commissioner testified that at the time he raised the issue that the law required the P&Z
commission to send a written recommendation to the Board to accompany the
documents, but that it never happened.
14.) This failure to identify a written recommendation from P&Z to the

Board precedes and precipitates a number of other legal difficulties. Because there is
no \vritten recommendation that can be identified from the P&Z to the Board, it is
impossible to tell when the Board received whatever it is they did receive, and therefore
impossible to tell when the Board commenced its "deliberations." It is obvious from the
court's prior findings made after the second injunction hearings-the transcribabJe
verbatim record issue-that the Board discussed these recommendations before [hey ever

gal to public hearing or were even noticedfor public hearings. The minutes are clear that
on November 28, 2006, in a meeting at which no record was kept, the "Board continued
discussing the proposed new Zoning Ordinance." (Defendants Exhibits, Pg. 318.). The
same thing occurred on December 11,2006, when the Board reviewed the Subdivision
Ordinance and proposed changes, and the Board "discussed the Camas County Zoning
Ordinance" and "The Board discussed the City Area ofImpact." Other unrecorded
meetings at which "the P&Z map" and the "proposed Zoning and Land Use Map" and the
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proposed ordinances were discussed by the Board occurred on December 26, 2007,
January 8, 2007, and February 20, 2007. (See Pgs 13 and 14 of the Decision on

Requirements of a Transcribable Verbatim Record and Other Records for Purposes of a
Preliminary Injunction filed herein December 28,2007.). Because there is no record of
what was discussed, it is impossible for the county to deny that these are "deliberations
toward a decision after compilation of the record."
In addition, because it is not possible to identify precisely what recommendations
the Board received, it is virtually impossible for the county to give proper legal notice as
to what would transpire at upcoming public meetings.

I.e. § 67-6509 states, "If the

governing board will conduct a subsequent public hearing, notice of the planning and
zoning commission recommendation shall be included in the notice of public hearing
provided by the governing board." Without a written recommendation from P&Z, this
requirement became almost impossible for the county to comply with. The County
attempts to get around these requirements by suggesting the proposed maps were on
display somewhere so that the public could go look at them in order to comment at public
hearings. However, unless the public has other maps available to illustrate what changes
are proposed, such a map would mean little. It is the \Nritten recommendation that the
public needs, and that the law requires, in order to know what is proposed.
Finally, without a written recommendation from P&Z that can now be identified,
it is difficult for the county to argue that they complied with I.e § 67-6509 by giving
notice of, and adopting, a proposed plan. If there was not a written proposed plan, what
did the Board adopt'? Presumably, the Board adopted a map that cannot now be located
Moreover, it is impossible to tell whether any changes or how many changes were made
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to the proposed "map" after its receipt, which would require additional hearings pursuant
to the same statute. There were at least some changes because the county claims it made
amendments on approximately March] 4, 2007 to include the whole county. It is also
evident from the minutes of the December 11, 2006 meeting that Commissioner Ken
Baxtrom was directed to "meet with the attorney to make the recommended revisions and
forward on to the Planning and Zoning Commission." Were those changes the subject of
additional hearings as required? Without knowing what recommendations originally went
up to the Board, it is impossible to know whether the final result was the subject of
proper hearings or not.
15.) The plaintiff and Camas County entered into a written stipulation filed herein
on May 21,2008 entitled "Stipulation as to Facts and Admission of Documentary
Evidence." A true and correct copy of that stipulation consisting of 6 pages is attached
hereto and incorporated herein by this reference, and the court adopts all of that
stipulation into these findings of fact. Alleged deficiencies in publication oflegal notices
are set forth in the stipulation at paragraphs 8, 9, 10, II, 12, and 13. When these
deficiencies are combined with the failure of the county to identify a written
recommendation from the P&Z Commission, the effect

IS

exponential.

16.) The Camas County Comprehensive Plan was amended during the same
March 2007 hearings that the county was rezoned. There is no formal written
recommendation from the Camas P&Z to the Board to amend or adopt amendments to
the Comprehensive Plan. (See Stipulation, Paragraphs 5 and 6.). This would appear to
violate Idaho Code § 67-6509. When asked at trial by the plaintiff s counsel where in the
record it appeared that the county considered the Comprehensive Plan and other evidence
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before adopting the amendments to the zoning code, Commissioner Backstrom gave an
answer sugge.sting that process occurred in his head, and if there had been discussions
about that issue with his fellow commissioners it had occurred over the years from time
to time.
However, as the court advised counsel, the court would not listen to the tapes in
order to ascertain events. The tapes are in evidence. This answer, however, suggests that
the county may not have properly considered the Comprehensive Plan in making
amendments to the zoning ordinance, or may not have considered the Comprehensive
Plan and the zoning amendments in the proper order. Idaho Code § 67 -6511 (c) provides
that "[a]fier the plan has been amended, the zoning ordinance may then be considered
for amendment pursuant to section 67-6511 (b), Idaho Code." I.e. § 76-6511 (Emphasis
added). See also Price v. Payette County Bd O/Com'rs, 131 Idaho 426,958 P.2d 583
(1998). The court makes no factual finding in this regard one way or the other, except to
the extent stipulated by the parties.
17.) This issue is magnified, however, by the failure of the county to "generate

any independent formal written record of decision of adoption of Ordinance 150 or
153 other than the Ordinance itself." (See Stipulation, Paragraph 7.). An amendment to
a zoning ordinance must be in accordance with the adopted plan. Love v. Board a/County

Commissioners, 105 Idaho 558,671 P.2d471 (1983). Although the court recognizes the
county's assertion that the very new decisions by the Idaho Supreme Court have modified
50 years of case law, this court is not so sure. As matters now stand, it appears that cases
like Price v Payette County Board a/Commissioners, 131 Idaho 426,958 P.2d 583

(1998); Love v. Board a/County CommisSioners, 105 Idaho 558, 67J P.2d471 (1983);
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and Cowan v. Fremont County, 143 Idaho 50] l 148 PJd 1247 (2006), are still good law.

This court recognizes that some of those decisions involve judicial review ofzoning
decisions. The court also recognizes that the action of the county in rezoning large
portions of the county may be entirely legislative activity. See Burt v. Idaho Falls, 105
Idaho 65, 665 P.2d 1075 (1983). However, neither of those issues is the focus here.
Rather, the focus here is to determine,for purposes of declaratory judgment,
whether Camas County complied with applicable law in enacting new zoning ordinances
in March of 2007. To this court, it appears that zoning decisions such as the one before
the court are quasi-judicial agency functions, in which the public is given notice and an
opportunity to be heard, and where evidence and testimony are taken. As such, it still
appears that "The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (I.A.P.A.) governs the review of
local zoning decisions." Price v. Payette County Board of Commissioners, 130 Idaho,
426,958 P.3d 583 (1998) Therefore, this court believes that: 1.) because this is an action
for declaratory relief, and 2.) because the county is engaged in a quasi-judicial function
when exercising its authority here, it matters not whether the county was acting on a
request from a particular landowner for a change in zoning or whether the Board was
considering a request or recommendation from its own P&Z Commission to amend
zoning. The fact is the county has taken evidence and testimony in the exercise of a quasi-

judicia/function and therefore due process considerations apply. Thus, the county must
make written findings oJJact and conclusions of 1mI'. The Price case and numerous Idaho
decisions say as much. Whether the county is acting on a particular application or on its
own recommendation from its P&Z affects whether a party might be able to seek
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judicial review, but it does not affect the requirements imposed by statutes and case law
as to whether the county must make written findings and conclusions.
The county suggests that the recent decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court in

Highlands Development Corp. v. Boise and Giltner Dairy v. Jerome County change this
result. In addressing whether findings of fact or conclusions of law are required, the
county states that "[a Js the Supreme Court has made patently clear in Giltner and

Highlands, there must be an application or permit to invoke the quasi-judicial review
provisions ofLLUPA." (Defendant's Trial Brief, pg. 12.). In other words, the county's
position is that as long as no one is able to seek judicial review of a county zoning
decision, even though the county Board has taken evidence and testimony in the exercise
of a quasi-judicial function, the Board does not need to identify the evidence or testimony
on which it relies in rezoning 10,000 to 20,000 acres, or an entire county.
This court does not believe Giltner and Highlands Development stand for so
broad a proposition. If it was the Idaho Supreme Court's intent to overrule significant
case law on point they would have more explicitly done so. Instead, it appears to this
court that both Giltner and Highlands turn on much narrower grounds-i.e., the right to

judicial review. Each case says as much. In Giltner Dairy the issue is directly stated as:
"Did Giltner Dairy have a right to file a petition/or judicial review of an amendment to
the comprehensive plan map"? GiltnerDairy, LLC v. Jerome County, 145 Idaho 630, 632,
181 P.3d 1238, 1240 (2008) (Emphasis added). In Highlands Development, the Supreme
Court again phrased the issue as, "Did the District Court Err in Dismissing the Petition

for Judicial Review?" Highlands Development Corp v. Boise, 145 Idaho 958, 960, 188
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PJd 900, 902 (2008) (Emphasis added). In each case the Supreme Court determined that
the allegedly aggrieved party had no right 10 judicial review.
There is, unfortunately, language in Giltner Dairy that could be interpreted to
mean that IDAP A does not apply at all to zoning decisions. If that were so, then the
Supreme Court, without saying so, has overruled a number of Idaho cases and done away
with any requirements that zoning bodies keep records or identify the basis of their
decisions. Such a decision would eliminate even declaratory relief actions such as this
one. The Supreme Court stated in Highlands that they did not intend to eliminate other
causes of action. It is this court's belief that the language quoted in Giltner Dairy about
the applicability of IDAP A to the issue before the Supreme Court was not intended to
eliminate a county's responsibility to make findings of fact in quasi-judicial zoning
matters. It was instead intended to clarify that the APA conferred no separate right to

an appeal of county zoning activity by way o/judicial review. That is what Giltner Dairy
was about. No more and no less. The case starts with that discussion and never varies
from it. There, the Court stated:
In its briefing, Giltner Dairy contends it is entitled to judicial
review under (he Idaho Administrative Procedures Act .... The
language of the lAPA indicates that it is intended to govern the
judicial review of decisions made by state administrative agencies,
and not local governing bodies. During oral argument, Giltner
Dairy admitted that the right [0 obtain judicial review in this case
must come from a statute other than the lAPA. During oral
argument, Giltner Dairy relied upon Idaho Code 67-6521 for a
right (0 appeal. "
GiltnerDairy, 145 Idaho 630, 632, J 81 P.3d 1238,1240 (emphasis added).
In Giltner Dairy, the Idaho Supreme Court clarified only that Giltner Dairy was
not an aggrieved party for purposes of appeal by way of judicial review. Highlands did
not change this result, but in fact reinforced it.
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On the other hand, there is a wealth of Idaho case law on the question of whether
zoning bodies must enter written findings and conclusions of law on zoning decisions.

See e.g. Evans v. Telon County, 139 Idaho 71, 73 PJd 84 (2003). Whether Giltner Dairy
and Highlands are intended to overturn all aspects of cases such as Evans v. Teton

County, Price v. Payette County, and Comer v. County of Twin Falls is anyone's guess.
Until the Supreme Court has explicitly said that this has happened, this court believes its
obligation is to follow existing law.
The following language is taken from Cowan v. Board of Com 'rs of Fremont

County decided less than 2 years ago:
For effective judicial review of the quasi-judicial actions of zoning
boards, there must be ... adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Conclusory statements are not sufficient; instead, what is needed for
adequate judicial review is a clear statement of what, specifically, the
decisionmaking body believes, after hearing and considering all the
evidence, to be the relevant and important facts upon which its decision is
based. (Citation omitted). However, a board of commissioners may adopt
a planning and zoning commissions' findings and conclusions because
I.e. § 67-6535 requires only that findings and conclusions be made.
143 Idaho 501,148 P.3d 1247 (2006) (emphasis added) (internal citations
omitted).
Because

I.e. §§ 67-6535(a) and (b) refer to "applications," the county suggests it

is exempt from requirements to enter findings and conclusions imposed by existing case
law. I-listoricaIIy, land use and zoning decisions have been appealable pursuant to
LLUPA and the APA, and findings of fact and conclusions oflaw have been required in
order to facilitate these appeals. Whether the Supreme Court has intended to do away
with requirements that counties enter findings of fact and conclusions oflaw following
quasi-judicial zoning hearings in cases that do not involve specific "applicants" remains
to be seen. Until that happens, this court believes they are still, and should be, required.
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If they are only required in cases where there is a narrowly qualified right to
judicial review, a county would be free to engage in "legislative activity" and rezone an
entire county without stating any standards and without indicating in any fashion what
evidence, if any, has been accepted and/or relied upon from public hearings. This would
also empower counties to rezone without reciting whether the zoning amendments in any
way conform to or have even been compared with a comprehensive plan. In that event,
the right to bring an action for declaratory relief in order to determine whether the county
has functioned according to law is worth little. Working back further into the whole
hearing process-without a requirement that there be a record and findings of fact and
conclusions of law-there would seem to be little benefit to having hearings or giving
notice.
This court believes these issues have already been addressed, though the same
sticky question sometime arises as to whether the zoning board is addressing a particular
rezone application. This court does not believe that should be the determinative factor.
From the case law, it appears that a county that engaged in purely legislative activity has
always been exempt from judicial review. However, in Jerome COUnfy v Holloway, the
Idaho Supreme Court states flatly that "[w]hen the statute requires notice and hearing as
to the possible effect of a zoning law upon property rights the action of the legislative

body becomes quasi-judiCial in character .... " 118 Idaho 681, 799 P.2d 969 (1990)
(emphasis added). The Cowan court likewise addressed this issue in the passage quoted
above. In addition, the Idaho Supreme Court stated in Chambers v. Kootenai County

Board of Commissioners that once there is a quasi-judicial decision, procedural
safeguards must be followed:
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This Court, in setting a standard o(due process (Or quasi-judicial
proceedings, held that: (a) a board of commissioners' failure to provide
notice of its second meeting regarding an application (after the public
hearing) where staff views were expressed; (b) the absence ofa
transcribable verbatim record of the proceedings; and (c) the failure fO
make specific findings ofjact and conclusions upon which a decision was
based, did not comport with notions o[procedural due process. In
addition, the opportunity to present and rebut evidence, which.is inferred
from the right to notice and specific findings of fact, is an element of due
process.
125 Idaho 115,867 P.2d 989 (1994) (emphasis added).
Thus, it is this court's conclusion that the question of whether a county
board must produce vvritten findings and conclusions when changing county
zoning laws is not connected to whether there is an identified "applicant," or
whether most of the activity to a given point is legislative activity, or even
whether an appeal pursuant to a judicial review proceeding is possible. Instead,
once proceedings reach the quasi-judicial stage-which, it did here because the
county engaged

In

hearings and took evidence and testimony pursuant to statutory

notice and hearing requirements-due process, if nothing else, requires the county
to make specific findings of fact and conclusions upon which a decision is based.
18.) There is no written record of what the Board did in amending the
Comprehensive Plan in March, 2007. There is nothing in v,Titing to confirm that
the Board did or did not consider amendments to the Comprehensive Plan before

amending zoning throughout the county. There is nothing in writing to confirm
what evidence or findings or data or criteria or rationale, if any, the county relied
upon in amending the Comprehensive Plan. There does not appear to be any
record of when or if or how any P&Z commission's recommendations regarding
changes to the Comprehensive Plan actually came into the hands of the Board.
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19.) The legaJ notice of public hearings published on April 19: 2006, before the
Camas County Board of Commissioners public hearing heJd initially on May 17,2006
and continued until May 22, 2006, at which time an Amended Comprehensive Plan and
Land Use Map were adopted as Resolution #96, failed to contain the Planning and
Zoning Commission recommendation.

I.e. § section 67-6509(a) requires inclusion of the

P&Z commission's recommendation in the notice provided by the governing board if the
board will conduct another public hearing. (See Plaintiff s Exhibit C6.).
20.) The governing board made material changes to the Comprehensive Plan
Land Use Map under consideration at meetings held May 3,2006, May 10,2006, May
12, 2006, May 17, 2006, and May 22, 2006. Yet further notice and hearing were not
provided. This would violate I.C. § 67-6509(b). (See Plaintiffs Exhibits B2, B4, B5, B6,
and B7.).
21.) Legal notices of public hearing before the P&Z Commission and before the
Board to consider recommendation or adoption of Resolution 96, and Ordinances 150
and 153, did not contain a summary of proposed amendments. I.e. § 67-6509(a) requires
publication of a "summary of the plan to be discussed". (See Plaintiff s Exhibits C, C 1,
C4, C6, C7, and C8.).
22.) The legal notice of public hearing published February 21,2007, before the
Board's public hearing held March 14,2007, at which the Board adopted Ordinance ]50,
Amended Zoning Designation Map, failed to include the P&Z recommendation.

I.e. §

67-6509(a) requires inclusion of the P&[ commission's recommendation in the notice
provided by the governing board. (See Exhibit C8.).
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23.) Resolution #96, the Amended Comprehensive Plan and Land Use Map
adopted on May 22, 2006 included only the southern half of Camas County.

I.e. § 67-

6508 requires that "[t]he plan shall include all land within the jurisdiction of the
governing board." (See Plaintiffs Exhibit G, and Finding # 13 above.). It would appear the
Board adopted Resolution # 103, to include all of the land within the county. Pursuant to

I.e. §§ 67-6507, 6508,

and 6509, it is the duty of the P&Z commission to conduct the

process to prepare and update the Comprehensive Plan, to hold public hearings on it prior
to amending the plan, to send out public notice of the hearings, and to make
recommendations to the Board. The court cannot see where that process was ever
undertaken by the P&Z Commission and recommended to the Board with regard to the
northern half of the county.
The Board can, under § 67-6509(b), make material changes to the P&Z
recommendations and give notice and amend the plan. Purportedly the public hearing to
amend the plan occurred on March 14,2007. However, all of the agenda notices, the
legal notices, and the minutes, refer to amendments to the Comprehensive Plan 111al!.. (See
Plaintiff s Exhibit B31 (minutes of meeting); Exhibit C8 (legal notice for the March 14
meeting); and Exhibit F, pg. 25, (agenda for the meeting).).
24.) At least pal1 of the importance of adequate legal notices to the public is so
members of the public can make an informed determination of what will be discussed and
decide whether they wish to attend a particular public meeting. If legal notice is
inadequate, there are members of the public that would not attend, simply because they
had no knowledge that particular topics would be discussed. In that event, it is not
possible to measure or know what evidence or testimony from the public is missed; all
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that can be measured or known is the evidence or testimony from those who attended .
With that in mind it is no answer to those who allege that JegaJ notices of public hearings
were inadequate, to counter that "you attended that meeting" and therefore "you were
heard," and therefore "never mind that notice to the rest of the world was improper, or
never given." While that mayor may not be the rule in evaluating due process
considerations for judicial review purposes ("You were not aggrieved by a lack of notice
because you [often as aparty] were abJe to attend and present your evidentiary case ."),
that is not the rule that should be followed if public legal notice is inadequate in the
context of enacting ordinances such as these. Statutory notice requirements are conditions
precedent to the enactment of valid ordinances and may not be dispensed with.
25.) This case was tried on August 20, 2008 . On August 8,2008, plaintiff filed a

Motianfor Leave to Amend Petition by Adding Two New Causes of Action. The court by
wTinen order denied this motion as to new allegations seeking declaratory judgment
relief. The court allowed plaintiff to amend his complaint in this action to add claims
against the individual m embers of the Board, and to add claims for alleged due process
and equal protection violations. In that same order the court addressed, but did not rul e
upon, the advisability o f attaching a Rul e 54(b) certificate to this deci sion . Following
entry of that order, and the filing ofpJain tiffs amended complaint, defendants removed
the remainder of this action to federal court (presumably all the civil damage claims that
had remainded pending), by virtue of a Notice of Remo val filed November 10, 2008.
Therefore, after the entry of this decision, there is and will be nothing further pending in
this action. Even if the entire pending case has not been removed to federal court, or in
the event federa l jurisdiction is lost and some or all civil damage claims are once again
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pending in district court in Camas County, a Rule S4(b) Certificate is proper in this case.
Any and all other pending claims are bifurcated for separate trial, and involve separate
issues. See Snake River Equipment Co. v. Christensen 107 Idaho 54 J, 691 P .2d 787
(App. 1984) For the foregoing reasons, and the reasons set forth in its order allowing the
filing of the amended complaint, this court will attach a Rule S4(b) certificate to this
decision, and it will become a final order subject to appeal.

FINAL CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER
In summary, in addition to any conclusions that appear above, with regard to the
ordinances in question, the court concludes:
1.) The Board of Commissioners of Camas County failed to keep a transcribabJe
verbatim record of deliberations they engaged in, leading up to quasi-judicial public
hearings, after they received recommendations from P&Z and had compiled at least part
of the record.
2.) In recommending and passing Ordinances #153 and #150 at least one P&Z
commissioner and one county commissioner acted with a conflict of interest as set forth
in this court's Decision on ConfliCfS of interests Issue filed April 2, 2008. The court can
find no exception in the law for members of these bodies if they are acting in a
legislative, as opposed to a quasi-judicial capacity.
3.) The P&Z Commission failed to keep and maintain adequate records of the
hearings, findings made, and actions taken by the commission, and failed to send a
written recommendation to the Board as required by law. The map or maps that were sent
as recommendations cannot not be identified, and no one can identify when any
recommendations with regard to changing the Comp Plan or zoning were received.
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Because of these failures, and the failure to keep verbatim records of meetings, it
is impossible to tell when the Board commenced deliberations toward a decision, or what
changes or how many changes were made to the zoning or comp plan amendments by the
Board. Consequently, it is not possible to tell ifrequirements for additional public
hearings were met.
4.) The Board failed to make any written record of its decision. No findings of
fact or conclusions of law were entered on a decision that purportedly effected a rezone
of at least portions of the entire county. These are required after the Board has made a
quasi-judicial decision.
5.) The Comprehensive Plan includes far more than a Comp Plan Map. In
amending the Comprehensive Plan, the county has failed to follow proper legal
procedures and to provide proper legal notice. In amending zoning in Camas County, the
county has failed to follow proper legal procedures and provide proper legal notice.
6.) This is a civil judicial proceeding between a county and a person as defined in
Idaho Code 12-117. That same section provides the court shall award the prevailing party
reasonable attorney's fees if the court finds the party against whom judgment is entered
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or Jaw. For the reasons set forth herein, the court
concludes Camas County acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law, and plaintiff
may make application for an award of attorney's fees.
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ORDER
THE COURT HEREBY DECLARES, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES:
1.) The amendments to the Comp Plan adopted May 25, 2006 and March 29,
2007 as Resolution 96 are null and void.

2.) The amendments to the Camas County Zoning Ordinance, adopted April 18,
2007, as Ordinance #153, and the Zoning Designation Map adopted March 29, 2007 as
Ordinance # 150 are all, and each of them, null and void.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 2nd day of December, 2008.

Robert J~l
District Judge

ifr

RULE S4(B) CERTIFICA TE
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment or order is it hereby
CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(b) LR.C.P., that the court has determined that
there is no just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the court has and
does hereby direct that the above judgment or order shall be a final judgment upon which
execution may issue and an appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate
Rules.
DATED this~ day of December, 2008.

ROberttffr£fF
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~...-c:Lday of DECEMBER, 2008, I served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, document by depositing a copy
there of in the United States mail, postage prepaid by first class mail to the following:
Christopher P. Simms
US Bank Bldg., Suite 209
191 Sun Valley Road
P.O. Box 3123
Ketchum, Idaho 83340
Phillip J. Collaer
250 S Fifth St., Suite 700
P.O. Box 7246
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426
Paul Fitzer
950 W Bannock St., Ste 520
Boise, Idaho 83702

~~k~GeJ:T

Korri Blodgett, Deputy Clerk
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CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS
Attorney at Law
US Bank Bldg., Ste 209
191 Sun Valley Road
P.O. Box 3123
Ketchum, ID 83340
Tel: 208 622 7878
Fax: 2086227129
ISB# 7473
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Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS

GEORGE MARTIN,
Plaintiff,
and
MARTIN CUSTOM
HOMES, L.L.C.,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO,
By and through the duly elected
Board of Commissioners in
their official capacities,

KEN BAXTROM,
BILL DAVIS, and
RON CHAPMAN,
Defendants,

1.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
')
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2008-40

AFFIDA VIT OF ROBERT "BOB"
RODMAN IN OPPOSITION TO
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

My name is Bob Rodman. I am an adult human being over the age of 18 years,

and I am of sound mind. The statements made in this affidavit are made upon my own
personal knowledge and are true to the best of my knowledge.
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT "BOB" RODMAN IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

2.

I was an appointed volunteer member of the Camas County Planning and Zoning

Commission from July 2004 until October 2006. I was the vice chairman from January
2005 until October 2006. I served for much of the relevant periods pertaining to this
cause of action, and thereafter continue to closely monitor the progress of the proposed
rezone as an interested citizen.
3.

By virtue of serving on the P&Z Commission, and thereafter as an observing

interested citizen, I am familiar with the facts and issues pertaining to the current legal
action against the County, the process used to adopt the 2006-2007 Comprehensive Plan,
Land Use Map, Zoning Ordinance, and Zoning Map, (2006-2007 P&Z Documents) and
to a lesser extent the 2008 re-enactment of the above rezoning amended ordinances.
4.

Beginning in 2004 and continuing until Oct. 2006, I was continually involved in

the process of creating the 2006-2007 P&Z Documents.
5.

Beginning in 2006 and continuing until today, as a private citizen,

r

have

continued to monitor the activities of the P&Z and the Commissioners regarding the
issues at question in these legal proceedings.
6.

I have been a witness of record regarding the actions of the defendants in the

current trial. I have attended all court trial proceedings for this action.
7.

I have personally observed, and the limited court records made available from

Camas County supports, the following situations I was personally involved in or
observed:
a.

During my tenure on the P&Z, comment letters and oral testimony from

public hearings was routinely not discussed or deliberated on by the P&Z. No
questions presented by the public were ever answered in vvTiting. For example, in

AFFIDA VIT OF ROBERT "BOB" RODMAN IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

April of 2005, the Chairman of the County Board of Commissioners, Ron
Chapman, ordered the sheriff to investigate a meeting where several P&Z
members met and tried to discuss testimony and evidence presented by the public
and not available to the P&Z members at the meeting prior to the scheduled
deliberations.
b.

During my tenure, there was repeated questioning from myself and the

public regarding conflict of interest issues with the P&Z chairman. This was
never answered with any written or oral legal opinion.
c.

During my tenure, the election results

from

the vote for the

recommendation of two new P&Z members in the spring of 2006 was held on a
secret ballot.

The results were withheld from the public.

The results of the

"secret ballot" were only known by the County Commissioners. The two new
"secret" appointees announced by the Board were both contractors with potential
personal conflicts of interest.
d.

The P&Z, during my tenure, did not routinely seek or consider the input

from appropriate political subdivisions, including but limited to the City of
Fairfield, School District, Road and Bridge or Fire Districts. Only once did the
County Road Boss testify to the P&Z.

After that, a motion was passed that

prevented any expert testimony from anyone to appear before the P&Z.
e.

During my tenure, in spite of repeated requests by myself and others, the

County was never able to produce a "current zoning map". No record of the
current County zoning was ever available during the entire preparation and
adoption of the 2006-2007 P&Z Documents.

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT "BOB" RODMAN IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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f.

During my tenure, and at no time during the 2006-2007 P&Z Documents

adoption process, were the P&Z members ever able to find out how many existing
building lots were already approved and owned within the County. We were only
told that there were more than 2,500 land owners in Camas County.
g.

During my tenure, at no time at any P&Z meeting was there ever any

discussion of the aquifer recharge area and the protection of the County's drinking
water.
h.

During my tenure, when the P&Z was completing its work on the 2006

Comprehensive Plan, there was no consensus on a Land Use Map. As a solution,
the chairman requested that each member of the P&Z submit a map and all the
maps were presented to the Board to choose from. There was also never any
record of the decision or a finding of facts and conclusion of law submitted with
the documents.
1.

During my tenure, while the Board of Commissioners had the 2006

Comprehensive Plan Documents, they amended and rewrote the recommended
documents extensively, making many substantial changes (including such items
as a new land use designation, multi-use) without ever returning the documents to
the P&Z
J.

During my tenure, as the preparation of the 2007 Zoning Documents was

being completed by the P&Z, I, and members of the public, repeatedly made the
Board of Commissioner members aware that more information and consideration
was required before large tracts of land were rezoned from agricultural to
residential uses.

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT "BOB" RODMAN IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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k.

During my tenure and thereafter repeatedly throughout this process, I

informed member of P&Z and the Board that considering and adopting
amendments during meetings, where the subject had not published and noticed as
a public hearing was not fair to the public whose allowed property uses would
change was not advisable. The response was to ignore the advise.
1.

During my tenure I often saw and heard the members of the P&Z act with

prejudice against the Plaintiff and other members of the public who questioned
the process or criticized what appeared to be a pre-determined outcome. At two
different meetings during this period, the Sheriff or a deputy was present at the
meetings to "control the public and limit the testimony".

Dated this 1st day of April, 2009

AFFIANT/ROBERT "BOB" RODMAN

~~
ROBERT RODMAN

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 1st day of April, 2009.

My Commission Expires:

If)

ht~/ l-

T

I

Donna J Simms
Notary Public
State of Idaho

I
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Paul Fitzer, ISB No. 5675
MOORE SMITIl BUXTON & TuRCKE, ClITD.

950 W. Bannock St., Suite 520
Boise, ID 83702
Tel: 208/33111800
Fax: 208/331/1202

Attorneys for Defendants Camas County and the Individual Commissioners

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FlFfH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY

GEORGE MARTIN and MARTIN CuSTOM
HOMES, LLC,

Plaintiffs,
v.
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHo, by
and through the duly elected Board of
Commissioners in their official capacity,

KEN BACKSTROM, BILL DAVIS, and RON
CHAPMAN,

Defendants.

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2008-40

DEFENDANT'S REPLY
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

)
)

)
)
)

Defendant, Camas County, Idaho (the County), by and through its duly elected Board of
County Commissioners (the Board), Ken Backstrom, Bill Davis, and Ron Chapman (the

Individual Commissioners), (collectively, County Defendants). by and through their attorneys of
record, Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke, Chartered, filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on
or about February 11, 2009. Plaintiff filed its Response on or about April 1, 2009. Defendants
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now submit its Reply Memorandwn in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment A hearing
on the Motion for Summary Judgment has been set for April 13, 2009.

ARGUMENT

The declaratory judgment act is not a forum for those with general complamts about the
legislative conduct of one's local governing board. "It is not enough that the party is a concerned
citizen who seeks to ensure that a governmental entity abides by the law." Thomson v. City of

Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 50 P.3d 488 (2002). Legislative actions are to be evaluated. with a
restricted standard of review; as a form of judicial deference to legislative actions. Cooper v.
Ada County Comm'rs, 101 Idaho 407, 410, 614 P.2d 947, 952 (1980). A strong preswnption
exists in favor of the validity of local zoning ordinances. In determining whether a zoning
ordinance should be upheld, "our review of decisions of zoning authorities is limited. Zoning is
essentially a political, rather than a judicial matter, over which the legislative authorities have,
generally speaking, complete discretion. ... It is' not the function of this Court or of the trial
courts to sit as super zoning commissions." Dawson Enterprises, Inc. v. Blaine County, 98 Idaho
506,511,567 P.2d 1257, 1262 (1977). "Legislative action is shielded from direct judicial review
by its high visibility and widely feIt impact, on the theory that the appropriate remedy can be had

at the polls." Burt v. City ofIdaho Falls, 105 Idaho 65,68,665 P.2d 1075, 1078 (1983).
Summary judgment is mandated if the non-moving party fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element which is essential to the non-moving party's
case and upon which the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Gelotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322.106 S.Ct 2548, 91 L.Ed2d 265 (1986); Olsen v. J.A.
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Freeman, Co., 117 Idaho 706,791 P.2d 1285 (1990). The party opposing summary judgment
must present more than speculation that material issues exist. East Lizard Butte Water

Corporation v. Howell, 122 Idaho 679, 837 P.2d 805 (1992).

While all controverted facts

should be liberally construed in favor of the non-moving party, Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113
Idaho 37, 740, P.2d 1022 (1987), a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine
issue. R.G. NelsonA.lA. v. M.L. Steer, 118 Idaho 409,797, P.2d 117 (1990).

For zoning agency actions, a court must defer to the agency's findings of fact unless they
are clearly erroneous. Spencer v. Kootenai County, 145 Idaho 448, 452 180 PJd 487, 491
(2008). The agency's factual determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even when there

is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are supported by
evidence in the record. Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork v. Valley County, 145 Idaho 121,
126, 176 P.3d 126, 131 (2007). Planning and zoning decisions are entitled to a strong
presumption of validity. including the agency's application and interpretation of its own zoning
ordinances. Spencer, 145 Idaho at 452, 180 P.3d at 491.
The burden of proving that an ordinance is invalid rests upon the party challenging its
validity and the presumption in favor of validity can be overcome only by a clear showing that:

1. Hann: Plaintiff suffered a "distinct palpable injury";
2. Error: The County committed a procedural error or that the legislative activity "as
applied is confiscatory, arbitrary, unreasonable, and capricious";
3. Nexus: That the injury was sustained "by virtue of' or with a "fairly traceable causal

connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct."
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Kootenai County, 145 Idaho 448, 457, 180 P.3d 487, 496 (2008)("The

party attacking a zoning board's action must first illustrate that the board. erred in a manner
specified herein. and then must show that a substantial right of the party has been prejudiced."

Further, the Plaintiff must show that his substantial rights were prejudiced "by virtue of" the
alleged error.) Spencer, 145 Idaho at 452, 180 P.3d at 491; Burt v. City of Idaho Falls, 105
Idaho 65, 68, 665 P.2d 1075, 1078 (1983); Rural Kootenai Org., Inc. v. Board ofCom'rs, 133
Idaho 833,841,993 P.2d 596,604 (1999):

I.

DISTINCT PALPABLE INJURY
Plaintiff must have "suffered an injury in fact- an invasion of a legally protected interest

which is ... 'concrete and particularized', and 'actual and imminent', not 'conjectural' or
'hypothetical'," Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d
351 (1992). Plaintiff asserts that he bas suffered a distinct palpable injury having suffered
financial damage... immediate negative fiscal impact because of the actual
rezoning ofms property and adjacent lands"[; that his) "property ... is reduced in
value ... [and] will suffer decrease in available services .. , increase in taxes and
prevent him from developing land as he would have been able under the preexisting zoning schematic.
See Plaintiffs Memorandum in Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 15,

'2.

Further, Plaintiff alleges that he has suffered harm due by virtue of the "government's

I See also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 500: "First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact" - an invasion of a
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) "actual and imminent", not 'conjectural'
or 'hypothetical;' "Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of the injury has to be "fairly ... trace[able) to the challenged action of the defendant, and not _.. thee} result (of] the
independent action of some third party not before the cou.xt» Third, it must be "likely", as opposed to merely
"speculative", that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision."
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illegal action [which] will increase competition and therefore hurt him financially." [d. at. 16.
While the County disputes nearly all of the factual allegations ofPlainti£f's affidavits, his claim
that he has suffered a distinct palpable injury different than that suffered by any other member of
the public is simply unsupported, and in fact is directly contradicted, by the record.

Ordinance 159 Zoning Map: Actual Rezone of Plaintiff's Properties - No Injury

A.

Plaintiff owns or has an alleged interest in the following parcels of property in Camas County:
a. Forty acre parcel at 770 E. 240 N.

i, Prior to the 2007 amendments, the property was zoned Agricultural (A);
ii. After the 2008 amendments, the property remained Agricultural (A);
iii. Prior to the 2006 Comprehensive Plan Land Use Map amendments, the property
was designated (A-T) and (A) after the amendments.
v. To the north, south, east and west the adjoining properties to this property were
all zoned Agricultural (A) prior to 2007 and thereafter.
vi. Effect of Legislation on Plaintiff: No Change
b. Twenty-nine acre parcel west of Soldier road.
i. Prior to the 2007 amendments, the property was zoned Agricultural (A) allowing
one unit per eighty acres;
ii. After the 2007 amendments, the property was upzoned Residential (R-I),
.
allowing one unit per acre and remains so today;
iii. Prior to the 2006 Comprehensive Plan Land Use Map amendments, the property
was designated (R-7) allowing seven units per acre, but (R-I) after the amendments
and remains so today.
iv. To the north. south, east and west the adjoining properties to this property were
all zoned Agricultural (A) prior to 2007, (R-t) after the 2007 amendments, and
remain (R-l) after the 2008 amendments,
v. Effect of Legislation on Plaintiff: Upzoned
C.

One-acre lot within Homestead Subdivision with vested and approved one-acre sized lots.
i. Prior to the 2007 amendments, the property was zoned (AT);
Ii. After the 2008 amendments, the property was zoned Residential (R-l).
iv. Prior to the 2007 amendments, the adjoining properties to the north, south, east,
and west in the subdivision were also zoned (A-T), and rezoned to (R-l) in 2008.
v. Effect of Legislation on Plaintiff: No change

d. Contractual Interest in Two eight acre parcels.
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i. Northern parcel: Both before and after the amendments, the property was zoned
(AT);

ii. Southern parcel: Before the amendments, the property was (A) AgricuItrual and
rezoned to Residential (R-1) after the amendments.
iii. Effect of Legislation on Plaintiff: No change or upzoned

e. Alleged Right of First Refusal in a 67 acre parcel.
i. Prior to the amendments, the property was zoned (A) Agricultural;
ii. After the amendments, the property was rezoned (R-l) Residential;
iii. Effect of Legislation on Plaintiff: Up zoned
(See Butlin Afr., '22-23). Plaintiffs properties have not been downzoned. Rather they either

remain the same or were even upzoned. Thus Plaintiff has not suffered a distinct palpable injury
to his own property. He does not have a personal stake in the outcome and the judicial relief
requested will not prevent or redress the claimed injury as the property would go largely
unchanged.
Further, Plaintiff has not yet sought to process a land use application pursuant to

Ordinance 157.2 Plaintiff asserts that McCuskey v. Canyon County, 123 Idaho 657, 851 P.2d
953 (1993) somehow bolsters his position. In McCuskey, the appellant sought and was issued a
building permit to erect a gas station and store. Thereafter Canyon County issued a stop work
order due to the adoption of a new zoning ordinance which downzoned his property from heavy
industrial to rural residential effectively prohibiting the appellant's proposed use. The appellant
challenged the Canyon County Zoning Ordinance itself for failure to provide him satisfactory
notice which would have allowed him the opportunity to testify. While canyon Comty's rezone
from industrial to rural residential might have been reasonably related to a legitimate
2 On the day before Zoning Ordinance 153 was enacted. Plaintiff filed an application seeking a rezone of the eight
acre parcel to (R-7). (See Budin Aff.• 1119-21). Thus, the applicable ordinance to his application is Ordinance 12.
The adoption of Zoning Ordinance 157 does not preclude him from going forward on his application pursuant to
Zoning Ora;....nce 12; the ordinance in effect at the time ofhis application. See Chisolm v. 1\..,in Falk CO'.L'1.ty, 139
Idaho 131, 134,75 P.3d 185, 188 (2003).
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governmental objective, the appellant's failure to receive actual or constructive notice served as
the ba.sis to void the ordinance rezoning his property. The appellant had a vested land use
application rescinded by a zoning ordinance to which he had Dot received constructive or actual
notice, which additionally downzoned his property. The injury was suffered by virtue of the
absence of notice. Note, the Court did not substitute its judgment for that of the county board as
to whether the property ought to be zoned industrial or residential.

This is a legislative

determination that was not addressed. Rather, the appellant simply had the right to notice and an
opportunity to testify. In the present action, there is DO such land use application. There was no
such down zone or rescission of a vested right. The Plaintiff cannot assert procedural defects
because the Plaintiffhad actual notice having attended and testified at each public hearing.

B.

Ordinance 159 Zoning Map: Adjacent Properties - No Injury
Plaintiff alleges that he has suffered a distinct palpable injury by virtue of an upzone to

"adjacent lands". Analogous to this rationale is Plaintiff's assertion that "increased competition"
causes him a distinct palpable injury different than that suffered by the general public
presumably because he is employed as a realtor and developer. Plaintiff has not suffered harm
by virtue of neighboring properties being upzoned. The evidence clearly shows that each and
every property to the north, south, east, and west of Plaintiff s properties were rezoned in exactly

the same fashion as the Plaintiff's properties. Where Plaintiff's property remained the same, so
did the "adjacent" property. Where Plaintiff's property was rezoned to
adjoining property.
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The law does not recognize a personalized, distinct palpable injury by virtue of increased
competition; i.e. the permitting of other (R-l) development does not reduce the value to his
property by creating added inventory. As a realtor and developer. Plaintiff's affidavits capably
identify his motive: Rezone his property to a high density designation while preventing any other
property from doing so. It is of no surprise that there is no ease law in Idaho that supports the
Plaintiff's position. Even a brief perusal of the persuasive authority demonstrates that standing
does not exist when alleged damages flow from increased or perceived unfair competition.
("Generally, persons whose only complaint is that the rezoning ... would create
competition with. them in the conduct of their business have been held not to have
standing to litigate the validity of the zoning action.")
4 Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning and Planning §63.34 (41h cd. 2005).

"a person whose sole interest for objecting to a zoning board's action is to prevent
competition with his or her business is not a person aggrieved, and therefore does
not have standing to challenge a zoning decision in court."
83 AmJur.2d Zoning and Planning §926 (2003). This approach, which denies standing to a
mere competitor, is the prevailing law throughout the country.

While Plaintiff offers an

alternative legislative solution to rezoning the county, such testimony is irrelevant. In acting in
its legislative capacity, if the county's county-wide planning and zoning legislative actions are

reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, neither the Plaintiff nor the Court can
substitute its judgment for that of the elected legislative body; Plaintiff's remedy is at the polls.

C.

Resolution 114 and I1S: Comprehensive Plan - No Distinct Palpable IDjury
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Plaintiff alleges that he has been injured because he can no longer develop his property
pursuant to the prior planning and zoning scheme.3 Without a pending application.. an R-7
designation on a comprehensive plan land use map does not confer a vested property right and
Plaintiff has not suffered harm by virtue of a subsequent change to the land use map. Giltner

Dairy, UC

\I.

Jerome County, 145 Idaho 630, 181 P.3d 1238 (2008)4. As Giltner and

Highlands Development Corp. v. City of Boise, 145 Idaho 958, 188 P 3d 900 (2008), illustrate, a
comprehensive plan, toning ordinance, and zoning map do not by their very legislative nature
confer a right to develop, but are merely legislation applicable to property county-wide. The
state legislature granted local governing boards the authority to exercise legislative judgment in
detemllning the appropriate zoning designation throughout its jurisdiction - an individual has

no right to a particular zone.

Without any evidence to support a finding that Plaintiff has

suffered a distinct palpable injury, Plaintiff does not have the standing to enjoin the County's

legislative activity, and the County is entitled to summary judgment

II.

NEXUS - Fairly Traceable Cau.sal COWleetion
Even were the Plaintiff to demonstrate a distinct palpable injury, he would still bear the

burden to demonstrate that he suffered a distinct palpabJe injury by virtue of a procedural or
substantive error of the County as in McCuskey (See also Spencer v. Kootenai County supra, 145
Idaho at 457, 180 PJd at 496 ) (or with a fairly traceable causal connection between the claimed
3 This author assumes that Plaintiff is referring to future land use applications should he submit them. As Plaintiff
does have an application pursuant to Ord:inanee 12, Plaintiff's statement is untrue as it pertains to existing
applications as he does have the right to have his application processed under the former ordinance schematic.
4 This argument is besides the point as Resolution 96 which removed the R-7 classification was adopted before
Plaintiff submitted his rezone application. Resolution 96 designated the properties pursuant to Plaintifr s application
as conducive to R-l.
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injury and confiscatory, arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious conduct on the part oftbe county.)

See Burt \I. City of Idaho Falls, 105 Idaho 65, 66, 665 P.2d 1075, 1076, n.2 (l983).

Plaintiff

asserts that the County committed numerous procedural and substantive errors. While the
County maintains its position that the applicable procedural requirements were either adhered to
or were simply inapplicable to the County's legislative actions, such a legal analysis is irrelevant

as the Plaintiff is unable to demonstrate that he suffered a distinct palpable injury !Jy virtue of a
procedural error. We will examine each in tum.

A.

LLUPA: Plaintiff is Dot entitled to el11umced due process for legislative actions.
As a preliminary consideration, many of the alleged procedural and substantive defects

are simply inapplicable in the legislative context. Citing case after case pertaining to petitions
for judicial review in the quasi-judicial setting, Plaintiff contends that minimum due process
requires the County to provide Plaintiff: 1) legal notice of the proceedings; 2) a meaningful
opportunity to be heard; 3) adequate findings of fact, conclusions of law; and 4) a transcribable
record. See Cowan v. Bd O/Comm'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 508, 148 P.3d 1247,
1254 (2006). This is the inconect analysis.

A$ the Supreme Court said in Cooper:

It is beyond dispute that the promulgation or enactment of general zoning plans

and ordinances is legislatiV'c action. Dawson, 98 Idaho at 506, 567 P.2d at 1257;
Harrell v, City of Lewiston, 95 Idaho 243, 506 P.2<l 470 (1973); Cole-Collister
Fire Protection District v. City of BOise, 93 Idaho 558, 468 P 2d 290 (1970);
Idaho Falls v. Grimmett, 63 Idaho 90, 117 P.2d 461 (1941). However, appellants
urge that a crucial distinction be drawn between a zoning entitYs action in
enacting general zoning legislation and its action in applying existing legislation
and policy to specific, individual interests as in a proceeding on an application for
rezone ofparticu1ar property.
. " Ordinances laying down general policies without regard to a specific piece of
property are usually an exercise of legislative authority, are subject to limited
review, and may only attacked upon constitutional grounds for an arbitrary abuse
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of authority. On the other hand, a determination whether the permissible use of a
specific piece of property should be changed is usually an exercise of judicial
authority and its propriety is subject to an altogether different test.
Basically, this test involves the determination of whether action produces a
general rule or policy that is applicable to an open class of individuals, interests,
or situations, or whether it entails the application of a general rule or policy to
specific individuals. interests, or situations. If the former determination is
satisfied, there is legislative action; if the latter determination is satisfied, the
action is judicial.

Cooper v. Ada County Comm'rs, 101 Idaho 407,409-410, 614 P.2d 947, 949-950 (1980).
Action is legislative when it affects a large area consisting of many parcels of
property in disparate ownership.... Conversely, action is considered quasi-judicial
when it applies a general rule to a specific interest, such as a zoning change
affecting a single piece of property, a variance, or a conditional use permit. ... It
is analogous to a general rezone which affects a large number of people-in this
case, multiple owners of multiple tracts of land approximating over eight hundred
individuals, each with varying affected interests and impacts, and which is highly
visible to the public. . .. The amendment of the plan and zoning of the annexed
property affects the interests of all persons in the city in some manner. Such
widely felt impact and high visibility is consistent with action deemed legislative.

Burt, 105 Idaho at 66,665 P.2d at 1077; see also Dawson, 98 Idaho at 511, 567 P.2d at 1262.
As a matter of law, the comprehensive plan, zoning ordinance, and zoning map are

county-wide legislation. As general legislation pertaining to "many parcels of property in
disparate ownership", they are wholly legislative in character. Burt, 105 Idaho at 67, 665 P.2d at

1075. Thus, the enhanced due process protections that affected parties are entitled to inquasijudicial actions are not afforded to general members of the public in the legislative context. The
plain meaning of the applicable statutory provisions also demonsttate that they do not apply in
legislative actions.
L

Idaho Code §67-6521: Plaintiff is not an "affected person"?
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For Plaintiff to invoke the judicial review protections of LLUPA, he must qualify as an
"affected person". See Idaho Code § 67-6521(1); Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 74, 73
P.3d 84,87 (2003).

An "affected person" is ((one having

an interest in real property which

may be adversely affected by the issuance or denial of a permit authorizing the development."
§67-6521(1)(a) (Emphasis Added). Plaintiff does not have an interest in real property that has
been adversely affected by the issuance or denial of a pennit authorizing development. Further,
a comprehensive plan, land use map, zoning ordinance, and county-wide zoning map, per

Highlands, do not, in of themselves, "authorize development".

As the Court in Highlands

indicated, such Plaintiffs are limited to the McCuskey analysis. Yet, unlike Mr. McCuskey,
Plaintiff has not had a land use application rescinded, has not been downzoned, and had actual
notice of the legislative proceeding.

2.

Idaho Code §67-6536 Transcribahle records are not required for legislative activity.

I.e. §67-6536 provides:
In every case in this chapter where an appeal is provided for, a transcribable
verbatim record of the proceeding shall be made... . The proceeding envisioned
by this statute for which a transcribable verbatim record must be maintained shall
include all public hearings, at which testimony or evidence is received or at which
an applicant or affected person addresses the commission or governing board
regarding a pending application or during which the commission or governing
board deliberates toward a decision after compilation of the record.

(emphasis added). No appeal. as provided for in I.C. §§ 67-6519 or 6521, is provided for
declaratory judgment actions challenging legislative activity. Further, a transcribable record is
required only for a public hearing pertaining to a pending application at which an applicant or
affected person addresses the Board. evide!'..ce is received, or the Board deliberates after
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compilation of the record. Per Giltner and Highlands, there is no pending application despite
Plaintiff s arguments to contrary; no applicant; and no affected person. Thus, no transcribable
record is required. Regardless, as a matter of COurSOl the County maintains transcribable records
in all public hearings and did so in this case as well.

3.

Idaho Code §67-6535: Written findings of fact, conclusions of law.
Idaho Code §67-6535 provides that the approval or denial of any application prOvided

for in UUPA shall be based upon standards as set forth in the comprehensive plan and zoning
ordinance. and to be in writing. As the Supreme Court has made patently clear in Giltner and
Highlands, there has been. no approval or denial of an application that would subject
comprehensive planning and zoning legislation to the quasi-judicial review provisions of
LLUPA. Of course, the zoning ordinance, map, comprehensive plan, and land use map are all
written documents which in and of the.mselves are public documents or records promulgated in a
public hearing, which identify standards as being the comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance,
and are in writing contained in the record. See Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 73 P.3d 84
(2003). Res Ipsa Loquitur: the thing speaks for itself.
4.

Idaho Code §67-6509: Record of the heappgs shall be maintained.
Pursuant to Idaho Code §67-6S09, a "record of the hearings, findings made, and actions

taken" shall be maintained by the County. Transcribable audio recordings were maintained and

submitted into evidence representing each and every public hearing for the challenged

legislation. Against the plain text of the statute, Plaintiff wishes to add the word ''written'' to this

REPLY MEMORANDUM -- 13

335

.'

requirement; that a written record, a transcribed not tr.anscibable record, i.e. findings of fact,
conclusions of law must be created.

B.
1.

There is no such obligation in a plain reading of the text.

Was Plaintiff denied due pr~ess pursuant to Idaho Code §61-6509 and §67-6511?
Actual Notice

Since the Plaintiff is not entitled to the due process protections afforded to "affected
persons" pursuant to LLUPA's judicial review provisions, what due process, if any, is Plaintiff'
entitled to and did the County fail to provide him this due process? Pursuant to Idaho Code §67-

6509 and §67-6511, Plaintiff, as a member of the public, is entitled to notice and an opportunity
to be heard. That's it. Plaintiff alleges numerous procedural violations mostly pertaining to

defective notice or other publication requirements. While the County certainly disputes these
allegations,' they are also immaterial. Regardless of the alleged defective notice, Plaintiff

5

Plaintiff alleges a number of allegations including:

a. Summary of the ptOposed amendments - The legal notices do provide a summru:y of each ordinance and
resolution including chapter or section headings. Plaintiff fails to allege that he did not have a full and expansive
understanding of the proposed legislation by virtue of an alleged f.tilure to public an expansive summary.
b. NQti.ce to aU Political Subdivisions The County alleges that notice of the public hearing, whether actUal or
constructive, was provided to all political subdivisions providmg services to the County. At trial, the Fire District
will provide testimony that they were fully aware of the hearings. Of COUISe, this is irrelevant as Plaitniff cannot
demonstrate a nexus between an alleged iIijury and the Fire District's fuilure to receive notice. The City ofFairfieJd
does not provide services to the County and therefore was not entitled to notice.
c. Failure to provide alternative notice pursuant to 67-6511 and Ordinance 142 by failing to post at Camas County
Courthouse or Fairfield City Hall The County was not required to post at these locations. On:tinance 142, which
identifies these locations, was codified in the 2007 zoning ordinance. Judge Elgee, in CV 07-24, ruled that a
preliminary inju.nction enjoins not only the current ordinance but aU prior ordiI1ances as well. Thus, at the time the
2008 Ordinances were enacted, Ordinance 142 was enjoined requiring the County to revert to I.C. 67-6511. This
required posting at all extema1 boundaries of the subject property. The County complied with this statute.
d. Findings of Fact Conclusign QfLaw was defective· Immaterial. not required.
t. Txanscribable Record not maintained - Immaterial, nor required, bur maintained anyway.
f. Planning and Zoning recommey.dation defective - The Planning and Zoning recommendation was issued both via
a written recommendation and by the proposed legislation itself Further, staff reports, legal notice, etc. all
identified P&Z's recommendation to the Board.
g. The draft dates of the proposed legislation predate the public hearing dates - Of course they do. This is
legislative activity. P&Z conducted three workshops and staffprepared drafts of the proposed ordinances prior to
the public hearing. Otherwise, there is nothing for the public to COIlllIJe.Ilt on..

REPLY MEMORANDUM - 14

waives any such challenge in that he attended and testified extensively at each and every public
hearing and most, if not all, public workshops, infonnational sessions, etc. (See Butlin Aff.
'-19,21, Exhibit M and N.)

Actual notice operates as a waiver to alleged defective notice.

Spencer v. Kootenai County, 145 Idaho at 453, 180, P.3d 487,492 (2008). In Cowan, the court
noted:
[TJhe Board concedes that both notices were defective. Nonetheless, Cowan has
failed to demonstrate that his substantial rights were prejudiced by either
defective notice. First, Cowan's counsel attended the _.. hearing and submitted a
brief objecting to notice. Moreover, Cowan spoke against the application at that
hearing. Therefore, even if the notice were defective, Cowan bas failed to
demonstrate how this defect prejudiced his substantial rights since he clearly had
notice of the meeting.

Cowan, 143 Idaho at 513, 148 P.3d at 1259. In Contrast, in McCuskey, 123 Idaho 657,851 P.2d
953 (1993), the county failed to properly post the property pursuant to Idaho Code §67-6511(b)
and Plaintiff had not received actual, constructive, or legal notice of the hearing, which rezoned
his property from Industrial to Residential thereby rescinding his building permit
In the present action, like Cowan, even if the County committed a procedural error,
Plaintiffhad no pending application, no injury and has failed to demonstrate the required nexus
between an alleged procedural or substantive error and an injury suffered by the Plaintiff. As
stated at the preliminary irtiUDction hearing before this Court, Plaintiff is more familiar with the
2008 legislation and has attended more workshops, mee~ and nearings than any other citizen
of the County including each and every board member. He has testified at every turn. Unlike

Mr. McCuskey, even if we were to assume defective notice, Plaintiff does not have standing to
allege he was denied due process as Plaintiff's actual notice operates as a waiver.
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Conflict oflnterest - Was Plaintiff Denied Due Process?
Idaho Code §67-6S06 provides that government officials shall not participate in any

proceeding or action when he has an economic interest in the procedure or action. In Manookian

v. Blaine County, 112 Idaho 697 (1987), the applicant sought a conditional use permit (i.e.
specific application authorizing development) to construct electrical transmission lines. Several
potential routes were identified to locate the lines, and the commissioners declined to approve
the route which would have run straight through property owned by two of the planning and
zoning commissioners in favor of the route, which crossed the property owned by the plaintiffs.
The court reasoned that the rejected route's impact upon the conunissioners' land constituted an
economic interest. The chosen route caused a distinct palpable uyury to the plaintiff with a fairly
traceable connection to the commissioner's conflict of interest.

Thus, the Court was able to

reverse this quasi-judicial governmental action.
The present action is distinguishable from Manoonkian. In Manoonkian, the properties
owned by the plaintiffs and the commissioners were the subject of a specific application. The
members specifically diverted attention from their own properties in favor of the plamtiff's
property.

Thus~

there was a causal and spatial connection. a nexus, between the respective

properties. In contrast, the present action is legislative in nature applying county-wide. Plaintiff
rests on its mere allegation that government officials, who are required to reside in the County,
have a per se conflict by virtue of their ownership of property in the county. To claim that
Plaintiff is denied a due process of law by virtue of a conflict of interest, Plaintiff bears the
burden to present evidence demonstrating a nexus between his property and the governmental
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agent's property. Further, if the County's rezone of the entire county is rationally related to a
legitimate government objective, Plaintiff's action fails.
While this issue is hotly contested in CV 07-24, now before the Idaho SUpreme Court, for

purposes of this action, the County officials who owned property in the county recused
themselves from participating in the enactment of Ordinance 158, the county zoning map.6
Because they did participate in the enactment of the comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance.

Plaintiff feels that a ''taint'' continues because the planning and zoning legislation did not change

in a material substantive manner.

What is the alternative?

You cannot materially alter

legislation that makes sense, i.e. maintain agricultural land in rural areas and locate higher

density zoning near Fairfield and other historically commercial areas.
Because all governmental members who owned property in the County recused
themselves, and because there is no showing demonstrating a nexus between an alleged conflict
of interest (if the Supreme Court concludes that a conflict exists by virtue of ownership in the
County) and a distinct palpable injury suffered by Plaintiff, as a matter of law, the County is
entitled to summax}' judgment.

4. "Substantive Dictates": Idaho Code 67-6508:
Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the Comprehensive Plan, Land Use Map, and Zoning Ordinance
based upon his mere allegations that the County failed to conduct a comprehensive planning and

zoning process. Aside from contesting these assertions, the County is entitled to summary

6 The

C-Ounty still m,ai...tains that no eon.tUct of inter~ existed and the county officials did not have to recuse

thenoselvesatall
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judgment because Plaintiff wholly fails to demonstrate how this perceived defect callses him a
distinct palpable injury or otherwise substantially impairs his fundamental rights.
Idaho Code §67-6508 provides that the commission shall conduct a comprehensive
planning process to prepare, implement, and update its comprehensive plan. It simply provides
that the comprehensive plan itself must include all planning components including property
rights, population, school facilities and transportation, economic development, land usc, natural
resources, hazardous areas, public services and facilities, recreation, special areas, housing.
community design, and implementation.
Similarly, Idaho Code §67-6507 identifies the powers of the planning and zoning
commission in relation to the planning process. It provides that the commission shall provide for
citizen meetings, hearings, surveys, or other methods to obtain advice on the planning process
and implementation of the plan. Thereafter, the section provides that the commission may, or in
other words, has the discretion to, consult with public officials or other professional
organizations, conduct informational m.eetings, etc. Idaho Code §67-6502 identifies the pUIpose
oftLUPA: to protect the healtl4 safety, and welfare of its citizens by protecting property rights,

ensure adequate public facilities, protect the environment, etc. Plaintiff also cites several other
LLUPA provisions that essentially identify further comprehensive planning and zoning
considerations.
The Plaintiff continually cites to the abbreviated legislative process and the absence of a
detailed record in enacting Resolution 114 and 115 as a basis to overturn their enactment. It is as
if three year's worth of comprehensive planning, work shops, meetings, hearings, assistance

from legal, engineering, and environmental experts, as well as countless hoUl'S of testimony did
REPLY MEMORANDUM -- 18
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not ever occur. Further, Plaintiff argues that it is an affirmative requirement to deliberate each
and every facet of each and every statutory provision on the record, This is not what lLUPA
contemplates or requires. For example, Idaho Code §61-6508 requires that the plan contain the

required components... not that each component is deliberated after public testimony is closed.
Res Ipsa

Loquitur~

the thing speaks for itself. The comprehensive plan contains all of the

required planning components.

The comprehensive plan and the zoning ordinance itself

provides for the protection of property rights, public infrastructure, the environment, agricultural
uses, commercial and residential densities etc. etc.

Plaintiff continually cites towards illegal deliberations that must have occurred prior to
the close of the public testimony evidenced by the absence of the Board's discussion of each and
every LLUPA provision in deliberation.

These are legislative documents not a quasi-judicial

hearing on a specific application. In the legislative context, staff (legal. planning, engineering.
public works) work on such documents for months ... even years before presenting it at a public
hearing. The governmental board members conduct workshops, infoxmational sessions, discuss
with constituents, run election campaigns, discuss with the media, etc. regarding legislative
enactments. This does not demonstrate bias or a conflict of interest. These are not illegal
deliberations. This is the legislative process.

If a plaintiff can establish that he suffered a

distinct palpable injury with a fairly traceable connection to arbitrary, capricious governmental
conduct, then the Court can examine whether the government's legislation is rationally related to
a legitimate governmental objective,

C.

Confiscatory. Arbitra..ry, Unreasonable or Capricious
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Even in quasi-judicial proceedings, the Court is not empowered to substitute its judgment
for the governmental entity and shall defer to the factual determinations of the governing body

unless they are clearly erroneous even when there is conflicting evidence before the agency.
Spencer, 145 Idaho at 452, 180 P.3d at 491. In legislative actions, the court has even less or
"limited" review. Affording the legislative branch nearly complete discretion, the gove.ming

board's decision shall not be "disturbed absent a clear showing that it is confiscatory, arbitrary,
unreasonable or capricious." Burt'V. City o/Idaho Falls. 105 Idaho 65, 66, 665 P.2d 1075,1076.
FN.2 (1983); Dawson, 98 Idaho at 506,567 P.2d at 1257. Legislative activity is "capricious ifit
is done without a rational basis" and "arbitrary if it was done in disregard of the facts and
circumstances presented or without adequate determining principles." American Lung Ass'n, etc.
v,

State, Dep't ofAgriculture, 142 Idaho 544, 547, 130 P.3d 1082, 1085 (2006).
The County's legislation is not confiscatory, arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious. Quite

the contrary, the County clearly had a rational basis pursuant to a legitimate governmental

objective to undertake revisions to the zoning ordinance, zoning map, comprehensive plan, and
land use map with the goals of main.ta.ining agricultural uses in rural areas and residential and
commercial uses in areas already developed or historically utilized in that fashion..

(See

Backstrom Aff. 15-8). Over the course of three years, the commission conducted an extensiVe
comprehensive planning process in updating the comprehensive plan conducting, on ahnost a
weekly basis, multiple informational workshops, public meetings, and numerous public hearings
in considering an amendment to the comprehensive plan including testimony from countless
citizens and experts. (See Backstrom Aff. '4.9). The County did not feel that new studies were
necessary as the preexisting plan adequately addressed this need. (See Backstrom Afr.
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There is no requirement that a county is required to expend the considerable resources to hire
new consultants or perform new studies each time the plan is amended.
The Plaintiff in his attached affidavit provides an alternate rationale as to why his

property should have a higher density pursuant to the comprehensive plan. In essence, he wishes
to substitute his own judgment for that of the County Board. Plaintiff simply disagrees with the
direction that the elected officials have undertaken in the comprehensive planning and zoning
process and offers an alternative suggestion. This is irrelevant. The County'S factual findings
are binding upon the

Court even in the presence of conflicting evidence provided the County's

findings are rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective. Spencer, 145 Idaho at 452~
180 P.3d at 491. The Board members are elected officials engaged in their legislative function.

As Burt and subsequent cases have staunchly held, "legislative action is shielded from direct
judicial review by its high visibility and 'Widely felt impact, on the theory that appropriate

remedy can be had at the polls." Burt 105 Idaho at 66, 665 P.2d at 1076.
In order to overturn the Board's action, this Court would have to find that the Board's
conduct was arbitrary and capricious in enacting its legislation aruJ that Plaintiff suffered a
distinct palpable injwy by virtue of this arbi1:raIy, capricious conduct. As a matter of law,
Plaintiff simply does not have the standing to challenge the County's legislation. Because the
County had a rational basis in light of the facts and circumstances in amending its
comprehensive planning and zoning legislation, and the Plaintiff's absence of any distinct,
palpable injury with a fairly traceable connection to County error or arbitrary conduct. the
County is entitled to summary judgment as a matter oHaw.
RESPONSE TO OBJECI10NS TO AFFIJ)AVITS
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Plaintiff objects to the Budin affidavit as his employment began after the 2006

comprehensive plan was enacted. In contrast to Mr. Rodman's affidavit, this case pertains to the
2008 legislation, not the 2006 comprehensive plan. Regardless, as custodian of the records
pertaining to this cause of action, Mr. Budin is familiar with the dates, agendas, and subject of
any and all public workshops, meetings, informational sessions etc. and the dates of adoption of
all ordinances and resolutions. Further, Mr. Butiin's affidavit concerns factual assertions that

occurred within his personal knowledge pertaining to the 2008 legislation.
Plaintiff objects to the Backstrom affidavit with regard to the substantive deliberations or
lack theroof that took place following the public hearings on the 2008 legislation. Again, the
Plaintiff misunderstands legislative process. The adoption of comprehensive planning and
zoning legislation is the compilation of many years of workshops, informational sessions, public
meetings, public hearings, election campaigning, etc., etc., etc. The considerations that a board
member makes in eventually approving proposed legislation and the motivations behind
comprehensive planning and zoning legislaton cannot be feasibly discussed in their entirely in
the deliberations following a public hearing nor need they be. This is legislative as opposed to
quasj..judicial action. Mr. Backstrom recused himself from voting in the adoption only of the
zoning map despite his continued assertion that one does not have a conflict of interest by virtue
of owning property within the county. Recusing himself from the vote, however, does not
somehow reduce his personal knowledge of the county. its planning processes, the importance of
preserving agricultural uses, diverting higher density development near the city centers and
townships, and the myriad of other concerns, While it is evident that the Plaintiff would prefer
higher density zoning on his property. and offers the rationale for doing so, Mr. Backstrom's
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affidavit certainly provides a rational basis as to why the county, as a whole, needed planning
and zoning amendments and long range planning.
Lastly, Plaintiff objects to the statement of facts as being argumentative. Given the tenor
of Plaintiff s caustic myriad of filings, this is a bit ironic and disingenuous. Nonetheless, the
statement of facts are just that: a detailed arrangement of the factual infonnation considered and
the dates of hearings, etc.

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S LAW OF THE CASE ARGUMENT
Plaintiff asserts that the doctrine of the "law of the case" mandates that this Court must

take judicial notice of the findings of fact and the conclusions of law as determined by the Fifth
Judicial District, via the Honorable Judge Elgee in CV 07-24. Aside from the fact that this cause
of action pertains to different public hearings and different ordinances, Plaintiff also misstates
the doctrine as applying between two state district courts.

The "Law of the Case'J doctrine

designates the principle that if an appellate court has passed on a legal question and remanded
the cause to the court below for further proceedings, the legal question thus determined by the
appellate court will not be differently determined on a subsequent appeal in the same case where
the facts remain the same. Union Pacific v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 139 Idaho 572, 575,
83 P 3d 116, 119 (2004); Suitts v. First Sec. Bank of Idaho, 110 Idaho 15, 21, 713 P.2d 1374,

1380 (1985); Creem v. Northwestern Mut. Fire Ass'n of Seattle, Wash., 58 Idaho 349, 3S2, 74

P.2d 702, 703 (1937). An appellate court's detennination on a legal issue is binding on both the
trial court on remand and an appellate court on a subsequent appeal given the same case and the

same set of facts. Id. The doctrine is applied to legal "principles" and "rules of law", and not
findings of fact made by the appellate court
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The findings of fact, conclusions of law as determined in CV 07-24 which held among
other things that, pursuant to LLUPA, findings of fact, conclusions of law, and transcribable

records, are required in legislative actions is under appear before the Idaho Supreme Court. The
Plaintiff contends that this decision is "binding and controlling precedent on the issues" with a
"binding and preclusive affect [sic] on the determinations before this Court" pertaining to the
2008 legislation before this Court. This argument is not an misstatement of the law, or a

misapprehension orit, but an outright re-invention of it and should not be taken seriously.
CONCLUSION
While the Plaintiff and the County disagree as to a myriad of factual allegations. as a
matter of law, the Plaintiff is unable to carry its burden that it has standing to challenge the
County's legislative activity. The Plaintiff simply has not suffered a distinct palpable injury with
a fairly traceable connection to a procedural error or arbitrary conduct on the part of the CoWlty.
Plaintiff's properties have remained the same or were even upzoned. The County complied with
all notice and hearing requirements which, even if defective, could not be asserted by the

Plaintiff who had actual notice and did testify at each public hearing. Lastly. while the Plaintiff
has a different legislative agenda than the County. even viewed most favorably to the Plaintiff,
the County has expressed its rationale for amending its legislation which does not rise to level of
arbitrary or capricious conduct. Defendant respectfully requests that this Court grant its Motion

for Sum.maxy Judgment awarding reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in defending this
action as Plaintiff never possessed a reasonable basis in law or fact to argue it had standing to

challenge the COWlty'S legislative activity.
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MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHID.

Paul J. Fitzer
Attorney for the County Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Defendant's Motion for

Summary Judgment was this

~ay of April, 2009 served upon the following individuals

and in the corresponding manner:
Christopher P. Simms
P.O, Box 3123
Ketchum, ID 83340
Via United States mail

C~-Sw{.~
\~ Paul 1. Fitzer
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS

GEORGE MARTIN and MARTIN
CUSTOM HOMES, LLC,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, by and
through the duly elected Board of
Commissioners in their official
capacities, KEN BACKSTROM, BILL
DAVIS, and RON CHAPMAN,
Defendants.

--------------------------

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2008-40

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment came on regularly for hearing on
Monday, April 13, 2009.

Counsel Christopher Simms appeared on behalf of the plaintiff,

Martin. Counsel Paul Fitzer appeared on behalf of the Board. After the court heard the arguments
of counsel, the court took the matter under advisement to issue a \vTitten decision.

1 - MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMEN~

L\.9

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.

Stipulated Facts

The parties to this proceeding in a prior hearing have stipulated to a set of facts as set
forth below and the court adopts the stipulated facts for purposes of the summary judgment
motion. The parties in separate stipulations of fact have stipulated as follows:
Stipulation of Facts submitted by Defendants:

1.

Plaintiff owns the following parcels of property in Camas County:

1) Property: forty acre parcel at 770 e. 240 N.
a.
Prior to the 2007 amendments, the property was zoned Agricultural (A) allowing one unit
per twenty acres;
b.
After the amendments, including 2008, the property was zoned Agricultural (A).
c.
Prior to the 2006 Comprehensive Plan Land Use Map amendments, the property was
designated A-T, but A after the amendments.
2) Property: twenty-nine acre parcel west of Soldier road.
a.
Prior to the 2007 amendments, the property was Agricultural (A);
b.
After the 2007 amendments, the property was zones Residential (Rl), allowing one unit
per acre.
c.
Prior to the 2006 Comprehensive Plan Land Use Map amendments, the property was
designated R-7, but R-l after the amendments.
3) Property: one, one acre lot within the existing, approved, and platted Homestead
Subdivision.
a.
Prior to the 2007 amendments, the properties were zones Agricultural Transitional (AT)
allowing one unit per acre;
b.
Prior to the 2008 amendments, the property was A-S, allowing one unit per five acres.
c.
After the 2008 amendments, the property was zoned Residential (Rl), allowing one unit
per acre.
2.
The Commission held several public meetings to discuss the new ordinances and
resolutions; 9. Notice of Public Hearing before the Planning and Zoning Commission on the
draft 2008 Comprehensive Plan, Land Use Map, Zoning Ordinance, and Zoning Map were
published in the April 2, April 9, and April 16,2008 editions to the Camas Courier.
3.

Pursuant to Idaho 67-6S11(b), notices were posted at:
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a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Camas/Gooding County Line on US 46;
East and West Camas County Lines on US 20;
Camas County Annex;
Entry Road to West Magic Highway 75;
Soldier Road from the North

Notice was not posted at Fairfield City Hall.
4.
Notice of the intent to amend the proposed legislation along with copies of the proposed
legislation was mailed, on March 14,2008, to the political subdivisions providing services within
the planning jurisdiction, including:
a.
Camas County Weed Management
b.
Camas Soil Conservation District
c.
Camas County Road and Bridge
d.
Idaho Department ofFish and Game
e.
Camas County Sheriff
f.
Camas County School District
g.
Frontier Telephone
h.
Camas County Fire Marshall
1.
Idaho Power
J.
Forsgren Associates, Inc.
k.
South Central Health Department
1.
Camas County Engineer at Galena Engineers.
5.
The Commission held public hearings on the 2008 Comprehensive Plan, Land Use Map,
Zoning Ordinance, and Zoning Map on April 21, 2008.
6.
All members, expect one (Celia), of the Planning and Zoning Commission recused
themselves on the record and did not vote to recommend approval of said zoning Map.
7.

The Commission allowed all interested persons to provide testimony.

8.

Plaintiff testified at all public hearings.

9.
The public hearing was closed at the conclusion of the April 21 public hearing. The
Commission then took up the matter and rendered its recommendation to forward the 2008
Comprehensive Plan, Land Use Map, Zoning Ordinance, and Zoning Map to the Board for
consideration and approval.
10.
The Commission forwarded its written recommendation to the Board which was received
in a Board meeting on April 22, 2008.
11.
The members of the Board that owned property in the County recused themselves on the
record and did not vote to adopt the proposed zoning map.
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12.
Notice of Public Hearing before the Camas County Board of County Commissioners on
the draft 2008 Comprehensive Plan, Land Use Map, Zoning Ordinance, and Zoning Map were
published in the April 23, April 30, and May 7, 2008 editions to the Camas County Courier.
13.
On May 12, 2008, the Board conducted public hearings on the proposed legislation
taking public and written testimony. Plaintiff testified at all public hearings. The public hearing
was closed on May 12, 2008 at the conclusion of testimony. The Board then took up the matter
and rendered its decision.
14.
By Resolution 114 and 115 the County adopted the Comprehensive Plan and Land Use
Map. By Ordinance 157 and 159, the County adopted the Zoning Ordinance and Map.
15.
The Planning and Zoning Commission nor the Board of Commissioners generated or
conducted new studies in the adoption of the 2008 Comprehensive Plan.

Stipulation of Facts submitted by Plaintiff:

B. The Planning and Zoning Commission nor the Board of Commissioners generated or
considered new studies in adoption of the Comprehensive Plans of 2008.
C. Legal Notice of Public Hearing was posted at:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Camas/Gooding County Line on US 46;
East and West Camas County Lines on US 20;
Camas County Annex;
Entry Road to West Magic Highway 75;
Soldier Road from the North

Notice was not posted at Fairfield City Hall.
D. At the Board of County Commissioner level Legal Notice of Public Hearing, pursuant to
I.C. 67-6509, was purportedly mailed to all political subdivisions providing services
within the planning area. Legal Notice of Public Hearing was not mailed to the City of
Fairfield. No written verification of notice exists fro service to the West Magic Fire
Protection District.
E. Individual Legal descriptions of the various zoning designations on the 2008
Comprehensive Plan, Land Use Map, Zoning Ordinance, and Zoning Designation Map
were not considered in adoption of the same nor published with the Ordinances.
F. Publication of Zoning Ordinance 157 adopted May 12, 2008 did not include any legal
descriptions. The publication provided: [t]he full text of Ordinance 157 is available for
public inspection during normal office hours at the office of the Camas County Planning
and Zoning Administrator.

4 - MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

352

G. Publication of the Zoning Designation Map Ordinance No 158 adopted May 12,2008 did
not include any legal descriptions.
H. Plaintiff owns in fee simple the following parcels of real property in Camas County as of
May 12,2008: (a) 40+ acre parcel 770 E 240 N; (b) 29 acre parcel west of Soldier Road
and south of Baseline Road; (c) lots 2 & 4 Blk 5 Homestead Subdivision, within an
exiting approved and platted subdivision of one acre lots.

1.

The above parcels of real property, in order, were located within the named zoning
district prior to and after the rezone process of 2006, 2007, & 2008: (a)
agricultural/agricultural; (b) agricultural/Rl; (c) AT/AS.

J. Plaintiff had a fee simple ownership interest in two (2) 80 acre parcels, in section 4, that
were sold to third parties while retaining a contractual fiscal interest in the development,
marketing, and building potential thereon. The north parcel was zoned AT before and
after the 2006, 2007, & 2008 rezone process. The southern parcel was rezoned from AG
to Rl as a result of the 2006, 2007, & 2008 zoning amendment process.
K. Plaintiff holds a first right of refusal as to a 67 acre parcel in Section 4 that was rezoned
from Ag to Rl as a result of the 2006, 2007, & 2008 zoning amendment process.
L. The parcels generally described in the two preceding paragraphs, numbered I and J, were
included in the R-7 land use designation in the in the Comprehensive Plan Land Use Map
existing prior to the 2006 Comprehensive Plan Amendments and R-l land use
designation in the post 2006 Comprehensive Plan Land Use Map amendments.
M. The 29 acre parcel described in paragraph H subparagraph (b) was included in the R-7
land use designation in the Comprehensive Plan Land Use Map existing prior to the 2006
Comprehensive Plan Amendments and R-l land use designation in the post 2006
Comprehensive Plan Land Use Map amendments.

B.

Summary of Facts
On May 12, 2008 the Board of Commissioners of Camas County (Board) adopted

Resolutions 114 and 115 which provided for a new Amended Comprehensive Plan and Land Use
Map and subsequent thereto and on the same date the Board adopted Ordinance Nos. 157 and
159 for a new Amended Zoning Ordinance and Zoning Designation Map. As a result of the
Board's action approximately 20,000 acres in Camas County was rezoned.
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The plaintiff is a resident and property owner in Camas County and owns or has a
contractual interest in the following properties:
1. 40+ acre parcel 770 E 240 N (fee simple ownership);
2. 29 acre parcel west of Soldier Road and south of Baseline Road(fee simple
ownership);
3. lots 2 & 4 Blk 5 Homestead Subdivision, within an exiting approved and platted
subdivision of one acre lots (fee simple ownership);
4. two (2) 80 acre parcels, in Section 4, that plaintiff sold but retains contractual interest
in the development and marketing for sale;
5. first right of refusal to purchase a 67 acre parcel in Section 4

The plaintiff filed the complaint for declaratory judgment on October 15, 2008. The
complaint seeks to have this court declare as void the adoption of the 2008 amended
comprehensive plan and amended zoning ordinance adopted by the Board. The complaint further
alleges that the plaintiff is an owner of real property and/or has a contractual interest in real
property in Camas County. The complaint summarizes proceedings relative to attempts by the
Board to amend and rezone property countywide prior to the adoption of the 2008
comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance and the complaint alleges that certain property of
board members or relatives of the board was up-zoned while unspecified property of plaintiff's
was do\\'n-zoned.

In addition, the complaint sets forth allegations of improper and illegal

procedures in the adoption of the 2008 land use package. The plaintiff in his affidavit, although
not specifically alleged in his complaint, primarily challenges the loss of the R-7 land use
designation on the 29-acre parcel of property. Specifically, the 29-acre parcel had a land use
map designation of R -7, and after the changes in the 2008 ordinance and comprehensive plan the
parcel had a designation of R-1. The 29-acre parcel was located in the named zoning district of
agricultural prior to the rezone process initiated in 2006; after the changes in 2006, 2007, and
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2008 the parcel was located in a named zoning district ofR-I. The defendants filed their motion
for summary judgment on February 13,2009.
II.
STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." IRCP Rule 56(c); Scona, Inc.
v. Green Willow Trust, 133 Idaho 283, 985 P.2d 1145 (1999). If conflicting inferences are
possible, summary judgment should be denied. Only if there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the affidavits, pleadings, and depositions have been construed in the light most favorable to
the non moving party should summary judgment be awarded. Loomis v. City of Hailey, I 19
Idaho 434,807 P.2d 1272 (1991).
If reasonable minds might come to different conclusions, summary judgment is
inappropriate. Carl H Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 870, 993 P.2d
1197 (1999). The moving party is entitled to a judgment when the non-moving party "fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case
on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 170,
16 P.3d 263, 267 (2000). The court must liberally construe all disputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party, and draw all reasonable inferences and conclusion supported by the record in
favor of the party opposing the motion. Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 541, 808 P.2d 876,
878 (1999). Further, our courts have repeatedly held that "issues considered on summary
judgment are those raised by the pleadings." VanVooren v. Astin, 141 Idaho 440, 111 P.3d 125
(2005).
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In the context of planning and zoning, ""[P]romulgation or enactment of general zoning
plans and ordinances is legislative action." Cooper v. Board of County Commissioners of Ada

County, 101 Idaho 407, 409, 614 P.2d 947, 949 (1980); Dawson Enterprises, Inc. v. Blaine
County, 98 Idaho 506, 567 P.2d 1257 (1977); Harrell v. City of Lewiston, 95 Idaho 243, 506
P.2d 470 (1973); Cole-Collister Fire Protection District v. City of Boise, 93 Idaho 558, 468 P.2d
290 (1970); City of Idaho Falls v. Grimmett, 63 Idaho 90, 117 P.2d 461 (1941)." Burt v. City of

Idaho Falls, 125 Idaho 65, 67, 665 P.2d 1075, 1077 (1983). ("Legislative activity by a zoning
entity is differentiated from quasi-judicial activity by the result--Iegislative activity produces a
rule or policy which has application to an open class whereas quasi-judicial activity impacts
specific individuals, interests or situations."). A legislative act is not subject to judicial review
but may be subject to collateral attack in a declaratory judgment action. Burns Holdings, IIC v.

Madison County Board of Commissioners, 2009 Opinion No. 65 (May 1, 2009); Scott v.
Gooding County, 137 Idaho 206, 46 P.3d 24 (2002); lvfcCuskey v. Canyon County, 123 Idaho
657, 851 P.2d 953 (1993); Jerome County v. Holloway, 118 Idaho 681, 799 P.2d 969 (1990);

Burt v. City of Idaho Falls, 105 Idaho 65, 665 P.2d 1075 (1983); Cooper v. Board of County
Com'rs. OfAda County, 101 Idaho 407, 614 P.2d 947 (1980).
III.

ANALYSIS

The plaintiff, George Martin is a resident and lando\vner in Camas County. He also
operates a real estate and land development business in the County. Camas County over the last
few years has attempted to amend its comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance on a county
wide basis for approximately 20,000 acres. Camas County has a population of less than 1000
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residents and overall consists of approximately 678,400 acres. A little over 30 % of the land in
the county is under private ownership and the remainder of the land is government owned.
In 2007 the County adopted an amended comprehensive plan and amended zoning
ordinance that became the subject of a declaratory and injunctive relief action filed by Mr.
Martin. (Martin v. Camas County-C V-200 7-24). The court in that action enjoined enforcement
of the 2007 comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance and subsequently after a court trial
determined that the zoning ordinance was void. This action is presently on appeal. This court has
been asked to take judicial notice of decisions and orders entered in CV -2007-24. This court
declines to take judicial notice of those proceedings, but it would appear to this court that the
issue of "standing" was not directly addressed in those prior proceedings.
On May 12,2008 the County adopted a further amended comprehensive plan and zoning
ordinance, which is now the subject of this pending action. In general the plaintiff, Mr. Martin
asserts that the 2008 adoption of the comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance is void for
essentially the same reasons that the 2007 comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance was void,
i.e., conflicts of interest (I.C. § 67-6506); lack of proper notice (I.C. § 67-6509 & 67-6511); lack
of a deliberative process and proper findings of fact (I.e. §67-6508; 67-6509; 67-6535).

It is undisputed that the adoption of a valid comprehensive plan is a condition precedent
to the validity of any zoning ordinance. Dawson Enterprises, Inc. v. Blaine County, 98 Idaho
506, 567 P.2d 1257 (1977); Sprenger, Grubb & Assoc. v. City of Hailey, 133 Idaho 320, 986
P.2d 343 (1999).
The Idaho Supreme Court has of recent times made it clear that planning and zoning
decisions are only subject to judicial review under the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act
(IAPA) , if there is a statute authorizing or granting a right to judicial review. Highlands
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Development Corp. v. City of Boise, 145 Idaho 958, 188 P.3d 900 (2008). The adoption or

amendment of a comprehensive plan or zoning ordinance is governed by the provisions ofLC. §
67-6507 - 67-6509 & 67-6511. These statutes do not expressly authorize judicial review of the
adoption or amendment of either the comprehensive plan or zoning ordinance. In fact, the court
in Giltner Dairy, LLC v. Jerome County, 145 Idaho 630, 181 P.3d 1238 (2008) held that an
amendment to the comprehensive plan was not subject to judicial review since there was no
statute authorizing judicial review. It stands to reason that the adoption or amendment of a
zoning ordinance likewise would not be subject to judicial review since LC.§ 67-6511 does not
expressly authorize judicial review. Burns Holding, LLC v. Madison County Board of
Commissioners, 2009 Opinion No. 65 (May 1, 2009). However, an aggrieved landowner may

seek relief through an independent action, i.e. declaratory judgment action, under certain
circumstances. Highlands Development Corp., supra., 145 Idaho at 962, 188 P.3d at 904.
A.

Does Martin have standing?

The first issue to be addressed on summary judgment is whether Martin has standing to
challenge the adoption of the 2008 amended comprehensive plan and amended zoning ordinance.
The issue of standing must be decided before reaching the merits of the substantive claims.
Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102,44 P.3d 1157 (2002). This court will summarize the

appellate court decisions that have addressed the issue of declaratory judgment actions relative to
planning and zoning matters as well as the issue of standing in such declaratory judgment
actions.
1. Case law re: planning & zoning and standing.

In Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 641, 778 P.2d 757, 763 (1989) the court set
forth the three relevant considerations concerning the issue of standing:

.e:55
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(1) "The doctrine of standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the issues the
party wishes to have adjudicated."
(2) "To satisfy the case or controversy requirement of standing, litigants generally must
allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief
requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury."
(3) "A citizen and taxpayer may not challenge a governmental enactment where the
injury is one suffered by all citizens and taxpayers of the jurisdiction."
In Jerome County v. Holloway, 118 Idaho 681, 799 P.2d 969 (1990) the issue presented
was the validity of a zoning ordinance amendment which prohibited dairies within one thousand
feet of a residence. A dairyman had applied for a special use permit for his proposed dairy. The
planning and zoning commission approved the special use permit and an adjoining property
owner appealed the granting of the permit to the County Commissioners claiming that the dairy
could not comply with the thousand foot setback requirement from their residence. The County
Commissioners referred the matter back to the planning and zoning commission which then
reissued the permit with the condition that the dairy not be operated or constructed within one
thousand feet of a residence. The dairyman then appealed to the County Commissioners, arguing
that the ordinance requiring the thousand foot setback was void because it was enacted without
the proper notice required by

I.e.

§ 67-6509. The County Board of Commissioners, while the

appeal was pending before them, filed a declaratory judgment action to determine the validity of
the amended ordinance. The court found that the amended ordinance was void but did not
address the issue of standing and it does not appear that the issue was ever raised by the parties
or the court.
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In McCuskey v. Canyon County, 123 Idaho 657, 851 P.2d 953 (1993) a landowner sought
to build a gas station and convenience store on land that he owned. The planning and zoning
commission issued to the plaintiff a building permit for a Circle K store. A dispute then arose as
to the zoning designation of his property and subsequently the planning and zoning commission
issued a stop order on the work claiming that the building permit had been issued in error. It was
discovered that the county had amended its comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance which
result in the plaintiff's property being down zoned from "heavy industrial" to "rural residential."
The plaintiff sought to challenge the adoption of the 1975 comprehensive plan and the 1979
zoning ordinance by way of a declaratory judgment action.
The contested issue in McCuskey was whether he could maintain a declaratory judgment
action since he had "failed to appeal certain adverse zoning decisions made prior to the
enactment of the 1979 zoning ordinance." Id. 123 Idaho at 661, 851 P.2d at 957. The court only
detem1ined that he could maintain his action as filed since he was only "seeking a determination
of how his land was zoned" and was not seeking to challenge any "administrative decisions."
The court subsequently determined that the amended ordinance was void since the county had
not complied with the notice procedures and the plaintiff did not have any actual or constructive
notice of the public hearings. Again it does not appear that the court or any of the parties raised
the issue of standing of the plaintiff to maintain his action. However, it is clear from the facts
presented that the plaintiff had in fact suffered a "peculiarized harm" when the county issued its
stop order which prevented the plaintiff from proceeding with the construction of his gas station
and store and the fact that his property was down zoned as a result of the enactment of the
amended ordinance.
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The Court of Appeals in Student Loan Fund of Idaho, Inc. v. Payette County, 125 Idaho
824, 875 P.2d 236 (Ct. App. 1994) addressed the issue of "standing" in a declaratory judgment
action wherein the plaintiff sought to challenge the validity of an "area of impact" agreement and
implementing ordinances between the City of Fruitland and the County of Payette. In regards to
the adopted agreement the court noted as follows:
The agreement specifies the zoning for land within the impact area
and provides that the county will amend its zoning ordinances to
conform to the agreed zoning for the impact area. The agreement
calls for the county to adopt a new zoning designation known as
"agriculture preservation." Within portions of the impact area to
be zoned "agriculture preservation," the agreement provides that
"no further development or division of property shall be allowed
unless agreed to by both the City and County.
125 Idaho at 825, 875 P.2d at 237.

The court further noted that the county had not passed any ordinances in compliance with
the agreement that would have specified the "zoning for the affected land." The record was silent
as to how the plaintiffs land was zoned prior to the adoption of the impact area, but did note that
a "small portion" of the plaintiff s land according to the agreement was to be zoned commercial
and the remaining land would be designated "agricultural preservation zone." The plaintiff
argued that it had standing to challenge the County's action because it was an "affected person"
since its land fell within the agricultural preservation zone. The court stated as follows:
We note that this is a contemplated future change, not an
accomplished rezoning of the property. Although the agreement
calls for the county to adopt particular zoning for the area of city
impact, as of the date of oral argument in this case, the county had
not complied with the agreement by amending its zoning
ordinances. Hence, zoning of the Fund's land is as yet unchanged
and, absent further action by the county, will remain so. We
recognize that standing may be predicated not only upon a past
injury but also upon a threatened harm. Harris, supra; Idaho
Branch, Inc. of the Associated Gen. Contractors ofAmerica, Inc. v.
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Nampa Highway Dist. No.1, 123 Idaho 237, 240, 846 P.2d 239,
242 (Ct.App.1993). Therefore, the peril of an imminent rezoning
of the Funds' property could be a sufficient predicate for standing
if the rezone would inflict some injury.
125 Idaho at 826, 875 P.2d at 238. The court concluded as to this argument that the fund
did not have standing because there was no evidence that the contemplated zoning would have
altered the permitted uses of the land or the "land's marketability or value."
The Court of Appeals distinguished the holdings in McCuskey v. Canyon County, 123
Idaho 657, 851 P.2d 953 (1993) and Jerome County v. Holloway, 118 Idaho 681, 799 P.2d 969
(1990) on the basis that "neither case presented any question as to the plaintiffs standing to
bring the suit" which sought to challenge the validity of zoning ordinance amendments. 1d., 125
Idaho at 826,875 P.2d 238.
The plaintiff, Student Loan Fund, further argued standing on the basis that it had a
"particularized interest at stake" but as to this contention the court concluded as follows:
Status as an owner of land within a designated area does not
relieve a complainant of the necessity of demonstrating a "distinct
palpable injury" traceable to the challenged governmental conduct.
It is the quality or magnitude of the injury suffered which must
differentiate a plaintiff from the citizenry at large in order to confer
standing. The situs of O\vned property in relationship to an area
touched by an ordinance is relevant to a standing inquiry only
insofar as the property's location exposes the landowner to
peculiarized harm. The deficiency in the Fund's status is not that
its injury is undifferentiated from that suffered by the general
populous of Payette County, but rather, that it has shown no injury
at all.
125 Idaho at 828, 875 P.2d at 240.

Therefore it is clear that based on the holding in Student Loan Fund that to have standing
the land owner must allege or demonstrate an actual or potential harm or injury by reason of the
challenged zoning ordinance amendment. By comparison, in Jerome County v. Holloway and
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McCuskey v. Canyon County, the adopted zoning ordinances had a direct impact on the permit

process at issue.
In Butters v. Hauser, 131 Idaho 498, 960 P.2d 181 (1998) a property owner brought a
declaratory judgment action seeking to declare an amended zoning ordinance void. This action
concerned a conditional use permit that was issued by Latah County to Hauser for a radio
transmission tower. The permit was issued based on an amended zoning ordinance related to the
issuance of conditional use permits. The district court had held that Butters did not have standing
based on the Court of Appeals holding in Student Loan Fund

The Idaho Supreme Court

disagreed with the district court and found that Butters did have a personal stake in both the
amended ordinance and the issuance of the conditional use permit and that she had shown had
demonstrated a "peculiarized harm":
[S]he owns land in close proximity to the tower; the tower looms
over her land; and its physical invasiveness affects her enjoyment
of her property. Although the location of her property alone does
not confer standing, the location does expose her to peculiarized
harm. In particular, Butters contends that she had to spend $1,500
for a new telephone system to eliminate the tower's radio signal
from her telephone and that the tower's radio signal still broadcasts
through her daughter's compact disc system.
Id. 131 Idaho at 501,960 P.2d at 184.
The court concluded that Butters had demonstrated the requisite peculiarized harm "as a
result of the conditional use permit which was issued pursuant to a new appeal procedure
prescribed by the ordinance amendment in question," and therefore had standing. Butters v.
Hauser, supra.

2. Martin's standing

The court will now address the issue of Mr. Martin's standing to challenge the adoption
of the 2008 amended comprehensive plan and amended zoning ordinance. In conducting such an
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analysis this court must detennine if the plaintiff has sufficiently pled or demonstrated a
peculiarized harm resulting from the adoption of the 2008 amended comprehensive plan and
amended zoning ordinance as discussed in the authorities cited above. In conducting this analysis
the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Martin as the non-moving party.
It is undisputed that at all relevant times Martin is a landowner as to some but not all of

the property described below in Camas County. The property owned or in which Martin claims a
financial interest was initially zoned as follows:
(l) forty acre parcel at 770 E. 240 N.- the property was zoned Agricultural (A) allowing
one unit per twenty acres;

(2) twenty-nine acre parcel west of Soldier road.- the property was zoned Agricultural
(A) allowing one unit per twenty acres; it had an R-7 designation on the comprehensive land use
map which would be 7 units per acre;
(3) one acre lot within the existing, approved, and platted Homestead Subdivision - the
property was zoned Agricultural Transitional (AT) allowing one unit per acre;
(4) Plaintiff had a fee simple ownership interest in two (2) 80 acre parcels, in section 4,
that were sold to third parties while retaining a contractual fiscal interest in the development,
marketing, and building potential thereon. The north parcel was zoned Agricultural Transitional
(A T) allowing one unit per acre. The southern parcel was zoned Agricultural (A) allowing one
unit per 20 acres. Each of these parcels is said to have had an R-7 land use designation on the
comprehensive land use map;
(5) Plaintiff holds a first right of refusal as to a 67 acre parcel in Section 4 that was zoned
Agricultural (A) allowing one unit per 20 acres. This parcel is said to have had an R-7 land use
designation on the comprehensive land use map.

After the adoption of the 2008 amended comprehensive plan and amended zoning
ordinance the property referred to above was rezoned as follows:
(l) forty acre parcel at 770 E. 240 N.- the property was rezoned Agricultural (A) allowing
one unit per twenty acres;

(2) twenty-nine acre parcel west of Soldier road- the property was rezoned Residential
(R-l) allowing one unit per acre and it lost its R-7 designation on the comprehensive land use
map;
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(3) one acre lot within the existing, approved, and platted Homestead Subdivision - the
property was rezoned Residential (R-l) allowing one unit per acre;
(4) Plaintiff had a fee simple ownership interest in two (2) 80 acre parcels, in section 4,
that were sold to third parties while retaining a contractual fiscal interest in the development,
marketing, and building potential thereon. The north parcel was rezoned Agricultural
Transitional (AT) allowing one unit per acre. The southern parcel was rezoned Residential (R-1)
allowing one unit per acre. Each of these parcels is said to have lost its R-7 land use designation
on the comprehensive land use map;
(5) Plaintiff holds a first right of refusal as to a 67 acre parcel in Section 4 that was
rezoned Residential (R-l) allowing one unit per acre. This parcel is said to have lost its R-7 land
use designation on the comprehensive land use map.
As a result of the rezone the property described above either did not change in its prior
zoning designation or the property was up-zoned so as to allow a greater density in development,
although some ofthe plaintiffs property lost the R-7 designation on the amended comprehensive
land use map. It is undisputed that at no time was there ever any property in Camas County that
was actually zoned R-7; that R-7 was only a designation on the original comprehensive land use
map; and that after the amendments the R-7 designation ceased to exist.
The plaintiff in his affidavit

(~

15) admits that on April 17, 2007, on behalf of a third

party he filed an application to rezone approximately 181 acres from (A) or (AT) to R-7. This
application for rezone was filed prior to the 2007 zoning amendments (declared void in CV2007-24) and the 2008 zoning amendments. The parties admit that the application is pending and
has not been fully processed by the County. The law is relatively clear that this application
would be processed under the zoning ordinance and comprehensive plan in existence at the time
of the filing of the application and would not be processed under the 2008 amended
comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance. Chisholm v. Twin Falls County, 139 Idaho 131, 134135,75 P.3d 185, 188-189 (2003); Payette River Property Owners Ass'n. v. Board ofComm'rs

of Valley County, 132 Idaho 551, 976 P.2d 477 (1999). The mere fact that the comprehensive
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land use map may have designated some of the plaintiff's property as R-7 for development does
not mean that the County would be compelled to rezone the property as such since the
comprehensive land use map is but one component to the comprehensive plan and does not act as
"legally controlling zoning law." Bone v. City ofLewiston, 107 Idaho 844,693 P.2d 1046 (1984).
a. 160 acre "downzone" from R-7 designation on comprehensive land use map.
The plaintiff alleges in his affidavit

(~

16) that the 2008 amendments to the

comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance "had the effect of up zoning approximately twenty
thousand (20,000) acres of real property in Camas County and down zoning the approximate
one hundred sixty (160) acres; the later in which I hold an economic interest." The court in
Highlands Development Corp. v. City of Boise, 145 Idaho 958, 962, 188 P.3d 900, 904 (2008),

citing McCuskey, indicated that a "landowner" could seek relief by way of an independent
action, i.e., declaratory judgment action, in those circumstances where a planning and zoning
decision resulted in the down-zoning of the landowner's property. This court would note that the
plaintiff no longer claims to be a landowner of the property that was designated R-7 on the
original comprehensive land use map. Plaintiff admits that the property in question was sold to
Soldier Star Development, LLC, which is not a party to this action. The plaintiff cites to no
authority that grants to a party who, is not a landowner, standing to challenge a zoning
ordinance.
It is clear that the plaintiff contends that the elimination of the R-7 designation as part of

the comprehensive land use map is a "down zone." However, this contention is not supported by
the law for the reasons set forth above. The undisputed evidence is that the amended zoning
ordinance left the plaintiff's actual zoning designation and density the same or allowed the
plaintiff a greater density in development, i.e. an up-zone. Further, the plaintiff admits that he has
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a pending application to rezone the subject property to R-7 based on the comprehensive plan and
zoning ordinance in effect at the time the application was filed. Because there has been no
determination on the plaintiff's application to rezone to R-7, any harm to plaintiff's property is
purely speculative-he cannot show that he has been harmed due to a downzone because no such
downzone has actually occurred and also the fact that he is not a landowner as to this property.
The plaintiff in his affidavit (rs 23-25) that the county zoned certain property R-4 that is
located north and south of the property in which he claims to have sold but retained some
contractual interest in the development and sale of such property that was rezoned to R-l. This is
the same property for which he has a pending rezone application for R-7 rezone under the preexisting ordinance and is the same property for which he has no ownership interest and is
therefore not a landowner. As to these arguments the plaintiff, he has failed to demonstrate the
requisite "peculiarized harm" for the purpose of standing.
b. Increased inventory.

As another basis for standing the plaintiff in his affidavit (r s 26-27) asserts that the
rezone of approximately 20,000 acres to "allow various densities of residential housing," which
was previously designated for agricultural use, creates an "over supply of residential property"
and a "diminished demand on all residential property in general." The plaintiff relies upon the
holding in Ameritel Inns, Inc. v. Greater Boise Auditorium District, 141 Idaho 849, 119 P.3d 624
(2005) for his proposition that increase in the residential inventory and the resulting diminished
demand gives him the requisite standing.
In Amerite/, the plaintiffs consisted of individual voters residing within the boundaries of
the Auditorium District and Ameritel Inns, which operated three hotels within the boundaries of
the Auditorium District.

The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the use of public funds by the
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Auditorium District to influence a bond election to expand its facilities for the construction of a
second convention center. The court addressed the issue of standing for both the individual
voters and Ameritel. As to the individual voters, the court concluded that they lacked standing
because there was no allegation that the Auditorium District did anything to "invade the privacy
or sanctity of the voting booth." Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens a/Term Limits, 135 Idaho 121, 15
P.3d 1129 (2000). The court further held that the allegation that expenditure of public funds
"increased the chances of its passage" was not sufficient to confer standing to the individual
voters. Id 141 Idaho at 852, 119 P.3d at 627.
As for the plaintiff Arneritel, it claimed to have standing as a "taxpayer," that the
expansion of the convention center "would negatively impact Ameritel's business," and that the
use of tax monies would "finance speech with which Ameritel disagreed, in violation of its First
Amendment Rights." Id 141 Idaho at 852, 119 P.3d at 627. The court held that Ameritel had
standing for two reasons: (1) that it was a taxpayer; and (2) the claim that the proposed
expansion of the convention center would negatively impact its business in that the District's
increase in meeting space would be in competition with the meeting space of Ameritel was a
sufficient

a1legat~on

of a "particularized injury that is not one suffered alike by all citizens within

the boundaries of the Auditorium District." Id 141 Idaho at 852-853, 119 P.3d 627-628. The
court's finding of standing was directly related to the fact that Ameritel was a "taxpayer" since
the Auditorium District was funded in part by a tax on the receipts of hotels and motels within
the District boundaries and as such Ameritel was among a limited number of taxpayers.
Ameritel's taxpayer status was "relevant to standing because its claim in this case is directly
related to the tax it is required to pay." Id 141 Idaho at 853, 119 P.3d at 628.
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Ameritel is distinguishable from the instant case. Plaintiff Martin admits that the rezone
"increased values of property originally with a land use of agricultural only." (Martin Affidavit ~
26). Mr. Martin by his own admission has not been harmed by the rezone as to the value of his
property. Prior to the rezone all of his property was zoned either Agricultural (A) [one unit per
20 acres] or Agricultural Transitional (AT) [one unit per acre] and after the rezone his property
was zoned either Agricultural (A) [one unit per 20 acres]; Agricultural Transitional (AT) [one
unit per acre]; or Residential (R-l) [one unit per acre]. Further, as to the discussion in Ameritel
as to increased competition, in the area of zoning decisions, the vast majority of jurisdictions
have concluded that reduced income or value based on competition is not the type of injury that
gives rise to standing to sue. Westbourgh Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, Mo., 693 F2d.
733, 747 (8 th Cir. 1982); Earth Movers of Fairbanks, Inc. v. Fairbanks N Star Borough, 865
P.2d 741, 745 (Alaska, 1993); Swain v. Winnebago County, 250 N.E.2d 439, 444 (Ill. 1969); E.
Servo Ctrs., inc.
Cummings

V.

V.

Cloverland Farms Dairy, Inc., 744 A.2d 63, 67 (Md. Ct. App. 2000);

City Council of Gloucester, 551 N.E.2d 46, 50 (Mass. Ct. App. 1990); City of

Eureka v. Litz, 658 S.W.2d 519, 523 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Copple
N.W.2d 628, 630 (Neb. 1982); Nautilus of Exeter, Inc.

V.

V.

City of Lincoln, 315

Town of Exeter, 656 A.2d 407, 408

(N.H. 1995); Rockland Hospitality Assocs., LLC v. Paris, 756 N.Y.S.2d 585, 586-587 (2003);
City of Pittsburgh, 620 A.2d 692, 696 (Pa. 1993); ATC South, Inc. v. Charleston County, 669
S.E.2d 337, 343 (S.c. 2008).
This court would note from the evidence provided that the plaintiff has not identified any
land use applications that are pending or that have been granted by the County which have
caused or will cause any particular harm to the plaintiff or any of his alleged financial interests.
The potential for a development of the land at one density is not the same as the immediate
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ability to develop the land at that density. Ameritel was actually engaged in a business which
included the rental of meeting space, and the action supported by the District would have directly
resulted in increased competition through the availability of additional meeting space, however,
it was not the mere competition that gave rise to standing but the fact that the Auditorium
District was using the tax dollars of Ameritel, a taxpayer, to fund such competition. If the
Auditorium District had not sought to use taxpayer funds to compete with Ameritel, then
Ameritel would not have had the requisite standing to sue. The plaintiff has not established that
he was actually engaged in development or even that he had the immediate ability, through a
lawful permit, to develop. As such, the plaintiff has failed to support his argument that the rezone
by the County caused him particularized harm due to the potential for added inventory of
residential property.
c.

Procedural allegations regarding notice.

Martin further alleges that through the course of the proceedings that the County failed to
comply with certain statutory notice requirements. However, Martin himself does not allege and
in fact admits that he had notice of and attended all proceedings relative to the adoption of the
amended comprehensive plan and amended zoning ordinance. Martin has failed to show that he
has suffered any particularized harm as a result of any defect in the notice procedures. Martins'
case is distinguishable from McCuskey since it was undisputed that Mr. McCuskey did not have
notice of the proceedings relative to the adoption of the amended comprehensive plan and zoning
ordinance. Assuming arguendo that the notices of the various public hearings may have been
defective in some respect does not confer standing absent a showing of a peculiarized harm or
the denial of due process as to him. Cowan v. Board of Com 'rs. Of Fremont County, 143 Idaho
501,513,148 P.3d 1247, 1259 (2006); Rural Kootenai Organization, Inc. v. Board ofCom'rs.,
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133 Idaho 833, 841, 993 P.2d 596, 604 (1999); Student Loan Fund of Idaho, Inc. v. Payette

County, 125 Idaho 824, 828, 875 P.2d 236, 240 (et. App. 1994).
3.

Conclusion.

To have standing to challenge legislative action in a declaratory judgment action the
plaintiff would have to make an adequate showing of a "distinct palpable injury" to himself and a
" 'fairly traceable' causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct."

Rural Kootenai Org., Inc. v. Board ofCom'rs, l33 Idaho 833,841,993 P.2d 596, 604 (1999).
Martin in his brief in opposition argues that the rezone will reduce the value of the lands that he
has an economic interest in; that he will suffer decrease in available services and an increase in
taxes; and that the rezone will prevent him from developing the land as he would have been able
under the pre-existing zoning scheme. (Plaintiffs Memorandum Response, pg. 15). However,
there are no such factual allegations actually alleged in the plaintiffs complaint. Further, the
affidavit of Mr. Martin does not allege that his taxes have increased as a result of rezone; the
affidavit does not allege that there has been a decrease in available services to his property or
what services are not available to his property; he admits that the rezone increased the value of
agricultural land, which his land was previously zoned. As to the allegation that he cannot
develop his land as he had intended, such an allegation is contrary to the facts and law

Martin

had filed an application on behalf of the current landowner for rezone under the prior existing
zoning ordinance which is still pending. It simply is yet undetermined whether the land can be
developed as intended. Finally, it is clear that the alleged injury as claimed is not particular to
Martin but would be common to all landowners subject to the rezone. "It is the quality or
magnitude of the injury suffered which must differentiate a plaintiff from the citizenry at large in
order to confer standing." Student Loan Fund, supra. The plaintiff alleges numerous defects in
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the adoption of the 2008 zoning ordinance and comprehensive plan. However, he does not have
standing merely because he "is a concerned citizen who seeks to ensure that a governmental
entity abides by the law." Ameritel, supra, citing Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473,
50 P.3d 488 (2002). The plaintiff lacks standing and has failed to show any dispute as to any
material fact relevant to the issue of standing. In as much as the court has found that the plaintiff
lacks standing to seek declaratory judgment as to the validity of the 2008 amended
comprehensive plan and amended zoning ordinance, this court need not address the merits of the
plaintiff s substantive claims.
For the reasons set forth above, the plaintiff Martin lacks standing to bring this
declaratory judgment action and the defendant's motion for summary judgment is hereby granted
based on a lack of standing. The complaint for declaratory judgment is hereby dismissed with

prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this

(P

day of

Y\;\1q1
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY
I, undersigned, hereby certifY that on the J±h. day of VYlA-~
, 2009, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE:
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY mDGMENT was mailed, postage paid, and/or
hand-delivered to the following persons:
Christopher P. Simms
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 3123
Ketchum, Idaho 83340

Paul Fitzer
Attorney at Law
950 W. Bannock St.
Suite 520
Boise, Idaho 83702

·r<oJ2JU J3!6DGell ..___
Deputy Clerk
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Paul Fitzer, ISB No. 5675
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD.
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 520
Boise, ID 83702
Tel: 208/33111800
Fax: 208/33111202

Attorneys for Defendants Camas County, the Individual Commissioners, and Ed Smith in his
capacity as a member of the Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY

GEORGE MARTIN and MARTIN CUSTOM
HOMES, LLC,
Plaintiffs,
v.

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV -2008-40

)

CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, by
and through the duly elected Board of
Commissioners in their official capacity,
KEN BACKSTROM, BILL DA VIS, and RON
CHAPMA0i,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

COME NOW, Camas County, Idaho (the County), by and through its duly elected Board
of County Commissioners (the Board), Ken Backstrom, Bill Davis, and Ron Chapman (the
Individual Commissioners), (collectively, County Defendants), by and through their attorneys of
record, Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke, Chartered, hereby move this Court for an order awarding

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS -- 1

ORIGINAL
37i{

Defendants their costs and attorney fees, as against Plaintiff, George Martin and Martin Custom
Homes, LLC, as set forth in the City's Memorandum of Costs and Fees filed contemporaneously
herewith.
The Defendants bring this Motion pursuant to Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1), (d)(5), and
54(e)(5); and

I.e.

§ 12-117. This motion is supported by (1) the Defendants' Memorandum of

Attorney Fees and Costs, and (2) the Affidavit of Paul 1. Fitzer in Support of the Defendants'
Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs; each filed contemporaneously herewith.
In the body of their memorandum supporting their motion for summary judgment, the
defendants requested fees and costs under Idaho R. Civ. P. 54 and
argument in support of that request.

I.e. § 12-117 and presented an

Defendants rely upon that argument in support of this

Motion.
Should the Plaintiff file a response to this Motion, the Defendants request oral argument.
If the PlaintitT files a response within the time permitted by the rules of civil procedure,
Defendants will notice the matter for a hearing. If Plaintiff files no response within the time
permitted, Defendants request the court rule without oral argument.
Dated this

(1

day of May, 2009.
MOORE

SM7JXTON &

TURCKE, CHrD,

IJ

11J1~
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS -- 2

***
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was this

~~_

day of May, 2009, served upon the following individuals and in the corresponding manner:
Christopher P. Simms
P.O. Box 3123
Ketchum, ID 83340
Via United States mail

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

FILED
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Paul Fitzer, ISB No. 5675
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD.
950 W. Bannock S1., Suite 520
Boise, ID 83702
Tel: 208/33111800
Fax: 208/33111202
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Attorneys for Defendants Camas County, the Individual Commissioners, and Ed Smith in his
capacity as a member o/the Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY

GEORGE MARTIN and MARTIN CLSTOM
HOMES, LLC,
Plaintiffs,

v.
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, by
and through the duly elected Board of
Commissioners in their official capacity,
KEN BACKSTROM, BrLL DAVIS, and RON
CHAPMAN,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV -2008-40

DEFENDANTS CAMAS COUNTY'S
MEMORA.NDUM OF ATTORNEY
FEES AND COSTS

Defendant Camas County, by and through its attorneys of record, Moore Smith Buxton &
Turcke, Chartered, hereby submits this Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs pursuant to
Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1), (d)(5), (e)(1), and (e)(5).

DEFENDANTS CAMAS COUNTY'S MEMORANDUM
OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS-- 1

OR~AL

A.

Discretionary Costs: Idaho R. Civ. P. S4(d)(1)(D)

Item No.

Description

Amount

1.

Photocopies
Total discretionary costs:

$419.56
$419.56

B.

Attorney Fees: Idaho Code § 12-117

Item No.

Description

Amount

1.

Fees for legal services for this matter incurred and billed
between October 14,2008, and May 7, 2009. For a
detailed itemization of fees, please see Exhibit A to the
Affidavit of Paul J. Fitzer in Support of Motion for
Attorney Fees and Costs.

$14,300.00

Total attorney fees:

$16,085.05

C.

Sum of Costs as a Matter of Right, Discretionary Costs, and Attorney Fees

Section No.

Item Description

Amount

A.

Discretionary costs

$

Total costs and fees requested:

$16,504.61

Dated this

-P-

419.56

day of May, 2009.
MOORE S~vlITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD.

e County Defendants
DEFENDANTS CAMAS C01JNTY'S MEMORANDUM
OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS-- 2

***
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was this

A

day of May, 2009, served upon the following individuals and in the corresponding manner:
Christopher P. Simms
P.O. Box 3123
Ketchum, ID 83340

Via United States mail

Pau

.

DEFENDANTS CAMAS COUNTY'S MEMORANDUM
OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS-- 3

Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke, Chtd.
950 W. Bannock, Suite 520
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208)331-1800

Camas County
P.O. Box 430
Fairfield ID 83327
In Reference To: 3037-11 CV 2008-40 Martin v. Camas County

Invoice # 35760

Statement for Oct 31, 2008
Legal Services (Billed at Reduced Rate at $125 Per Hour)
Hours
10/14/08

PJF

Executive session with Board; Telephone conference
4.50
with Simms; Telephone call to court; Review complaint, TRO, begin
objection to Temporary Restraining Order, Research
case law.

10115/08

PJF

Continue TRO, Begin answer to complaint; Research case law.

5.00

10116/08

PJF

Continued Review 2008 Complaint and
Temporary Restraining Order; Prepare motion to
disqualify Judge Elgee; Continue Answer to Complaint:
Continue Response to Preliminary Injunction.

7.00

10/20/08

PJF

Review Disqualification order; Telephone conference
with Court and telephone conference with Simms.

1.00

10/20/08
Thru
10/23/08

PJF

Prepare for Court; Prepare affidavit in support of
22.00
Objection to Preliminary Injunction, Prepare brief support of
Objection to Preliminary Injunction, Telephone conference with
Ken, Camas Board in exec., Ed, Dwight, Megan, e-mails with all,
e-mail with Marshall; Telephone conference with Simms
on stipulation; Status conference with Judge, etc. Research caselaw

10/24/08

PJF

Preparation of stipulation of facts cont.; converse with
Simms, prepare argument, direct, cross, etc.
Travel to Jerome, Motion for Preliminary Injunction
before Judge Butler.

13.00

360

Camas County
In Reference To:

Page 2

3037-11 CV 2008-40 Martin v. Camas
County

For professional services rendered

Hours

Amount

52.50

$6,562.50

Additional charges:
Facsimile

$82.50

Meals/Meetings

$45.49

Photocopies

$61.20

Postage
Travel Expense
Westlaw

Total costs

$4.87
$140.40
$65.13

$399.59

Total amount of this bill

$6,962.09

Balance due

$6,962.09
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Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke, Chtd.
950 W. Bannock, Suite 520
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208)331-1800

Statement for November 30, 2008
Legal Services (Billed at Reduced Rate at $125 Per Hour)
Camas County
P.O. Box 430
Fairfield ID 83327
In Reference To: 3037-11 CV 2008-40 Martin v. Camas County

Invoice # 35992

Legal Services

11112/08

11120108

PJF

Review Order regarding Preliminary Injunction;
Strategy session with Carl and what to do next.

1.80

CJW

Review Judge Butler's decision denying Application
for Injunction; Conference P. Fitzer regarding same.

0.80
No Charge

PJF

E-mail and request for mediation from Chris Simms,
e-mail to Dwight and Board for executive session to
discuss; Telephone conference with Dwight.

0.70

Amount
For professional services rendered

3.30

312.50

Additional charges:
Photocopies

2.04

Postage

0.84
$2.88

Total costs
Total amount of this bill
Previous Balance
11114/08

Payment

thank you, Ck# 19092

Balance due

$315.38
$6,962.09
($4,187.49)
$3,089.98

Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke, Chtd.
950 W. Bannock, Suite 520
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208)331-1800
Statement for December 31, 2009
Legal Services (Billed at Reduced Rate at $125 Per Hour)
Camas County
P.O. Box 430
Fairfield ID 83327
In Reference To: 3037-11 CV 2008-40 Martin v. Camas County

Invoice # 36200

Amount
Previous balance
03/11109

Balance due

Payment - thank you, Ck#19338

$3,089.98
($3,089.98)
$0.00
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Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke, Chtd.
950 W. Bannock, Suite 520
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208)33 I -1800

Statement for January 31,2009
Legal Services (Billed at Reduced Rate at $125 Per Hour)
Camas County
P.O. Box 430
Fairfield ID 83327

In Reference To: 3037-11 CV 2008-40 Martin v. Camas Countv
36372

Invoice #

Legal Services
116/09

Hours

CJW Locate and analyze judicial authorities for inclusion in
memorandum in support of Motion for Summary Judgment.

1.30

1/9/09

CJW

Review, analyze and edit Motion for Summary Judgment.

0.80

1112/09
THRU 1/16

PJF

Research case law cited in Order; Prepare Motion for
Summary Judgment, Affidavits, executive session
with Board, telephone conference with Dwight, Ken,
etc. regarding Butler case.

20.00

]/26/09

PJF

Continue work on summary judgment motion.

4.50
Amount

For professional services rendered

26.60

$3,325.00

Additional charges:
Copies
Westlaw
Total costs
Total amount of this bill

11.05
1,591.91
$1,602.96

Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke, Chtd.
950 W. Bannock, Suite 520
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208)331-1800

Statement for February 28,2009

Legal Services (Billed at Reduced Rate at $125 Per Hour)
Camas County
P.O. Box 430
Fairfield 1D 83327
In Reference To: 3037-11 CV 2008-40 Martin v. Camas County

Invoice # 36472

Legal Services
Hours
2/2/09

PJF

Summary Judgment.

2.50

2/3/09

PJF

Affidavit for Ken Backstrom.

1.20

PJF

Summary Judgment in Butler case; Meet with Ken for
his affidavit.

5.50

Continue Summary Judgment, put exhibits together,
insert exhibit numbers, etc.

2.50

Complete affidavits, exhibits, motion, memorandum
for Summary Judgment.

5.50

2111/09 PJF

E-mail to Simms regarding hearing dates; Notice of hearing.

0.30

2117/09 PJF

E-mail.tc.s regarding resetting hearing dates.

0.30

2118/09 PJF

StipUlation to continue.

0.20

Telephone conference with Dwight, Ken.

0.60

2/4/09

PJF

211 0/09 PJF

PJF

:585

Statement for February 28, 2009

36472
Camas County Page
In Reference To:

Page 2
3037-11 CV 2008-40 Martin v. Camas
County
Hours

Amount

18.60

$2,325.00

For professional services rendered
Additional charges:
Copies

298.69

Postage

25.45

Total costs

$324.14

Total amount of this bill

$2,649.14

Previous balance

$4,927.96

Balance due

$7,577.10

Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke, Chtd.
950 W. Bannock, Suite 520
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208)331-1800
Statement for March 31,2009
Legal Services (Billed at Reduced Rate at $125 Per Hour)
Camas County
P.O. Box 430
Fairfield ID 83327
In Reference To: 3037-11 CV 2008-40 Martin v. Camas County

Invoice # 36688

Amount

03111109

Balance due

Previous balance

$7,577.1

Payment - thank you, Ck#19555

($319.63)
$7,257.47

Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke, Chtd.
950 W. Bannock, Suite 520
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208)331-1800

Statement for April 30, 2009
Legal Services (Billed at Reduced Rate at $125 Per Hour)
Camas County
P.O. Box 430
Fairfield ID 83327
In Reference To: 3037-11 CV 2008-40 Martin v. Camas Countv

Invoice # 36848

Legal Services
Hours

4/1/09

4/2/09

417109

PJF
Review & respond to Summary Judgment Simms,
affidavits, etc.

1.00

PJF
Review & respond to Summary Judgment Simms,
affidavits, etc. (continued)

1.00

LWA Proofread memorandum for Paul.

0.90

CJW

Review & edit P. Fitzer draft of brief.

0.90

4/8/09

CJW

Review & edit P. Fitzer reply memorandum.

1.20

4113109

PJF

Prepare for, travel to, and attend Summary Judgment
motion before Judge Butler; Read Simms materials:
Research case law cited; Review current case law just released.

8.00

4114/09

P JF

E-mails/tc regarding court appearance to client.

PJF

Research standing issue raised by Simms (Ameritel and others).

0.30

4/22/09

0.90
Amount

For professional services rendered

14.20

$1,775.00

388

Statement for April 30, 2009

36848
Camas County Page
In Reference To:

Page 2
3037-11 CV 2008-40 Martin v. Camas
County

Additional charges:
Amount
Copies

46.58

Facsimile

40.50

Westlaw

128.01

Total costs

$215.09

Total amount of this bill

$1,990.09

Previous balance

$7,257.47

4/]6/09 Payment - thank you, Ck#19670
Balance due

($7,257.47)
$1,990.09

Paul Fitzer, ISB No. 5675
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD.
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 520
Boise, ID 83702
Tel: 208/33111800
Fax: 208/33111202
Attorneys for Defendants Camas County, the Individual Commissioners, and Ed Smith in his
capacity as a member of the Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND F'OR CAMAS COUNTY

GEORGE MARTIN and MARTIN CUSTOM
HOMES, LLC,

)
)
)

Plaintiffs,

)

Case No. CV -2008-40

)

v.

)
)

CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, by
and through the duly elected Board of
Commissioners in their official capacity,
KEN BACKSTRO'v1, BILL DA VIS, and RON
CHAPMAN,

)
)
)
)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL J.
FITZER IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY
FEES AND COSTS

)

Defendants.

State of Idaho
County of Ada

)

)
)ss.
)

Paul J. Fitzer, first being duly sworn, states as follows:

AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL J. FITZER IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS -- 1

1.

This affiant is an attorney with the law firm Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke,

Chartered, Boise, Idaho, attorneys of record for Camas County, Idaho, which was retained for
the purpose of defending this lawsuit.
2.

I am familiar with the files generated in this case and I have knowledge of the

contents thereof, and I make this Affidavit based on my own personal knowledge.
3.

The Defendants request a total of$16,504.61 in attorney fees and costs.

4.

I have reviewed the sum identified in Section A of the Memorandum of Attorney

Fees and Costs. Defendants seek only the costs of photocopies as discretionary costs. These
discretionary costs were necessary and extraordinary costs associated with this action. The costs
of photocopying were necessary as the documents served as the factual basis for the Defendants'
motion for summary judgment. These costs are reasonable, necessary, and extraordinary.
5.

I have reviewed Section B of the Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs. The

amount of attorney fees are reasonable under the factors identified in Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(e)(3).
Attached as Exhibit A to this Affidavit is the itemized list of fees billed by this firm for this
matter from the time the Cause of Action was filed until this Court ruled on the matter on May 7,
2009. I believe it accurately reflects the work done, hours consumed, and rate charged for the
attorneys in this firm who participated in the defense of this action. I explain how the fees
requested are reasonable under Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(e)(3) below:
A.

Time and labor required: Please see Exhibit A, attached hereto.

This case

necessitated significant factual investigation and research to defend. Plaintiff alleged a plethora
AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL 1. FITZER IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS -- 2
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of legal and factual assertions which necessitated significant time to review, research, and
respond. Significant time was necessary to accurately identify and assess the facts in the
legislative action and its relationship to this matter including revIewmg audio recordings,
minutes, findings, etc. This case also required significant time researching the legal basis for
the defense of the case including numerous statutory references and legal bases. The hours and
rate reflect the time and labor required.
B.

Novelty and difficulty of the question: The central defense of the action centered

on the plaintiff's standing to prosecute the action.

However, as noted above, the question

required significant factual investigation to accurately identify the plaintiff's interests in the case
and the numerous alleged procedural and substantive infirmities in the enactment of the
challenged legislation.
C.

Skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the experience and ability

of the attorney in the particular field of the law: I have been practicing law in Idaho since 1997
and act as the county/city attorney or special counsel to numerous cities in this state. I have
significant experience in local government and land use matters, having worked for this firm and
for the City of Boise for a dozen or so years.

Additionally, I have consistently taught

courses/CLE's in municipal and land use law for the National Business Institute. the Idaho
Municipal Association, various state bar sections, and other similar seminars.

Land Use I

Municipal law is never an easy subject and generally requires a significant amount of skill and
experience. That being said, as a courtesy to some of the smaller governmental entities such as
AFFIDA VIT OF PAUL 1. FITZER IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS -- 3

Camas County, I charge a significantly reduced rate of $125 per hour as opposed to my general
hourly fee of $200 per hour.
D.

Carl J. Withroe, an associate in this firm, participated in the defense of this case.

Mr. Withroe clerked for a state district judge for two years and an Idaho Supreme Court justice
for approximately a year and a half. Since joining this firm in 2006, he has gained significant
experience representing political subdivisions of the state. He also has significant experience
researching and writing. Mr. Withroe's experience was necessary to the successful defense of
this case.
E.

Prevailing charges for like work: Since my admission to the bar of this state, I

have perforn1ed similar services to those required by this case. I am aware of the prevailing
charges for like work. I believe that an appropriate attorney fee for this work to be between
$150.00 per hour and $250.00 per hour. My services for work on this matter were $125.00 per
hour. The services for Mr. Withroe's work on this matter were also $125.00 per hour. I believe
these fees were reasonable and a courtesy to the many smaller governmental entities that do not
have the resources to defend itself from frivolous causes of actions.
F.

Whether the fee is fixed or contingent: The fee agreement in this matter is based

on an hourly rate.
G.

The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case:
This case presented no more time limitations than the usual case, although this

case

IS

different in that it was broadly drafted with challenges to the County's entire
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comprehensive planning and zoning scheme. This is atypical. The hours spent and rate reflect
this.
H.

The amount involved and the results obtained: There was no amount of money

involved; however, plaintiff sought to invalidate significant portions of Camas County's
planning and zoning legislation. The result obtained-summary judgment in the county's favor
and dismissal with prejudice of plaintiff's complaint-was the best and most cost effective result
the county could have obtained. In direct contrast is CV 07-24 where the parties were not
permitted to file summary judgment motions, affidavits, or other such time-saving measures and
were forced to proceed to trial costing both the plaintiff and defendants well over one hundred
thousand dollars each.
I.

The undesirability of the case: This case was no more undesirable than any other

defense of a political subdivision although quite extensive and far reaching. The hours and rate
retlect this.

1.

The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client: I have been

representing Camas County since 2006. I serve as special counsel on all civil matters concerning
the county.
K.

Awards in similar cases: Based on my experience, the amount sought in this

matter is consistent with awards of fees in similar cases, perhaps less, given the reduction in the
typical hourly rate.

AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL J. FITZER IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS -- 5

L.

The reasonable cost of automated legal research: Given the importance of this

action and the necessity of extensive legal research, the amount of charges for automated legal
research (Westlaw) is reasonable.

Automated research is the most efficient tool for legal

research, and the research was necessary to accurately represent the law applicable to the facts of
this casco Results from use of Westlaw was used to form the legal argument advanced by the
county in this matter.
M.

Plaintiff did not have a reasonable basis in law or fact: The myriad of legal and

factual assel1ions made by the Plaintiff, for the most part, was a rcd herring. The inescapable
conclusion throughout these entire proceedings is that the Plaintiff simply had not suffered harm
and therefore did not havc the requisite legal standing to bring this cause of action. Plaintiff had
actual notice and participated at every level of the legislative process. Hc simply disagrees with
the result.

His properties either remained the same or were even upzoned.

Neighboring

properties were treated identically. Instead, Plaintiffs legal counsel asserted that Plaintiff had
the right, cven duty, as a sort of private attorney general to challenge perceived injustices
wherever found or something of the sort. The law is firmly established in this arena. One must
have a personal stake in the outcome, a peculiarized harm , not suffered by everyone in the
county in order to challenge the legislative activity of a governmental entity. This action was not
pursuant to the approval or denial of Plaintiffs land use application, but rather county-wide
legislative activity. The tax payers of the county were forced to pay for and defend a frivolous
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law suit without a reasonable basis in law or fact. This is an improper use of the judicial system
designed to protect individuals from peculiarized harm.

***
Further your affiant sayeth naught.
Dated this

_~{C+! day of May, 2009.
TON & TURCKE, CHARTERED

AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL J. FITZER IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS -- 7

STA TE OF IDAHO

)
ss.

County of Ada

On this

)

--:....171---

day of May, 2009, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in

and for the State, personally appeared Paul 1. Fitzer, known to be the person whose name is
subscribed to the foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal on the date last above
written .

Residing at ~t;;.u.~~~~~r:::~~
My Commission Expires:

--13

***

AFFIDA VIT OF PAUL 1. FITZER IN SUPPORT OF
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was this

fI

day of May, 2009, served upon the following individuals and in the corresponding manner:
Christopher P. Simms
P.O. Box 3123
Ketchum, TD 83340

Via United States mail

AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL J. FITZER IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS -- 9

Paul Fitzer, ISB No. 5675
MOORE SM1TH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD.
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 520
Boise, ID 83702
Tel: 208/33111800
Fax: 208/33111202

Attorneys for Defendants Camas County, the Individual Commissioners, and Ed Smith in his
capacity as a member of the Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY

GEORGE MARTIN and MARTIN CCSTOM
HOMES, LLC,
PlaintifTs,

)
)
)
)
)

v.

)

CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, by
and through the duly elected Board of
Commissioners in their official capacity,
KEN BACKSTROM, BILL DA VIS, and RON
CHAPMAN,

)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

Case No. CV -2008-40
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS'
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES
AND COSTS

)
)

COME NOW, Camas County, Idaho (the County), by and through its duly elected Board
of County Commissioners (the Board), Ken Backstrom, Bill Davis, and Ron Chapman (the
Individual Commissioners), (collectively, County Defendants), by and through their attorneys of

DEFENDANTS'

~10TION

FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS -- 1
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ORIGINAL

record, Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke, Chartered, hereby respond to Plaintiffs' Objections to
Defendants' Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs.
In response to the County' s assertion that Plaintiff had no reasonable basis in law or fact
to challenge the County's legislative activity in the absence of standing, Plaintiff asserts that it
had a reasonable basis in law or fact to rely upon Fifth Judicial District Judge Elgee's finding
that Plaintiff had standing to challenge the Defendant's "identical ordinances" in case no. 07-24.
Plaintiffs assertions arc incorrect for the following reasons:

1.

Judge Elgee has not, as of this date, issued a final order in case no. 07-24.

Thus,

there is no order for Plaintiff to reasonably rely upon meeting its burden to proceed
with a reasonable basis in law or fact. On May 26, 2009, the Court heard Plaintiffs
Motion to re-issue his final order in case no. 07-24. Pursuant to the United States
District Court and Judge Elgee's own statements on the record, Judge Elgee's
December 3, 2008 Final Order was invalid as the state court was divested of
jurisdiction over the case, which had been properly removed to the United States
District Court per the Honorable Candy Dale.

Moreover, at the time Plaintiff

brought this cause of action, Judge Eigee had not issued even its invalid order.

2.

The ordinances are not in fact "identical", nor is the actual text of the ordinances
even relevant. The issue presented to thi s Court is whether Plaintiff had sufficient

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS -- 2

standing, 1.e. peculiarized harm, entitling him to due process.

The dates of the

hearings, the conduct of hearings, Plaintiff's presence at the hearings, and most
importantly, Plaintiff's alleged injury sustained entitling him to due process was
distinct from earlier legislative activity.

This court's final order pertained to

Plaintiff's lack of standing; that Plaintiff had not suffered peculiarized harm by virtue
of the 2008 legislation. Notably, this Court noted that none of Plaintiff's properties
had been downzoned.
Most pertinent to this discussion is the Court's finding per the parties stipulated
facts that the one acre lot in the Homestead Subdivision resulted in no change. Per
the Court ' s order and stipulation of the parties:
Property: One, one acre lot within the existing, approved, and platted Homestead
Subdivision.
a. Prior to the 2007 amendments, the properties were zoned Agricultural
Transitional (AT) allowing one unit per acre:
b. Prior to the 2008 amendments, the prope11y was (A5), allowing one unit per five
acres.
c. After the 2008 amendments, the prope11y was zoned Residential (R 1) allowing
one unit per acre.

Thus, from 2006 to 2007 the property was rezoned from AT to A5 , and from 2007
to 2008 from A5 to Rl. Judge Elgee, who never conducted an extensive analysis of
Plaintiffs peculiarized harm nonetheless referenced this property in his invalid order,
but did not include the 2008 amendments; despite their enaction eight months prior to
his December 3, 2008 invalid order. Thus, to Judge Elgee, the property was rezoned

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS -- 3
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from AT to A5; one unit per acre to one unit per five acres. Now, Judge Elgee is
mistaken, and on appeal , this author will argue lack of harm, mootness, judicial
estoppel, and other legal defenses to Judge Elgee's finding. For the purposes of this
motion however, Plaintiff is judicially estopped from relying upon Judge Elgee's
finding of a downzone as Plaintiff stipulated that for purposes of the 2008 legislation
the property was rezoned to an R-l designation. Thus technicall y, this property was
rezoned from an AT to an A-5 in 2007 per Judge Elgee; a downzone, and an A-5 to
an R-l in 2008 per the stipulation of the parties and this Court; an upzone. This is a
materially distinct fact. Thus, Plaintiff has no reasonable basis in law or fact to rely
upon the earlier invalid and incorrect finding per Plaintiff's own stipulation of facts,
different procedural status, materially different substantive status, and lack of a valid
decision.

1____
_

Dated this ___

day

/t:w09
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD_

efendants

***
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was this

-1--

day of June, 2009, served upon the following individuals and in the corresponding manner:
Christopher P. Simms
P.O. Box 3123
Ketchum, ID 83340

Via United States mail
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CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS
Attorney at Law
US Bank Bldg., Ste 209
191 Sun Valley Road
P.O. Box 3123
Ketchum, ID 83340
Tel : 208622 7878
Fax: 208 622 7921
ISB# 7473

~~

c:~

Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS
GEORGE MARTIN,
Plaintiff,
and
MARTIN CUSTOM
HOMES, L.L.c.,
Plaintiff,
v.
ED SMITH,
Defendant,
and

CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO,
By and through the duly elected
Board of Commissioners in
their official and capacity

KEN BACKTROM,
BILL DAVIS, and
RON CHAPMAN,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV -07 -24

ORDER REISSUING FINDINGS
OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND ORDER FOLLOWING TRIAL

ORDER REISSUING FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
ORDER FOLLOWING TRIAL

THE COURT, being fully apprised of the circumstances, having reviewed
Plaintiffs' Motion for Order Re-issuing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order
Following Trial, Defendants' Response thereto, and argument of counsel finds and orders
as follows,
1.

This Court was divested of jurisdiction over this matter on November 5,
2008, by the Defendants' filing of Notice of Removal to Idaho Federal
District Court.

2.

This Court was re-vested of jurisdiction over this matter on March 17,
2009 when the Idaho Federal District Court issued its Order granting
Plaintiff s Motion to Remand.

3.

This Court's December 3, 2008 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order Following Trial, issued during a period of interruption of this
Court's jurisdiction, is hereby, this day reissued, is attached hereto and
made a part hereof.

IT IS SO ORDERED

ROBERT~' ~T
DATED this )

7

dayof

JUDGE

~~'2009.

ORDER REISSUING FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
ORDER FOLLO\VING TRIAL

2

L/DS

CLERK ' S CERTIFICATE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

a 9 day of

'-tV)

CUZf

2009, I served

a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER REISSUING FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LA W, AND ORDER FOLLOWING TRIAL by delivering same, to
Phillip J. Collaer, Attorney for Defendant Ed Smith, 250 South Fifth Street, Ste. 700,
P.O. Box 7426, Boise Idaho 83707-7426, Paul Fitzer, Attorney for Camas County
Defendants 950 W. Bannock St., Stc 520, Boise, Idaho 83702, and Christopher Simms,
Attorney for Plaintiffs, P.O. Box 1861, Hailey, Idaho 83333.

----b~D,hJolk
Deputy Clerk

ORDER REISSUING FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
ORDER FOLLOWING TRIAL

M.

3
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CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS
Attorney at Law
US Bank Bldg., Ste 209
191 Sun Valley Road
P.O. Box 3123
Ketchum, ID 83340
Tel: 208 622 7878
Fax: 208 622 7129
ISB# 7473

FILED

ORIGINAL
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Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS

GEORGE MARTIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
MARTIN CUSTOM
HOMES, L.L.c.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

)
)
)
)

Case No. CV -2008-40

)
)
)
)
)
)

NOTICE OF APPEAL

v.

)
)

CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO,
By and through the duly elected
Board of Commissioners in
their official capacities,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

KEN BAXTROM,
BILL DAVIS , and
RON CHAPMAN,

)

Defendants-Respondents,

)

______________________J

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANTS, CAMAS COlJNTY, IDAHO, BY
AND THROUGH THE DULY ELECTED BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, IN THEIR

NOTICE OF APPEAL
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OFFICIAL CAPACITIES, KEN BAXTROM, BILL DAVIS AND RON CHAPMAN
AND THEIR ATTORNEY OF RECORD, PAUL 1. FITZER, 950 W. BANNOCK
STREET, STE. 520, BOISE, IDAHO, 83702, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVEENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HERBY GIVEN THAT:

1. The above named appellants, George Martin and Martin Custom Homes, LLC,
appeal against the above-named respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final
judgment entitled Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment entered in the above-entitled action on the 7

tll

day of May, 2009,

Honorable Judge John K. Butler presiding.
2. The Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the
judgment and order described in paragraph one (1) above is an appealable judgment and
order under and pursuant to Rule II (a)( 1), I.A.R.
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which appellants intends to assert
in the appeal is as follows:
(a)

Whether the District Court erred in holding that Plaintiffs lacked
standing to challenge, through a declaratory judgment action,
defendants adoption of an amended zoning ordinance that rezoned
property owned by Plaintiffs, rezoned property in which Plaintiffs held
a financial interest, and rezoned property adjacent to property ovmed
by Plaintiffs and in which Plaintiffs held a financial interest.

(b)

Whether the District Court erred in refusing to take judicial notice of
the Court ' s file in CV-07-24 and ruling that the Court ' s finding

NOTICE OF APPEAL

2

40«\

therein, that Plaintiffs had standing to challenge a substantially
identical amended zoning ordinance, did not have a collateral estoppel
effect on the issue of standing.
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

S. A reporter's transcript is requested. The appellants requests the preparation of the
following portions of the reporter's transcript: the reporter's compressed transcript
pursuant to Rule 26, I.A.R., supplemented by the following:

6.

(a)

October 24,2008 Preliminary Injunction hearing

(b)

April 13,2009 Motion for Summary Judgment hearing

Appellants request those doeuments which are automatically included under Rule

28, LA.R., be included in the clerk's record.

Appellants also requests the following

documents be ineluded in the clerk's record:
(a)

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment filed 2.13.09

(b)

Memorandum in support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

filed 2.13.09
(c)

Plaintitfs' Statement of Material Fact & Submittal of Affidavits and

Document in in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment filed 4.1.09
(d)

Affidavit of Bob Rodman in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment

filed 4.1.09
(e)

Affidavit of George Martin

In

Opposition to 1,\/10tion for Summary

Judgment filed 4.1.09

(0

Plaintiffs' Memorandum Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary

Judgment filed 4.1.09

NOTICE OF APPEAL
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(g)

Defendants' Reply Memorandum

10

Support of Motion for Summary

Judgment filed on 4.8.09.
(h)

Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Defendants' Motion for Summary

Judgment issued May 7,2009.
Pursuant to 1.A.R. 31 , Appellants request that all tapes, exhibits, including charts,
graphs, maps or other documents, offered and admitted as evidence during the
proceedings, whether at hearing or trial , be included as exhibits to the record .
7. I certify that:
(a) A copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter whom a
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below:
Court Reporter, Fifth Judicial District, Jerome County
Candice Childres
233 W . Main
Jerome, Idaho

(b)

The Clerk of the District Court has been paid , contemporaneously with the
filing hereof, the estimated fees for preparation of the designated reporters
transcript as required by rule 24.

(c)

The Clerk of the District Court has been paid, contemporaneousl y with the
filing hereof, the estimated fees for preparation of the clerk's record and all
appellate fees.

(d)

Service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to
Rule 20, I.A.R.

NOTICE OF APPEAL
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CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS
A TTORc'JEY FOR PLA TTIFFS-APPELLANTS

~. t"6:Qy
Cliristopher P. Simms

Dated

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
j
/ ""-__ day o f . /
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the ___

v,i///$

~

2009,

a copy of PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF APPEAL was served upon counsel via facsimile
and addressed to Paul Fitzer, Attorney for Camas County Defendants 950 W. Bannock
St., Stc 520, Boise, Idaho 83702, facsimile number 20833 I 1202.

~ //Y

=-V-~I--

......

Christopher P. Simms
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Paul Fitzer, ISB No. 5675
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD.
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 520
Boise, ID 83702
Tel: 208/33111800
Fax : 208/33111202

Attorneys for Defendants Camas County, the Individual Commissioners, and Ed Smith in his
capacity as a member of the Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY

G EORGE MARTIN and MARTIN CUSTOM
HOM ES, LLC ,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.

)
)
)
)
)
)

C AMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, by
and through the duly elected Board of
Commissioners in their official capacity,
K EN BACKSTROM, BILL DAVIS, and RON
CHAPMAN,
Defendants-Respondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV -08-40
DEFENDANTS CAMAS COUNTY,
THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF
THE CAMAS COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, AND ED
SMITH ' S REQUEST TO SUPPLEMENT
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL

I.A.R. 19

---------------------------)
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that the Respondent (Cross-Respondent) in the above
entitled proceeding hereby requests pursuant to Rule J 9, I.A.R., the inclusion of the following
material in the reporter's transcript or the clerk's record in addition to that required to be included
by the I.A.R. and the notice of appeal:
DEFENDANTS CAMAS COUNTY AND THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE CAMAS
COlJNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS' REQUEST TO SUPPLEMENT
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL -- 1

ORIGINAL

1.

Plaintiffs-Appelllants, George Martin and Martin Custom Homes, LLC, by

counsel filed a Notice of Appeal herein on or about June 15,2009.
2.

Idaho Appellate Rule 19 provides for a Respondent to request additional materials

to supplement Clerk 's Record identified by Appellant, and does therefore request the
following documents:
a.

Plaintiffs Verified Application for Temporary Restraining Order, filed

10115 /2008;

b.

Statement

In

Support of Proposed Temporary Restraining Order, filed

1011512008 ;

c.

County Defendants' Objection to Plaintiffs' Application for Temporary

Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, filed 10/20/2008 ;
d.

Affidavit of Dwight Butlin in Support of County Defendants' Objection to

Plaintiffs' Application for Temporary Restraining Order; filed 10/20/2008;
e.

Stipulation as to Facts and Admission of Documentary Evidence, filed on

October 28, 2008 ;

f.

Affidavit of Dwight Butlin

In

Support of Defendants ' Motion for

Summary Judgment, fi led 0211 3/09;
g.

Affidavit of Ken Backstrom

In

Support of Defendants ' Motion for

Summary Judgment, fi led 02113 /09 ;
h.

Defendants ' Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs, filed 05 /20109;

DEfENDANTS CAMAS COUNTY AND THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE CAMAS
COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS' REQUEST TO SUPPLEMENT
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL -- 2

Y,3

1.

Defendants' Memorandum of in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees and

Costs, filed 05/20109;
J.

Affidavit of Paul J. Fitzer in Support of Defendants' Motion for Attorney

Fees and Costs, filed 05/20109;
k.

Hearing to be held on July 13, 2009 on Defendants' Motion for Attorney

Fees and Costs;
I.

Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Motion for

Attorney Fees and Costs.
3.

I certify that a copy of this request was served upon the clerk of the district court

and upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20 Idaho Code.
ZiJ

Dated this _ _1_ _ day of June, 2009.
MOOR E SMITH BUXTON & T URCKE, CHTD .

. . _ _ + h " - t - - - - - -/

DEFENDANTS CAMAS COUNTY AND THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE CAMAS
COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS' REQUEST TO SUPPLEMENT
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL -- 3
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***
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Request to Supplement
Clerk's Record on Appeal was this

#

day of June, 2009 served upon the following

individuals and in the corresponding manner:
Clerk of the Court
Fifth Judicial District
County of Camas
P.O. Box 430
Fairfield, Idaho 83327
Via United States mail
Court Reporter
Fifth Judicial District
County of Jerome
233 West Main
Jerome, Idaho 83338
Via United States mail
Christopher P. Simms
P.O. Box 186]
Hailey, ID 83333
Via United Slates mail

DEFENDANTS CAMAS COUNTY AND THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE CAMAS
COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS' REQUEST TO SUPPLEMENT
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY
GEORGE MARTIN and MARTIN CUSTOM
HOMES,LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellants,

V.

)
)
)

SUPREME COURT NO.

)
)

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS
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)
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, by
And through the duly elected Board of
Commissioners in their official capacity,
KEN BACKSTROM, BILL DA VIS, and RON
CHAPMAN,

)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants-Respondents,

)

I, KORRI BLODGETT, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the
State ofIdaho in and for the county of Camas, do hereby certifY:
That the attached list of exhibits is a true and accurate copy ofthe exhibits being forwarded to the
Supreme Court on Appea\. However the following exhibits will be retained at the district Court Clerk's
Office and will be made available upon request:
1. Plaintiff's exhibit #A-Published Notice of P & Z Commission Hearing on Zoning Ordinance &
CompPlan
2. Plaintiff's exhibit #B-Published Notice of Board of County Commissioners Hearing on Zoning
Ordinance & Comprehensive Plan.
3. Plaintiff's exhibit #C-Finding of Facts & Conclusions of Law by Camas County Planning &
Zoning Commission regarding Camas County Zoning Map.
4. Plaintiff's exhibit #D-Findings of Camas County Planning & Zoning Commission Re: Zoning
Ordinance.
5. Plaintiff's exhibit #E-Findings of Camas County P&Z Commission Re: Comphrehensive Plan.
6. Plaintiff's exhibit # F-Findings of Camas County P&Z Commission Re: Comprehensive Plan.
7. Plaintiff's exhibit #G-Publication on May 14th , of adoption on May 12,2008 Zoning
Ordinance # 157 &Zoning Map Ordinance # 158
8. Plaintiff's exhibit #H-Decision on Requirements of a "Transcribable Verbatim Record"
9. Plaintiffs exhibit I-Order Following Contempt Hearing & Order Expanding Preliminary
Injunction.
1O. Plaintiff's exhibit #J-Decision on Conflict of Interests Issue for Purposes of a Preliminary
Injunction.
11. Plaintiff's exhibit #K- Minutes ofP&Z Additional Meeting dated April 21, 2008.
12. Plaintiff's exhibit #L-Minutes of May 12,2008 Camas County Commissioners Meeting.
13. Plaintiff's exhibit #M-Motion to dismiss.
14. Defendant's exhibit #I-April w, 2008 legal Notice of Public Hearings for Camas County
Zoning Ordinance & Comprehensive Plan &Comprehensive Plan Map & Zoning Map.
IS. Defendant's exhibit #2 April 9, 2008 legal notice of Public Hearings.
16. Defendant's exhibit #3-ApriI16, 2008 Legal notice of Public Hearing.
17. Defendant's exhibit #4-Finding of Facts & Conclusions of Law of Camas County P&Z
Commission Re camas County Zoning Map.
18. Defendant's exhibit #6- Findings of Camas County P&Z Commission Re: Comphrehensive
Plan

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS
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19. Defendant's exhibit #7- -Findings of Camas County P&Z Commission Re: Comprehensive
Plan Map.
20. Defendant's exhibit #8-Camas County P &Z recommendation Form dated 4/22/08.
21. Defendant's exhibit #9- April 23, 2008 legal Notice of Public Hearings for Camas County
Zoning Ordinance & Comprehensive Plan &Comprehensive Plan Map & Zoning Map.
22. Defendant's exhibit #10-April 30, 2008 legal Notice of Public Hearings for Camas County
Zoning Ordinance & Comprehensive Plan &Comprehensive Plan Map & Zoning Map.
23. Defendant's exhibit #1 I-May 7, 2008 legal Notice of Public Hearings for Camas County
Zoning Ordinance & Comprehensive Plan &Comprehensive Plan Map & Zoning Map.
24. Defendant's exhibit #12-Agenda for May 12, 2008 Board of County Commissioners
meeting.
25. Defendant's exhibit #13- Agenda for May 19, 2008 Board of County Commissioners
meeting.
26. Defendant's exhibit #14-Minutes of the May 12,2008 Camas County Commissioners
Meeting.
27. Defendant's exhibit #15-Minutes of the May 19,2008 Camas County Commissioners
meeting.
28. Defendant's exhibit #16--Publication on May 14th, of adoption on May 12,2008 Zoning
Ordinance # 157 &Zoning Map Ordinance # 158.
29. Defendant's exhibit #17-Camas County Board of Commissioners Findings of Fact and
Conclusion of Law Re: 2008 Zoning Map.

I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following document will be submitted as an exhibit to the Record:
I.

2.

Affidavit of Dwight Butlin in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
Affidavit of Ken Backstom in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court the
of August, 2009.

day

F.R. Bennett
Clerk of the District Court
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IN THE DISTRICT COUT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS

GEORGE MARTIN and MARTIN CUSTOM
HOMES, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellants,
V.

)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court No.36605-2009

) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, by
And through the duly elected Board of
Commissioners in their official capacity,
KEN BACKSTROM, BILL DAVIS, and RON
CHAPMAN,

)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants-Respondents,

)

Korri Blodgett, Deputy Clerk of the Dist ct Court of
the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho l in and
for the County of Camas, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by United States mail, postage
prepaid, one copy of the Clerk's Record and any Reporterls
Transcript to each of the parties or their Attorney of
Record as
lows:
II

Christopher P. Simms
P.O. Box 1861
Hailey, ID 83333

Paul Fitzer
950 W.Bannock St, Suite 520
Boise ID 83702
l

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed
the seal of the said Court this
day of August, 2009.

F.R.Bennett

Clerk of the District Court

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY
GEORGE MARTIN and MARTIN CUSTOM
HOMES,LLC,
Plaintiff-A ppe Ilants,
V.

)
)
)

)
)
)

CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, by
And through the duly elected Board of
Commissioners in their official capacity,
KEN BACKSTROM, BILL DAVIS, and RON
CHAPMAN,

)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants-Respondents,

)

SUPREME COURT NO.

,3<Olo05- 200<t

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

I, Korri Blodgett, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Camas, do hereby certify that the
above and foregoing Record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and
bound under my direction and is a true, full and correct Record of, the pleadings
and documents under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
I do further certify that all documents and exhibits offered or admitted in the
above-entitled cause will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the supreme court
along with the Court Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record as required by Rule
31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
said Court at Fairfield Idaho, this ~ day of August, 2009.
F.R. Bennett
Clerk of the District Court

~oAA>. 22\ ~\)hf1)

By
Korri Blodgett
Deputy Clerk

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

